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ABSTRACT
This dissertation comprises two essays that study the link between corporate exposure to interna-
tional markets, liquidity management and hedging through debt in foreign currency.
Chapter 1: Currency Exposure and Liquidity Management.
Exchange rate movements present many risks for globalized companies, such as unexpected
liquidity shortfalls that reduce their ability to undertake profitable investments. How does currency
risk affect the liquidity policy of highly globalized firms? In this chapter, I present and test the
hypothesis that globalized firms with high currency exposure hold more cash relative to credit lines
as a precaution to these adversities. I show that high currency risk increases the cost of credit lines
for U.S. firms, and strengthens the relative use of cash as the main liquidity provider. This result
is robust to several measurements of currency exposure. Moreover, in times of high volatility on
currency markets, reliance on cash increases for highly-exposed firms, but not for less-exposed ones.
These results link the literatures of liquidity management and corporate policy under currency risk.
Chapter 2: Cash Retentions from Debt in Foreign Currency: A Hedging Instrument.
Companies that issue debt in foreign currency (DFC) and convert the proceedings back to their
original currency create a hedging instrument that offsets volatility on foreign income. In this chap-
ter, I evaluate if American multinationals and exporters use this hedging mechanism by holding
more cash from their DFC issuances as compared to their U.S. dollar-denominated debt issuances.
I find evidence that multinationals and exporters indeed use this mechanism. I show that for every
monetary unit raised in foreign currency debt, these companies retain 3.49x more cash than they
do for regular U.S. dollar debt issuances. Exploiting firms’ heterogeneity to investigate potential
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characteristics that intensify this channel, I find that cash retention is more pronounced for compa-
nies that have no alternative hedging instruments (e.g. derivatives or lines of credit), and for debt
issuances on floating currencies, as opposed to currencies from countries with managed exchange
rate regimes.
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Chapter 1
CURRENCY EXPOSURE AND LIQUIDITY
MANAGEMENT
1.1 Introduction
American companies have increased their share of foreign sales from less than 10% of total sales in
the 1980s to almost 50% in 2012.1 The globalization phenomenon directly exposed these firms to the
movements of foreign currencies and promoted exchange risk management in the corporate agenda.
Much of the work in the literature on corporate management of currency risk has focused on the
hedging properties of sophisticated financial instruments such as derivatives and debt in foreign
currency. However, cash and lines of credit can also be interpreted as providers of insurance or
hedge against liquidity shortfalls. This means that they are also potential instruments of corporate
policy to offset the effects of currency risk. In this study, I empirically test the hypothesis on
whether firms make their cash or credit lines choices conditional on their exposure to currency risk.
Specifically, I document that highly-globalized firms exposed to currency risk rely more on cash
holdings over lines of credit, and that they pay higher spreads on their lines of credit.
Exchange rate movements create risks to firms on many ways. For example, it affects: (i) the
market value of the firm through economic prospects based on expected cash flow, discount rate,
and investment needs (Economic Risk); (ii) the risk that a U.S. firm with physical presence in a
foreign market incurs when converting book values of its subsidiary to U.S. dollars (Translation
Risk); and (iii) the risk that an exporting company is exposed to between the dates of trade
1Data from the universe of Compustat firms.
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initiation and the settlement of the deal (Transaction Risk). Directly or indirectly, all of these
exchange risk channels can lead to liquidity shortfalls.
Because exposure to currency risk is directly related to a firm’s degree of globalization, it is a
natural choice to focus the analysis of liquidity shortfalls on firms with sales to foreign markets.
To fix ideas, consider the example of a U.S. firm that exports to Germany. A depreciation of the
U.S. dollar with respect to the Euro raises the firm’s revenue from abroad: not only the home
value per item sold abroad increases, but also its products become more competitive in foreign
markets. This movement can generate two effects on liquidity. On the supply side of liquidity,
more favorable cash flows entail a larger provision of liquidity to the firm. On the demand side,
a higher relative advantage on the German market might create new investment opportunities,
increasing the firm’s demand for liquidity. The magnitude of these two effects at the firm-level
gives rise to heterogeneity within U.S. exporting firms: on firms for which the supply effect is
higher than that on demand, depreciation is linked to liquidity surpluses. Conversely, on firms for
which demand effect dominates, U.S. dollar depreciation is linked to liquidity shortfalls. Therefore,
depending on the net effect between higher cash flows and investment needs, one should find
liquidity needs of U.S. firms to be negatively correlated, uncorrelated, or even positively correlated
with the USD/Euro exchange rate. Obviously, an appreciation of the U.S. dollar produces the
opposite effects described above and also implies the heterogeneity of liquidity needs within the
distribution of U.S. firms.
If financial markets were frictionless, even in the event of currency-driven liquidity shortfalls, the
net demand for liquidity would be met because positive NPV projects would be easily financed.
Under frictions though, the ability to raise external financing is limited. Following Holmstrom and
Tirole (1998) and Tirole (2006), the pleadgeable income on a firm’s investment opportunities may
be lower than the required external financing. Even considering the ability to raise external funds,
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the correlation of an exporting firm’s net liquidity provisions and the exchange rate is an important
indicator to firms, as it can lead to states where positive NPV projects are forgone. Therefore,
companies have incentives to carry liquidity from good states (surpluses) to bad states (shortfalls)
for securing funds needed to undertake investment opportunities.
According to a large literature on liquidity management, cash holdings and lines of credit are
good instruments to carry liquidity.2 Cash holdings are often referred as the “king” of liquidity
instruments, not only because they are the most common, but also for being the most traditional.
Additionally, lines of credit are desirable as a liquidity instrument because they create a commit-
ment on the availability of resources before a liquidity shock happens.3 I claim that if exchange
rate movements are likely to cause a liquidity shortfall, then one should expect a firm to shape
its liquidity policy according to its exposure to currency movements. The use of cash holdings
or credit lines to carry liquidity is a policy that creates value for exposed firms, because foregone
profitable projects would have increased the value of the firm.
Standard models such as Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Tirole (2006) indicate that the need
for liquidity increases with the likelihood of a firm’s liquidity shortfall. In other words, the riskier the
firm is, the more cash it should hold. In a seminal paper, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson
(1999) empirically showed that cash holdings are indeed related to investment opportunities and
to the riskiness of cash flow. Following the same logic, because currency risk is a component of the
total riskiness of a firm, more exposure to it should increase the firm’s precautionary demand for
cash.
Besides cash holdings, the literature has also established a link between exposure to risk and the
use of lines of credit. In Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2013) the underlying risk is the aggregate
2See Almeida, Campello, Cunha, and Weisbach (2014) for a thorough survey on liquidity management.
3Berkovitch and Greenbaum (1991) provide a framework where loan commitments can mitigate underinvestment
problems arising from variations in required investments.
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economic risk. They provide a theoretical model where banks cannot provide enough liquidity to
all firms in case of a negative, economy-wide shock. As the aggregate risk is unhedgeable, banks
are also constrained in bad times. The limited supply of funds in negative states of the world
decreases the availability of lines of credit and increases their spreads to firms highly exposed to
aggregate risk. The authors empirically show that firms exposed to the systematic risk rely less
on lines of credit and more on cash. I use Acharya, Almeida, and Campello’s (2013) approach to
establish how the use of liquidity instruments is connected with a firm’s exposure to a risk factor,
currency risk. However, I deviate from their model, because banks may be able to hedge currency
risk. Instead, I follow Sufi’s (2009) idea that the availability of lines of credit is dependent on the
firm’s likelihood to face a liquidity shortfall. The more likely a firm’s shortfall, the less credit lines
a bank will offer to it. Therefore, higher exposure to currency risk should increase the likelihood of
breaking covenants, reducing the availability of lines of credit to firms, and increasing their spreads.
Acharya, Almeida, Ippolito, and Perez (2014) provide a theoretical model based on moral hazard
where firms that present higher liquidity risk are highly monitored by banks, increasing the costs
of lines of credit, and making them switch to cash holdings.
In my study, I present a specific type of risk and refine the general findings of Opler, Pinkowitz,
Stulz, and Williamson (1999) by analyzing a cleanly defined channel through which currency risk
affects firms’ liquidity policy. Moreover, I study a type of risk that is independent of Acharya,
Almeida, and Campello’s (2013) aggregate risk, and which is highly important for globalized firms.
I focus on whether the exposure to currency risk can be viewed as factor that: (i) increases the
precautionary reasons to hold cash; and (ii) increases the spreads on lines of credit. The first should
be related to exposed firms having higher cash holdings, while the second should be associated with
increases in default risk or of breaking covenants in lines of credit, raising their costs and making
them less available. My main hypothesis is that a company’s exposure to currency risk should be
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positively related to the use of cash holdings and negatively related to the availability of lines of
credit.
The results suggest that firms shape their liquidity policy to accommodate liquidity needs that
may arise from shocks on the exchange rate of foreign markets to where they sell. Specifically, if
they are more exposed to currency risk, they have less lines of credit as compared to cash holdings.
The main findings of this study can be summarized by Figure 1.1. It plots the average ratio of
lines of credit over total liquidity, LC-to-Cash, by exposure to currency risk (measured by the
variable Beta FX for different levels of globalization). The use of lines of credit over cash for highly
globalized firms is negatively related to currency exposure. Highly globalized firms in the extreme of
the distribution of exposure to currency risk present less lines of credit over cash holdings compared
to firms on the center of the distribution. On the other hand, the liquidity policy of less globalized
companies and domestic ones does not show much sensitivity to currency exposure.
Particularly, under a linearization of the analysis presented on Figure 1.1 a one-standard devi-
ation increase in currency exposure is related to a decrease of 8.44 p.p. in LC-to-Cash for firms
whose currency exposure are better measured. When compared to the average LC-to-Cash for this
subsample, 42.8%, the currency exposure mechanism can account for a decrease of more than (8.44
/ 42.8 =) 19.7% in the relative use of lines of credit over cash. When compared to the standard
deviation of LC-to-Cash for this subsample (0.403), the currency exposure mechanism is able to
explain (8.44 / 40.3 =) 20.9% of the variation in LC-to-Cash.
Figure 1.1 shows the relation between exposure to currency risk and the relative availability of
lines of credit over cash net of confounding factors, such as the exposure to aggregate risk and
profitability. Therefore, it is interesting to highlight that the currency exposure relation to the use
of liquidity instruments is independent not only to the aggregate risk studied in Acharya, Almeida,
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and Campello (2013), but also to a firm’s profitability.4 Less profitable firms are more likely to
break covenants on lines of credit, reducing the availability of this instrument to firms. Figure 1.2
shows that the sensitivity of the availability of having at least one line of credit to exposure to
currency risk is also independent of the level of profitability showed by Sufi (2009).
Moreover, I also investigate the relation between exposure to currency risk and cash holdings vs.
lines of credit as separate liquidity instruments. The results on cross sectional analysis suggest
that exposure to currency risk is associated to less lines of credit as a proportion of total assets.
Figure 1.3 summarizes this point by showing that the sensitivity of lines of credit is higher at
the top levels of globalization. However, the results on the analysis of cash holdings as separate
instrument do not confirm that all firms exposed to currency risk have more cash holdings. Figure
1.4 shows that only positively currency-exposed firms are related to higher cash holdings at the top
level of globalization. On the other hand, time series analysis shows that higher expected currency
volatility increases cash holdings for exposed firms but not for other firms. It indicates that when
currency markets are volatile, i.e. exchange rates become even less predictable, the ability of firms
to secure liquidity in all states is reduced, prompting them to accumulate cash.
In order to investigate the mechanism behind the lower availability of lines of credit for exposed
firms, I also analyze the relation between currency exposure and their cost. If currency risk increases
the chance of default or of breaking covenants, then it should present negative correlation with the
cost of lines of credit. The empirical results provide evidence that this is the case: a one-standard
deviation increase in currency exposure is related to an increase on the spread paid to banks by
14.4 basis points. This value compares to the sample average spread of 170.1 basis points, which
shows some economic significance. The time series analysis also shows that when currency markets
are volatile, the initiation of lines of credit diminishes and their spreads increase. All together, the
4Sufi (2009) shows that the level of profitability is a critical factor explaining if a firm has a line of credit available.
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results suggest that a mix of precautionary and higher cost of credit lines drives the accumulation
of cash.5
Related Literature This study is related to several strands of the literature. Bates, Kahle, and
Stulz (2009) investigate why cash holding of U.S. firms have increased in the recent years. Their
main finding is that the volatility of cash flow raised and due to precautionary motives, cash became
more desirable. Despite the progress of the literature, in a recent survey on liquidity management,
Almeida, Campello, Cunha, and Weisbach (2014) highlights that “it remains a puzzle why the level
of cash held by most firms has varied so much, and in particular, why cash holdings have increased
so dramatically in recent years.” The currency exposure channel not only provides a contribution
to the corporate liquidity management through a new mechanism, but also helps explain in some
extent the recent increase in cash holdings. During the 2008 financial crisis, currency volatility has
increased by almost 50% compared to the average of the previous decade. Following my time series
results on the effect of currency volatility on cash, this increase is predicted to have contributed to
an increment of 17% in cash holdings of highly exposed firms.
The results presented here are especially related to the broad literature on liquidity policy, which
brings an extensive list of instruments available to the firm.6 Besides cash holdings and lines of
credit, firms can rely on debt capacity, and even on derivatives to carry liquidity between states of
the economy. However, standard debt may not be considered a reliable option for all firms trying
to secure liquidity for investments. According to Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007), if a
negative liquidity shock is coupled with low pledgeable income, the firm will not be able to raise
standard debt to keep investments. On the other hand, derivatives can be viewed as substitutes
5Due to data limitations, it is not possible to analyze the direct effect of currency exposure on the chances of
breaking up covenants or defaulting on credit lines. However, from the significant relationship between currency
exposure and higher spreads on credit lines, it is plausible to infer that that higher costs steam from higher likelihood
of nonconformity.
6See Almeida, Campello, Cunha, and Weisbach (2014) for a thorough survey on liquidity policy.
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to cash holdings because they are also able to transfer liquidity to states where it is needed.
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) have laid the theoretical background for the role of hedging
as an instrument to mitigate underinvestment problems.7 In the case where the source of risk is
traded, such as foreign currencies, derivatives can be employed to increase debt capacity (Disatnik,
Duchin, and Schmidt, 2014). Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011) also shows that the use of foreign
currency derivatives have real corporate outcomes by reducing the spread on loans and by loosening
the covenants on investments.
While the use of foreign currency derivatives has been shown to increase firms’ value, my study
focuses on cash holding and lines of credit for two reasons. First, foreign exchange derivatives
present high costs, limited availability, and short maturities. With these shortcomings, they are
instruments less likely to be employed by small and medium firms. In fact, the literature on foreign
currency derivatives has focused on large companies, exactly because they are able to bear the
aforementioned hurdles.8 By focusing on cash holdings and credit lines, I am able to analyze a
broader sample of firms, including small and medium firms. Second, derivatives markets are less
developed in emerging economies. Because my study is intended to be applied to a more general
set of firms, using cash and lines of credit allows me to include a much larger geographic span of
emerging market economies’ currencies. Even studies analyzing a wider sample of firms show that
larger firms are more likely to use derivatives.9 With that in mind, one could think that large
7Other studies have introduced additional theories to explain why hedging policy can create value by adding
some friction to the Modigliani and Miller world. Stulz (1984) argues that managers have risk averse utilities and
can increase their well being by hedging if they have a large amount of their wealth in the firm’s stock. Smith and
Stulz (1985) point out to the convexity of the tax code as a reason to reduce profit volatility. Finally, DeMarzo and
Duffie (1995) have shown that when managers possess private information on the firm’s expected profits, hedging
can increase value even if shareholders are able to do it on their own.
8Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and Disatnik, Duchin, and Schmidt (2014) focus on the S&P 500 firms, Allayannis
and Weston (2001) on companies with more than $500 million in assets, and Allayannis, Lel, and Miller (2012) on
international firms with ADRs.
9Graham and Rogers (2002) show that a one percent increase in firm assets is related to a raise of 0.4 p.p. in the
use derivatives as a proportion to total assets (see Table III). Bartram, Brown, and Minton (2010) analyze a sample
of manufacturing firms whose average market capitalization is $4.7 billion. In their study, the subsample of users
of foreign currency derivatives have a market capitalization 30% higher than the average firm (see Table 10). On
Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011), firms with derivatives are in average 2.7 larger than non users by assets (see
8
firms heavily rely on derivatives to ensure liquidity in all states, implying that a study focused on
cash and credit lines loses its representativeness in a broader universe of firms. However, Disatnik,
Duchin, and Schmidt (2014) show that derivative hedging is complementary to the use of credit
lines, which entails that the sample studied in my study does not leave behind liquidity choices of
larger firms.10
Besides the contribution to the literature on liquidity management, my study also improves
the identification of currency exposure. The baseline approach of my study is similar to the one
adopted by previous studies, i.e. using a proxy for currency exposure estimated from the exchange
rate of local currency to a trade-weighted currency index (Chaieb and Mazzotta, 2013; Aggarwal
and Harper, 2010; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Guay, 1999). However, I improve upon this by
identifying the exact source of risk, pinpointing the countries to where a U.S. company sells.
Therefore, I build a firm-level measure of currency risk that is based only on these locations. Since
the exposure to currency risk is measured so as to capture the correlation between the firm’s returns
(net of confounding factors such as market risk) and the exchange rate of these specific countries,
the identification is improved because it is a refined, cleaner version of the proxy that uses a broad
index.
Finally, my study is also related to previous ones that documented a positive relationship between
cash holdings and a firm’s ratio of foreign-to-domestic income (foreign markets accounts). A recent
contribution in this sense is made by Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2016), who relates high
R&D expenditures with higher cash holdings of multinational companies. Foley, Hartzell, Titman,
and Twite (2007) study cash parked at foreign countries for tax avoidance. The currency risk
Table I, Panel B).
10In fact, it is interesting to mention that lines of credit can also be interpreted as a hedging instrument, making
it a potential substitute for derivatives. Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1987) provide a model where credit lines have a
similar role to put options: firms use credit lines to borrow at a lower pre-arranged rate when interest rates (the
underlying risk) are high. Analogously, exchange rate movements can be viewed as the underlying risk on a put
option interpretation of credit lines. When a negatively exposed firm faces an appreciation of the U.S. dollar, a line
of credit provides pre-committed funds for a company short on liquidity.
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channel presented in my study is an additional contribution to this literature, and explains in part
the liquidity management of multinational companies through the use of cash and credit lines.
Chapter Outline The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 offers the
empirical design by describing the main questions and hypotheses to be tested. It also details
the sample selection process and the construction of the main variables, including the proxies for
currency exposure. Section 1.3 presents the empirical results on the relation of currency exposure
and liquidity policy. Section 1.4 provides additional tests on several measures of currency exposure.
Section 1.5 focus on the results of time series analysis. Section 1.6 presents concluding remarks.
1.2 Empirical Design
The main claim of this study is that, for highly globalized firms, exposure to currency risk is
related to liquidity management by reducing the availability of lines of credit and by increasing
the use of cash holdings. Where, Globalization is the proportion of sales to foreign markets over
total sales. I focus on highly globalized firms because one can identify a direct source for their
exposure to currency risk. On the other hand, low globalized firms and domestic firms are used
as controls because the source of their exposure to currency risk is not identified. If currency
exposure is indeed a relevant factor related to the liquidity policy of a firm, then the currency
exposure from identified direct sources should have a stronger association to liquidity compared
to a similar currency exposure from an unidentified source. The latter may capture a spurious
correlation between performance and exchange rate, rather than a cleaner identified exchange
rate risk. Taking into consideration the differences between identified and unidentified sources, I
evaluate the relationship between currency exposure and liquidity policy conditional on the level
of Globalization. Specifically, I separate firms into quintiles of Globalization and then I compare
10
the estimated parameters among these groups.
Another direct source of currency risk to companies are their imports. However, due to data
limitations it is not viable to determine what is the proportion of firms’ inputs that are imported.
Two similar firms with equal estimated exposures to currency risk but with different shares of
imported inputs cannot be separated. As both firms are treated as equals, the identification of a
direct source of currency risk for importing firms is undermined. Consequently, if they do not have
foreign sales, importers are employed as control group to globalized firms.11 Nevertheless, even in
the case that the control group has importers with direct but not identified sources, the proportion
of identified to unidentified is significantly higher in the globalized group compared to the control
group. Although it is not possible to identify importing companies by the proportion of inputs
that are acquired abroad, the sign of the exposure to currency risk may indicate their role. Strictly
exporting companies are more likely to present negative exposure to currency risk, while strictly
importing companies, positive exposure. For firms that both import and export their exposure
may vary from negative to positive depending on this balance.
As the identification of the source of currency risk is done by foreign sales, it could be the case
that my sample only has negatively exposed firms among the ones whose source of currency risk
is identified. However, positively exposed firms may also be among firms whose source of risk is
identified. Consider the case of a net importer, whose foreign sales represent a high share of the
total. This company probably has a positive exposure and it also has a high level of Globalization,
indicating that its source of currency risk is identified. Although the identification is done only
from the company’s exports and not from its imports, it is still linked to a real source of currency
risk under a positive exposure. As a result, my sample has negative and positively exposed firms
among the ones whose source of risk is identified and proxied by Globalization. Nevertheless, besides
11Likewise, firms outside the import or export business cannot have the source of their exposure identified. Besides,
the nature of these firms’ exposure is indirect, because it comes from competition on product markets.
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evaluating the relationship between currency exposure and liquidity policy conditional on the level
of Globalization, I further separate these analyses between the negatively and positively exposed
sample to better understand the nature of exposure on liquidity policy.
Given the strategy to identify the source of exposure to currency risk, I turn to the questions of
my study. Besides investigating the relationship between currency exposure and liquidity policy, I
also evaluate if the rationale behind it lies on the association of higher exposure to currency risk to
higher costs of lines of credit and to higher precautionary reasons to hold cash. To provide evidence
to this thesis I break down the previous statements into a few set of questions and I empirically
test the hypothesis related to each one.
Cross-sectional analysis I compare the liquidity policy among firms with varying exposure to
currency risk by each level of Globalization. Specifically, first I question whether globalized firms
with higher to exposure to currency risk are less likely to have lines of credit. Second, I turn
to the intensive margin and evaluate the role of currency exposure on the availability of lines of
credit relative to cash holdings. I investigate whether they are related and quantify this relation.
Moreover, I inquire if this exposure changes the availability of lines of credit and cash holdings
as separate instruments of liquidity management. I then re-evaluate the previous analyses to test
whether firm-years whose estimated exposure to currency risk is less likely to be statistically zero
present a stronger relationship to liquidity policy. Finally, in order to clarify the mechanism behind
this behavior I question whether the cost of lines of credit is associated to currency exposure.
Time series analysis I evaluate the time effect of volatility from currency markets on liquidity.
Particularly, I analyze if an increase in volatility of currencies, controlled for the market volatility,
reduces the initiation of new credit lines for exposed firms. Also, I evaluate the effect of volatility
on the accumulation of cash, on spreads and on maturities of credit lines.
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Differently from other studies on credit lines I do not evaluate violations on their covenants.
Most of the literature on this topic uses a sample of random firms constructed by Sufi (2009). This
sample has only 300 firms from 1996 to 2003. The intersection of his sample to the one of my study
yields less than 70 firms. Hence, it is impractical to extend the analysis for this subsample. Once
this limitation in the data is overcome, it will be a promising extension to my study.
Following the literature on lines of credit, the granularity of the empirical tests on liquidity policy
is at the firm level. In a study about liquidity management, it would also be interesting to evaluate
the effect of currency exposure on the liquidity at the foreign subsidiary level. However, the lack of
fine-grained data makes it is impractical to perform any analysis that takes into account the cash
flow or cash level of foreign subsidiaries. I leave this important topic to future developments on
the literature.
1.2.1 Data
The data used to perform empirical analysis are obtained from six distinct sources. From Com-
pustat Fundamentals, I gather information on financial statement variables at the firm-year level,
and from Compustat Segment I extract detailed information on sales by intra-firm geographical
location. Data on lines of credit comes from Thompson Reuters’ LPC Dealscan. From CRSP, I use
equity monthly returns to measure exposure to currency risk. Finally, data on foreign exchange
rates are obtained from the H10 report at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
The sample covers fiscal years from 1998 to 2012.12 Firm-years with less than $5 million in sales
12The bounds on the sample period at the years of 1998 and 2012 are due to three factors: (i) in June 1997,
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued FAS-131 requiring firms to report separately information
about an operating segment whose “...revenue, including both sales to external customers an operating.” represents
more than 10% of the total. Therefore, before the fiscal year of 1998, report of sales by segment was optional and
this reflects on the few observations of sales at the geographical level at Compustat Segment Data for the period
before 1998. (ii) The determination of the fixed exchange rate of the Euro and the currencies of the initial European
Monetary Union countries was set on January 1st 1999. Therefore I cannot use foreign segments designated as
“Europe” before that date. The year of 1998 is included because the regressions rely on financial statement variables
that are lagged by one year. (iii) I rely on the database constructed by Chava and Roberts (2008) that links facilities
on LPC Dealscan to firms on Compustat. It has updated links up to the year of 2012.
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or in market value for year 2000 real dollar terms are dismissed. Firms are also required to present
positive assets. Following previous works, I exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000 to 6999) and
utilities firms (SIC 4900 to 4999). Companies on the financial sector are compelled to attain capital
requirements; hence their cash and cash equivalents may not be held for the purposes presented in
this study. Utility firms also hold cash for other reasons such as regulatory guidance.
The intersection of the databases previously mentioned severely reduces the size of my final
sample compared to the Compustat population. Besides, the estimation of exposure to currency
risk further reduces my sample. While the Compustat population presents 64,728 firm-years for
the period from 1998 to 2012, my final sample has 30,300 firm-years. Nevertheless, I am able to
replicate with my sample results from other studies in the literature about credit lines and cash
holdings.
1.2.2 Variable Definitions
Globalization. In order to identify a source of exposure to currency risk I construct the variable
Globalization as the proportion of all foreign sales to total sales. Foreign sales include exports from
U.S. operations and sales from foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinational firms. Compustat Segment
Data provides ubiquitous data about sale amounts of each geographical segment. However, for other
items on financial statements, such as cost, they are highly incomplete. Consequently, sales at the
geographical segment level is a straightforward proxy to measure the overall source of exposure to
currency risk of a firm at each year. Globalized firms are defined as the ones that present a positive
value for Globalization on at least one fiscal year. On most of regressions I evaluate the relationship
of currency exposure and liquidity management conditional on the level of Globalization. I also
include in this study domestic firms, that are defined as companies that do not report foreign sales
at any year on my sample. Domestic firms are the ones with a value of zero for Globalization on
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all their sample years. Therefore I break down firm-years into six different levels of Globalization:
5 quintiles of the globalized ones and one last subgroup for domestic firms.13
LC-to-Cash. To capture whether the liquidity policy of a company leans towards cash or lines
of credit I employ a measure for the use of later that is the proportion of credit lines to the sum of
credit lines plus cash holdings. The construction of LC-to-Cash follows the same procedures as in
Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2013).
LC-to-Assets and Cash-to-Assets. To evaluate the effect of exposure to currency risk separately
on each instrument of liquidity management, I normalize the outstanding amount of lines of credit
that is available to the firm by the total amount of assets, LC-to-Assets. The same procedure is
applied to amount of cash to construct Cash-to-Assets.
Beta FX. The idea behind the measures of currency exposure is to capture the correlation between
a firm’s liquidity needs and the exchange rate of the countries to where it sells. A standard
exposure could be constructed from financial statements data on the difference between cash flow
and capital investment. However, this exposure does not capture the interplay between future cash
flow and investments prospects. Instead, I use market-determined prices of firms’ common stock
to construct the baseline measure of currency exposure. Data from equity returns have higher
frequency, incorporates long-term prospects, and are simultaneously determined with exchange
rates. All together, these qualities make market based betas a straightforward baseline measure for
this study. Nevertheless, on section 1.4 I show that the results are robust to the use of currency
betas constructed from cash flow and capital investment.
Specifically, I build the baseline currency exposure beta, Beta FX, in a way it does not capture
the systematic risk, whose effect on the choice of lines of credit is studied in Acharya, Almeida, and
Campello (2013). It is constructed following previous studies on the determination of economic
13Appendix A provides a thorough explanation on how Globalization is constructed.
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exposure to currency risk, such as Jorion (1990) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001). For each firm
and year, I regress the total monthly equity return of firm i at month m (Ri,m) on market portfolio
return (MKTm) and the return on a trade-weighted exchange rate index of currencies (∆FXj,m)
using the model below.14
Ri,m = α1,i,t + β1,i,t4FXi,m + β2,i,tMKTm + ei,t,m (1.1)
The time window for each estimation is the past 60 months ending on the last month of the
current fiscal year t.15 The firm-year currency exposure is the coefficient β1,i,t. Since ∆FXj,m is
constructed as the percentage change on the indirect exchange rate, a positive (negative) ∆FX
refers to an appreciation (depreciation) of the U.S. dollar.16 Therefore, a firm that benefits from
the appreciation (depreciation) of the U.S. dollar will present a positive (negative) β1,i,t. Figure
1.5 shows that during the sample period from 1998 to 2012 the U.S. dollar has presented phases
of both appreciation and depreciation against the index of currencies. The variability in the sign
and size of ∆FX improves the ability of Beta FX to capture the exposure to distinct states of the
underlying risk.
The use of an aggregated broad index of currencies as the baseline underlying currency risk
for all firms provides a parsimonious solution to the challenges of identifying and aggregating
distinct foreign markets for each firm. Nevertheless, as discussed in the introduction, I also present
14The trade-weighted exchange rate index of currencies (TWEXB) is published by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. It is a weighted average of the exchange-rates of the U.S. dollar against the currencies
of a broad group of U.S. trading partners. As of 2012, the index includes the currencies of following areas: the
European Monetary Union, Canada, Japan, Mexico, China, United Kingdom, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Hong
Kong, Malaysia, Brazil, Switzerland, Thailand, Philippines, Australia, Indonesia, India, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Russia,
Sweden, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile and Colombia. I also present on section 1.4 that the results are robust to the
use of a trade-weighted index based on a narrower set of of 7 U.S. trade partners (TWEXM).
15Following the literature on exposure to currency risk, I use monthly data because indices using data with higher
frequency may suffer from noise and from nonsynchroneity problems. In order to run each regression, it is required
at least 48 months (observations) with complete data on equity return, market return and percentage change of
TWEXB.
16An indirect quote is a foreign exchange rate quoted as the foreign currency per unit of the domestic currency.
For the purpose of this study, the U.S. dollar is the domestic currency.
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results on the relationship of exposure to currency risk and liquidity management by estimating an
alternative beta that is specific to each country to where firms sell. The results are robust when
employing this heterogeneous currency risk.
Betas constructed from equity returns are directly related to leverage. Credit lines, as one of
the main objects of investigation in this study, are a type of debt; this means that a higher usage
of them culminates in higher leverage. Ultimately, this connection may bias the estimations when
analyzing the effect of betas on credit lines. In order to circumvent this problem, I unlever β1 from
equation (1.1) using a multiple factor version of the Hamada model. The resulting Beta FX is then
an asset-based exposure to currency risk. I also employ and present the equity-based beta on the
analyses on liquidity policy and the results are robust to both specifications.
Figure 1.6 shows the distribution of Beta FX. It is interesting to notice that the estimation
yields a balanced proportion of negative and positive betas: from 30,300 regressions, 48.6% are
positive and 51.4%, negative, with an average value of 0.038. The median value for the subsample
of negative Beta FX is -0.904 and for the positive subsample, 0.912.17 These values are in line
with the distribution of currency exposure found in the literature (Bartram, Brown, and Minton,
2010). Beta FX is winsorized the 5% level on each tail to avoid outliers; therefore there is a spike
on the frequency on its extremes at -3.07 and 3.14.
As firms choose where to sell to or where to establish a foreign subsidiary, one may argue that
companies may engage in geographical strategies to mitigate currency exposure (Chowdhry and
Howe, 1999; Mello, Parsons, and Triantis, 1995); or to directly increase debt capacity (MacKay,
2003). If these “operational hedges” are in place, Beta FX captures an ex-post exposure that is
lower than the ex-ante. Actually, that is an advantage to my identification because the empirical
analyses using the ex-post Beta FX estimate the relationship to liquidity policy from an exposure
17The difference between their absolute values is not statistically significant different from zero.
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that still matters for the firm. A similar argument can be presented to examine the use of derivatives
as a hedging instrument. As discussed in the introduction, Disatnik, Duchin, and Schmidt (2014)
have shown that derivatives and lines of credit are complementary and not substitutes.
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 1.1 reports summary statistics for firm characteristics. Panel B of Table 1.1 shows
summary statistics on the characteristics of lines of credit. The average share of lines of credit to
the total liquidity (LC-to-Cash) is 41.8%, the average loan spread over LIBOR is 173.6 basis points
and the average annual fee on the undrawn portion of the loan is 30.3 basis points. Panel C reports
that the average proportion of sales to foreign markets (Globalization) is 22.6%. The average Beta
FX conditional on being negative is 1.125%. This means that a one percent change (appreciation
or depreciation) in the exchange rate is related to an average change (decrease or increase) of
1.125% in the value of the assets of a firm. On the other hand, for positive Beta FX firms the
average increase in the market value of assets given an one percent appreciation of the U.S. dollar
is 1.138%. The same analogy can be made to Beta MKT and assets returns, though for the later
the one percentage increase (decrease) in the S&P 500 is related to an increase (decrease) of 1.101%
in asset value.
Most of the empirical analyses consists on comparing coefficients that are related to subsamples
formed by different levels of Globalization, signs of Beta FX or by Beta FX ’s statistical significance.
As so, it is noteworthy to evaluate major differences among these subsamples. Table 1.2 breaks down
the mean and standard deviation of selected variables by three levels of Globalization: domestic,
first quintile and fifth quintile; by negative and positive Beta FX ; and by low or high statistical
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significance of the estimated Beta FX, measured by their p-value from the estimation of equation
(1.1).18
As expected, total assets and sale increases monotonically accordingly to the level of Globaliza-
tion; domestic firms have on average one third of the asset value of highly globalized companies. In
line with other studies about multinationals such as Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2012), cash
holdings also increase with the level of Globalization: from 15.4% of total assets for domestic firms,
18.9% for the bottom quintile of globalized firms, to 25.4% at the top quintile. Domestic firms
and companies at the bottom quintile of Globalization present more lines of credit as a propor-
tion of assets (26.1% and 29.7% respectively) compared to the top quintile (15.7%). Mechanically,
the combination of cash holdings to assets and lines of credit to assets sets a LC-to-Cash that is
decreasing on the share of sales to abroad. To allow for comparability on the coefficients related
to Beta FX among the subsamples constructed from Globalization, the variables related to the
aforementioned characteristics are used as controls on the main regressions.
Table 1.2 also shows the differences between the negative and positive Beta FX subsamples.
Negative Beta FX firms are, on average, bigger, more profitable, older, less R&D intensive, less
exposed to systematic risk and with more tangible assets compared to positive Beta FX firms.
Focusing on measures of liquidity management, negative Beta FX firms present higher availability
of lines of credit and lower cash holdings compared to positive ones. In line with a higher average
availability of lines of credit, negative Beta FX firms face lower spreads.
In order to address the concern about the reduction in sample size due to filtering only companies
with an estimated Beta FX, I compare the distribution of the main variables on my sample to the
distribution of the same variables found in Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2013), and to the
18The low p-value sample includes firm-years whose Beta FX are at the bottom 35% of their distribution of p-
value (high statistical significant). The high p-value sample includes the top 35% firm-years based on their Beta
FX ’s p-value (low statistical significance).
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whole Compustat sample. The filtering of my study produces a sample that leans towards larger
but less profitable firms. Compared to their sample, the firms on my sample have higher volatility
on profits and sales. Compared to the Compustat sample, the difference in volatility is smaller. The
variables that are related to the size and cost of lines of credit (LC-to-Cash, All-In-Drawn Spread
and Undrawn Fee) present averages across samples whose differences to mine barely surpass 10%.
Despite some significant differences in sample, the empirical tests presented thereafter are able to
replicate the basic results found on studies about the use of cash and the availability of credit lines.
1.3.2 Extensive Margin
The first question that arises when investigating the relationship between a firm’s exposure to
currency risk and its liquidity policy is whether the former influences the choice of having or not a
line of credit. In order to examine this effect I estimate a logit model using maximum likelihood.
I am interested to know if currency exposure is related to the probability of a firm to use at least
one line of credit. The baseline specification for this model follows Sufi (2009); I add to it Beta FX
and Globalization:
Logit(Line of Crediti,t) = α2 +
5∑
q=0
φq 1i,t,q |BetaFX|i,t +
5∑
q=1
δq 1i,t,q + φ6Ebitdai,t−1
+ φ7 Tangibilityi,t + φ8 Sizei,t−1 + φ9Networthi,t−1
+ φ10Qi,t−1 + φ11 ln(Age)i,t + φ12 IndSalesV oli,t
+ φ13 ProfitV oli,t, (1.2)
where Line of Credit is a dummy indicator for whether the firm has a line of credit at year t, 1
is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if the firm is at the qth quintile of Globalization
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at year t for non-domestic firms. A value of zero for q is reserved for domestic companies. I
also add year fixed effects and industry fixed effects. My major intent is to estimate the effect of
currency exposure for firms at each level of Globalization and then compare the results among them.
Specifically, I focus on the estimation of coefficient φ5, that is related to the interaction of |Beta
FX | and the dummy for the highest quintile of Globalization. I am also interested on the estimation
of coefficients φ0 and φ1, that are related to the interaction of |Beta FX | and the dummy for the
bottom quintile of Globalization and to domestic firms, respectively. The hypotheses to be tested
are that exposure to currency risk is related to liquidity management for highly globalized firms
and not so for less globalized firms or domestic firms (firms whose source of currency exposure is
not identified). That is, under the null hypothesis φ5 is zero; and φ0 and φ1 are different from zero.
As regressions are run separately for the negative and for the positive Beta FX subsamples, I use
the absolute value of Beta FX on the regressions in order to allow for a straightforward comparison
of the estimated coefficients.
Table 1.3 presents the marginal effects from the estimation of equation (1.2). On column 1, I
replicate Sufi (2009) specification and the results are mostly consistent with his findings. Ebitda
and Size are key determinants that increase the probability of a firm to have a line of credit. On
the other hand, Age and Networth are not significant on my sample. Column 2 adds Globalization
quintiles dummies, and as expected, the higher Globalization is, the less are the chances of having a
line of credit. Column 3 further adds the exposure to systematic risk, Beta MKT, and as predicted
by Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2013), it is negatively related to chances of having a line of
credit.
Focusing on the main question of this study, the results presented on columns 4 to 7 suggest that
currency exposure is a critical factor to explain the adoption of credit lines for highly globalized
firms and not for less globalized or domestic firms. For negatively exposed firms, the coefficients on
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column 4 suggest that an increase in two standard deviations of Beta FX is accompanied by a (2 x
0.867 x 0.025 =) 4.3 p.p. decrease in the probability of having a line of credit for companies in the
fifth quintile of Globalization. Even when I include Beta MKT as a control, the result presented on
column 5 is statistically significantly at the 10% level. It shows a reduction of (2 x 0.867 x 0.024=)
4.2 p.p. on the chances of having a line of credit, given an increase in two standard deviation of
Beta FX.
Although the results presented on columns 6 and 7 do not corroborate with the hypothesis that
the effect of currency exposure is stronger at the highest quintile of Globalization for positively
exposed firms, the significant result coming from the fourth quintile is evidence that non-spurious
currency exposure is related to the adoption of lines of credit. Moreover, the coefficients from the
two bottom quintiles are not statistically significant, what further supports the previous claim.
The analyses on the extensive margin indicate that, for highly globalized firms, there is evidence
that the use of credit lines is negatively influenced by currency exposure. It is an important
clarification to better understand the effects of currency movements on the liquidity management
of firms.
1.3.3 Intensive Margin
Once evidence is presented to support the claim that there is a negative relationship between
currency exposure and availability of credit lines, it is natural to extend the investigation to the
availability of credit lines as a proportion of the firm’s total liquidity. To gauge these relationships
I regress a standard OLS model where the independent variable is LC-to-Cash and where the
regressors of most interest is the interaction between the levels of Globalization and Beta FX. The
LC-to-Cash analysis aim to identify the relationship of currency exposure and the equilibrium
outcome of the firm’s decision to have lines of credit over cash holdings. The controls for the
22
LC-to-Cash regressions are the same variables found on model (1.2):
LC-to-Cashi,t = α3 +
5∑
q=0
θq 1i,t,q |BetaFX|i,t +
5∑
q=1
ηq 1i,t,q + θ6Ebitdai,t−1
+ θ7 Tangibilityi,t + θ8 Sizei,t−1 + θ9Networthi,t−1
+ θ10Qi,t−1 + θ11 ln(Age)i,t + θ12 IndSalesV oli,t
+ θ13 ProfitV oli,t + 3,i,t. (1.3)
Similar to the previous analysis, I expect θ5 to be negative and θ0 and θ1 to be zero on model
(1.3). Higher exposure to currency risk are expected to increase the cost of lines of credit and as
result firms should present lower availability of them and rely more on cash as the main provider
of liquidity. Table 1.4 presents the estimation of equation (1.3) on a sample restricted to firms that
have at least one line of credit. On column 1, I replicate the Acharya, Almeida, and Campello
(2013) specification and the results are mostly in line with their findings. Given that they construct
the proxy for systematic exposure using a different approach, and that my sample is limited to
companies with estimated Beta FX, the replication is essential to validate my analyses.19 A two-
standard deviation increase in Beta MKT is related to a decrease of (2 x 0.733 x 0.068=) 9.97
p.p. in LC-to-Cash.20 Also, Ebitda, Tangibility, Q, are significant factors that affect LC-to-Cash
and present the same sign as in their study. On the other hand, I have opposite sign for Size and
Networth, and no significant effect for Age, IndSalesVol or ProfitVol. Column 2 adds Globalization
quintiles dummies, and as expected, the top quintiles are related to lower LC-to-Cash.
19Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2013) construct their proxy for systematic risk using a different approach:
instead of using the Hamada model to unlever equity beta, they apply a Merton-KMV-type model. Rather than
estimating the beta from a 5 year rolling window, they do on a yearly basis. And differently from equation (1.1),
systematic risk is the single factor when constructing market exposure.
20They find that a two st. dev. increase in systematic risk decreases LC-to-Cash in (2 x 1.032 x 0.083 x 100)=
17.13 p.p. (numbers from Table I and Table III, column 3).
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Focusing on the inquiry of my study, the coefficients on the third column of Table 1.4 present
the effects of Beta FX on LC-to-Cash for each level of Globalization for negatively exposed firms.
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that for highly globalized companies, the effect of
currency exposure on the intensity of credit lines is negative. An increase of two standard deviation
on Beta FX is related to a decrease of (2 x 0.867 x 0.034 =) 4.98 p.p. in LC-to-Cash, for a firm
at the highest quintile of Globalization. Even when including controls for systematic exposure -
column 4 - the results are similar. An analogous pattern is found on the results for the positively
exposed subsample. Columns 5 and 6 show that the higher the Globalization’s quintile the firm is
the stronger is the negative relation between Beta FX and LC-to-Cash. As expected, the estimated
coefficients for the interaction of Beta FX and domestic firms and the one for firms at the bottom
quintile of Globalization are statistically zero.
The results previously reported suggest that highly exposed firms rely less on lines of credit
compared to cash holdings. However, it could be the case that the exposure is only affecting credit
lines and not cash holdings, or vice-versa. In order to tackle this issue, I regress equation (1.3)
using LC-to-Assets in place of LC-to-Cash as the independent variable to isolate the availability of
lines of credit. Besides, I also regress the model below to isolate the relationship between currency
exposure and cash holdings. The controls on model (1.4) are based on Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and
Williamson (1999) :
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Cash-to-Assetsi,t = α4 +
5∑
q=0
γq 1i,t,q |BetaFX|i,t +
5∑
q=1
κq 1i,t,q + γ6BetaMKTi,t
+ γ7CashF lowi,t + γ8Qi,t + γ9 Sizei,t + γ10Capexi,t
+ γ11Acquisitionsi,t + γ12 Leveragei,t + γ13 IndSalesV oli,t
+ γ14 ProfitV oli,t + γ15Non-CashNWCi,t + γ16R&Di,t
+ γ17Dividendsi,t + γ18DebtIssuancei,t + γ19EquityIssuancei,t
+ 4,i,t. (1.4)
If currency exposed is related to the availability of lines of credit, then θ5 from the LC-to-Assets
regression should be negative. Higher exposure, related to higher chances of breaking up covenants
on credit lines, increase spreads and reduces the availability of them. If it affects cash holdings
separately, then γ5 should be positive. The increased exposure would make firms more prone to
hold cash as a liquidity carrier for precautionary reasons.
Table 1.5 shows the results of the estimation of model (1.3) isolating the availability of lines of
credit from cash holdings. The relationship between Beta FX and LC-to-Assets is statistically
different from zero for both the negative and the positive currency exposure subsamples at the top
quintile of Globalization. Specifically, column 4 shows that a two st. deviation change in Beta FX
is related to a decrease of (2 x 0.876 x 0.062 =) 10.74 p.p. in LC-to-Assets for the most globalized
firms. Given that the average availability of lines of credit as a share of total assets is 0.232, a
company whose Beta FX is one standard deviation lower than the average is predicted have (0.1074
x 0.5 / 0.232 =) 23.2% less LC-to-Assets. Regarding the ability of currency exposure to explain
deviations on the availability lines of credit, a one st. deviation change in Beta FX corresponds to
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(10.74 x 0.5 / 0.669 =) 3.60% of LC-to-Assets st. deviation. Columns 5 and 6 shows that similar
results are found for the positive Beta FX subsample.
The estimated coefficient of Beta FX for the bottom quintile of Globalization is not statistically
equal to zero for negatively exposed firms. However, the estimated coefficient for the interaction
between the dummy for domestic firms and Beta FX cannot be considered different from zero in
statistical terms. For positively exposed firms, the coefficient is statistically zero for both domestic
and the first quintile of Globalization.
Turning to the analysis of the relationship between exposure to currency risk and cash holdings,
Table 1.6 presents the estimation of model (1.4). The results presented on columns 3 and 4
suggest that for negatively exposed firms currency exposure is not related to cash holdings per se.
Conversely, column 6 shows that for positively exposed companies a two standard deviation change
in Beta FX is related to an increase of (2 x 0.879 x 0.008=) 1.41 p.p. in Cash-to-Assets.
Overall, the evaluations on the intensive margin of the relationship of exposure to currency risk
and liquidity management provide evidence that higher currency exposure is associated with firms
relying more on cash compared to lines of credit. Moreover, for negatively exposed firms, a higher
exposure is specifically linked to a lower availability of lines of credit but not with more cash
holdings. For positively exposed firms, higher exposure is accompanied to a change on the use of
both instruments: lower availability of credit lines and more cash holdings.
1.3.4 Beta FX ’s Quality Analysis
The previous evaluations give evidence that currency exposure and liquidity management are re-
lated. These analyses involved the assumption that Beta FX ’s relationship to liquidity management
arises from its ability to capture exposure to currency risk. As Beta FX is a parameter estimated
from equation (1.1), there is heterogeneity on the statistical significance of Beta FX that may be
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related to its ability to capture exposure to currency risk. I claim that the stronger the statistical
significance of Beta FX is, the better should be its ability to capture exposure to currency risk,
and by consequence the stronger should be its relationship to liquidity management.21 To test this
hypothesis I re-estimate the previous analysis by subsamples based on the p-value of Beta FX from
equation (1.1). Using a SUR-OLS, I compare the coefficients of the interaction of Beta FX with
the top quintile of Globalization across the p-value subsamples. If my claim holds, then I expect
the coefficients related to the subsamples with lower p-values to be stronger than the coefficients of
the subsamples with higher p-values. The only expected exception to this pattern is the analysis
without evidence of a relationship between currency exposure and liquidity management, such as
the relationship between Beta FX and Cash-to-Assets for negatively exposed firms. In that case,
I expect that for all p-value subsamples, one will not be able to reject the hypothesis that all the
estimated coefficients on the interaction of Beta FX and the highest quintile of Globalization are
zero.
Table 1.7 shows the results for the estimation of model (1.3) for subsamples constructed on the
p-values of Beta FX. Panel A limits the sample to the negatively exposed firms while Panel B focus
on positively exposed firms. The results on both panels show that θ5 is statistically significantly
different from zero for all subsamples, except for the one where Beta FX ’s p-value is very high
between 0.75 and 1. They also show that the economic association between Beta FX and LC-to-
Cash diminishes monotonically from the subsample with the lowest p-value to the subsample with
the highest p-value. The difference on θ5 between the first and sixth column is 0.16 at Panel A,
and it is 0.152 at Panel B, both statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% level. For
negatively exposed firms, a two-standard deviation change in Beta FX is related to a decrease of
(2 x 0.867 x 0.179 =) 31.04 p.p. in LC-to-Cash for the subsample whose Beta FX ’s p-value is
21Compared to the whole sample estimation.
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lower than 5%. This value is 5.3 times higher than the one predicted using the sample including
all Beta FX ’s p-valued firms. For the subsample on the p-values lower than 25%, a two-standard
deviation change in Beta FX is related to a decrease of (2 x 0.867 x 0.098 =) 16.99 p.p. in LC-
to-Cash. Essentially, these outcomes suggest that the more reliable Beta FX is, the stronger is its
association to the share of credit lines to total liquidity. And by consequence, it is an indication
on the robustness of previous evaluations.
Besides the re-estimation of the LC-to-Cash analysis under the Beta FX ’s p-value approach, I
also re-estimate the LC-to-Assets and the Cash-to-Assets analyses. Table 1.8 Panels A and Panel
B present the results for the estimation of the p-value subsamples approach under the LC-to-
Assets analyses. Differently from the LC-to-Cash Beta FX ’s p-value analysis, the estimated θ5
coefficients on the negatively exposed firms are not monotonically decreasing on the ordering of
the subsamples. However, they are statistically significantly differently from zero for all but the
subsample with highest p-value. For positively exposed firms, only the estimated θ5 for the second
and third lowest p-value subsamples are statistically differently from zero. The estimated θ5 for the
subsample whose Beta FX’s p-value are lower than 5% (-0.084) has a p-value of its own equal to
0.127. Even though this value is above the commonly accepted upper bound of 10% to be declared
different from zero, I interpret that there is still an evidence of a negative relationship of Beta FX
and LC-to-Assets at the lowest Beta FX ’s p-value subsample. The reason behind this assessment
lies on the fact that 0.127 is not too well above 0.10, also on the fact that θ5 for this subsample
implies an economically larger association of currency exposure and lines of credit compared to the
θ5 estimated from the whole negative exposure sample, and also on the fact that this subsample
has the smallest number of observations (602) compared to all other subsamples, that have more
than a thousand observations each.
Finally, Table 1.9 presents the results of the estimation of equation (1.4), the Cash-to-Assets
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analysis, for each subsample of Beta FX ’s p-value. The estimated values of γ5 at Panel A cor-
roborate with the results presented on Table 1.6: as expected, for negatively exposed firms, even
among the more reliable Beta FX, currency exposure is not related to cash holdings. For positively
exposed firms the results shown at Panel B support my claim that the more reliable Beta FX is,
the stronger should be its relationship to cash holdings. Not only γ5 is statistically significantly
different from zero at the three lowest p-value subsample, but also the estimated γ5 for the lowest
p-value subsample entails a relationship between currency exposure and cash holdings that is 3.2
times bigger than the one estimated from the whole sample. Specifically, a firm whose Beta FX is
two-standard deviation higher than another’s and whose p-value is below 5% is predicted to have
a Cash-to-Assets that is (2 x 0.879 x 0.048 =) 8.44 p.p. higher.
For both negative and positively exposed firms, a more reliable Beta FX is related to a stronger
relationship with LC-to-Cash. However, when I evaluate the relationship of a more reliable Beta
FX separately to each one of the two liquidity management tools, the results confirms a divergence
of behavior between the negatively and the positively exposed firms. While both negatively and
positively exposed firms present less credit lines compared to cash holdings, for negative exposed
firm this pattern comes solely from a lower availability of credit lines. For positively exposed firms
present this pattern also comes from higher cash holdings.
1.3.5 Cost Analysis
After providing evidence on the relationship between exposure to currency risk and liquidity man-
agement, I evaluate the claim that a possible mechanism that can explain this behavior involves the
cost of credit lines. If the spread charged by the banks are costlier for firms with higher currency
exposure, then firms will present a lower availability of lines of credit, corroborating to the results
previously documented. As discussed before, the rationale behind it lies on the increased economic,
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translation and transaction risks associated with movements on the exchange rate of the currencies
of the countries where to firms sell. I follow an empirical design to test the hypothesis that exposure
to currency risk increases the spread charged by banks on lines of credit that is similar to the ones
previously employed. I regress two measures of cost of credit lines, All-In-Drawn Spread, the cost
charged on the portion of the credit that is drawn by the firms, and Undrawn Fee, the cost of the
undrawn portion of a line of credit, on the interaction of Beta FX and each level of Globalization.22
All-In-DrawnSpreadi,t = α5 +
5∑
q=0
µq 1i,t,q |BetaFX|i,t +
5∑
q=1
νq 1i,t,q + µ6 LIBORi,t
+ µ7NewLCi,t + µ
′Xi,t + 5,i,t (1.5)
Once again the parameter of most interest is the one related to the interaction of the top quintile
of Globalization and Beta FX : µ5. If exposure to currency risk increases the chances of default or
to break covenants, then one should expect that banks would charge higher spreads. Therefore,
the null hypothesis is that µ5 is zero. The controls variables are the same as the ones employed on
model (1.2) with the addition of New LC and LIBOR. New LC is the dollar amount of credit lines
initiated in year t over total assets, LIBOR is the weighted average of the interest rate prevailing
at the month the facility is initiated.
Table 1.10 Panel A presents the estimation of equation (1.5). On columns 1 and 5, I once
more replicate Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2013) specification and the results under my
sample are similar to their numbers. A two-standard deviation increase in Beta MKT is related to
an increase of (2 x 0.733 x 0.149 =) 21.84 basis points in All-In Drawn Spread for the negatively
exposed subsample. For positively exposed firms the results show a similar but economically smaller
22Model (1.5) is motivated from equation (21) at Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2013).
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relation, a two-standard deviation change in Beta MKT is predicted to increase spreads by (2 x
0.733 x 0.060 =) 8.79 basis points. Furthermore, the coefficients for all control variables have the
same sign as in their study.23
After matching the results on sample, I turn to the results related to the currency exposure
hypotheses. The coefficients estimates on column (2) indicate that an increase of two-standard-
deviation in Beta FX is related to a rise of (2 x 0.867 x 0.129=) 22.36 basis points in the spread of the
drawn portion of lines of credit for negatively exposed firms at the highest quintile of Globalization.
Additionally, the weaker statistical significance of Beta FX at lower quintiles shows that the effect
is restricted to the most globalized firms. I also report the estimation of model (1.5) on samples
based on Beta FX ’s p-value. Column 3 shows that the estimated µ5 under a low p-value subsample
implies that a two standard deviation change in Beta FX is related to an increase of (2 x 0.867
x 0.213 =) 36.93 basis points in All-In-Drawn Spread. That is 1.6 times higher than the relation
predicted for the whole negatively exposed sample. Columns 6 to 8 show that a similar pattern is
found for the positively exposed subsample.
When I evaluate the effect of currency exposure on the Undrawn Fee, Table 1.10 Panel B shows
a slightly different outcome compared to the All-In-Drawn analysis. For negatively exposed firms,
the estimated coefficient µ5 is statistically significant only for the low Beta FX ’s p-value subsample.
However, one cannot reject that currency exposure is not related to the spread on the undrawn
portion of lines of credit for the positively exposed firms.
Despite weaker statistical results for the Undrawn Fee analyses, the strong results linking expo-
sure to currency risk and higher spreads on the drawn portion of lines of credit indicates that the
cost mechanism is driving the negative relation between exposure to currency risk and availability
of lines of credit. It is also interesting to notice that the results for the estimated νq coefficients
23A noteworthy difference is the coefficient on Tangibility : it is not significant different from zero on my study and
significant at 5% level at theirs.
31
show that Globalization per se is not related to the spread charged on lines of credit. On evaluating
the availability of lines of credit, the results suggest that Globalization itself is a key determinant
that increases not only LC-to-Assets but also LC-to-Cash. All together, the evidences suggest that
Globalization by itself is not a risk that decreases the expected return of the banks on lines of
credit. As consequence, an increasing demand for lines of credit due to Globalization leads to an
equilibrium where one observes higher availability of these for more globalized firms. Even impor-
tant is to highlight the different pattern between Globalization and exposure to currency risk. Both
may increase the demand for lines of credit, however while the first is not a risk, the second is, and
in equilibrium they produce opposite relations to the availability of credit lines.
1.4 Alternative Betas
All the analyses implemented on previous sections have relied on the assumption that Beta FX is
able to capture the exposure to currency risk faced by firms. The empirical design behind section
3.4 even took advantage of the heterogeneity on the quality of Beta FX to improve the evidence
on the relationship between currency exposure and liquidity management. However, on all these
cases the baseline currency beta remained the same Beta FX. As previously discussed, Beta FX is
a preferred candidate to be a baseline currency beta due to its properties of being able to capture
an independent correlation from firm’s market determined returns and movements on the exchange
rate. Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to assume that Beta FX perfectly captures all the relevant
information on the exposure to currency risk that pertains liquidity management. Other currency
betas may not be as desirable as Beta FX is, however they may capture some relevant information
that were not evaluated under the baseline beta. If the previously documented relationship between
currency exposure and liquidity management is not to be undermined, then I should expect to find
similar results between alternative betas and liquidity management.
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I evaluate the robustness of the previous results by constructing alternative betas based on
concerns around Beta FX and re-estimate the LC-to-Cash analyses. Mainly, I tackle concerns that
are related: (i) to the procedures by which Beta FX is estimated and unlevered, (ii) to the choice
of the index of currencies, and (iii) to problems associated to the use of market data in place of
financial statements data. Additionally, I also evaluate the role of other alternative betas that are
not a challenge to the baseline results, but a complementary evaluation on specific questions.
Beta Cash and Beta Equity. I motivated the use of an asset beta as a way to avoid the
mechanical relation with credit lines. However, another pitfall may arise when applying a measure
of leverage that is based on gross debt: firms with high cash holdings (risk-free securities) could
present lower asset-based betas. To verify if the results are robust to this potential problem,
I employ net leverage (gross debt − cash / total assets) to unlever the equity-based beta, the
estimated β1 coefficient from equation (1.1). The resulting Beta Cash is then used to analyze the
effect of currency exposure on the availability of lines of credit. Additionally, I report the results
of the equity-based beta (Beta Equity) for comparison.
Beta OneFactor. As previously discussed, constructing the baseline currency beta by isolating
it from the market risk allows for the estimation of an independent effect. However, it leaves open
the question about the whole quantitative effect from currency exposure on liquidity policy. Even
though this is not a problem that could challenge the results, it is interesting to gauge the complete
effect and compare it to the independent one. As this alternate beta is built from a modified version
of equation (1.1) where the only independent factor on the regression is the return on the broad
exchange rate index, it is named Beta OneFactor.
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Beta Portfolio. The estimation of the baseline Beta FX may suffer from measurement error.
Therefore I construct Beta Portfolio to offset idiosyncrasies. Annually, 20 equally weighted port-
folios are formed on the ranking of 10 deciles of negative Beta FX firms and 10 deciles of positive
Beta FX firms. For each portfolio and year, I re-estimate equation (1.1) and assign the unlevered
β1 as Beta Portfolio.
Beta Tail. It could be the case that the exposure to currency movements that matters to liquidity
management is actually restricted to extreme exchange rate shocks that reduce the value of the
firms. In that case, only a strong appreciation of the U.S. dollar would matter to negatively exposed
firms and only a strong depreciation of the U.S. dollar would matter to positively exposed firms.
To test this hypothesis I construct a beta that only captures the undesirable tail risk of each of
these two groups of firms. I estimate a modified version of a beta that captures tail risk found
in Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2017) to create Beta Tail. It is defined as the
ratio of the marginal expected shortfall over the expected shortfall. The expected shortfall is the
average ∆FX for the 5 worst ∆FX months for each firm-year on the last 60 months. The marginal
expected shortfall is the average return on same 5 worst months of ∆FX for each firm-year on
the last 60 months. Therefore, Beta Tail captures the average loss in return for each unfavorable
percentage point change in the exchange rate.
Beta TWM. The reliance on the assumption that Beta FX is able to capture exposure to
currency risk using a trade-weighted basket of currencies from a broad set of trading patterns of
the United States may be a reason for concern. Firms whose foreign sales are concentrated on
a smaller set of countries or even on just one country would be less affected by the broad index,
and instead would be more sensitive to a specific currency. Although the correlation between the
broad index and each one of the currencies of the countries reported as foreign markets for my
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sample between the years of 1998 and 2012 is positive, there still could be idiosyncratic currency
movements that do not matter for liquidity management. Therefore, to tackle this issue I construct
an additional beta: Beta TWM. To estimate it I replace the percentage change on the broad index of
currencies for an index based on a basket of currencies restricted to the major trade partners of the
United States. Given that the latter is a subset of the first, the analysis on the relationship between
Beta TWM and LC-to-Cash reflects the following question: is the documented relationship between
currency exposure and liquidity management being solely driven by exchange rate movements of
less important countries or is it also driven by the currencies the U.S. major trade partners? By
construction, the major trade partners are the most important countries to where U.S. firms export
and from where they import. Therefore, it is important to show that the latter holds in order to
validate the identification strategy that the exposure to currency risk that matters for liquidity
management is the one that one can direct link the sales of a firm to its foreign market.
Beta IFS. Even though Beta TWM focuses on a set of countries more related to the average firm
engaged on foreign trade, it could be the case that my sample is biased towards a different weighting
of the countries. Hence, I construct a beta that captures the exposure to the exact foreign markets
to where the firm sells. To do that, first I identify each reported foreign geographical segment at
the country level for each firm-year; therefore called identified foreign segment (IFS).24 Second,
I re-estimate equation (1.1) for each firm-year-IFS using the percentage change of the currency
of each IFS in place of the broad index. Finally, I aggregate all estimated IFS exposures at the
firm-year level to create Beta IFS.25 The meaning of the analysis on the relationship between Beta
IFS and LC-to-Cash is similar to the one for Beta TWM, however the first is able to identify the
exact market of each firm’s sales exposure.
24See Appendix A for a detailed explanation on the definition of IFS.
25See Appendix B for more details on the construction of Beta IFS.
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Beta Cash Flow and Beta Gap. There is a possibility that it could be the case that the
correlation of future prospects of the company and movements on the exchange rate is a more
important determinant for liquidity management compared to the correlation between the current
liquidity needs and movements on the exchange rate. To evaluate if the previous claim holds I test
if LC-to-Cash is related to measures of current liquidity needs and liquidity provision. To do so, I
make use of betas constructed from information on the financial statements of a company, particu-
larly on the provision of cash flow and on the net need for resources defined by difference between
cash flow and capital investments (gap). I follow the strategy employed in Acharya, Almeida, and
Campello (2013) to construct Beta Cash Flow : for each industry at the three-digit level, I estimate
the sensitivity of its ratio of cash flow to assets to ∆FX, by regressing a 10-year rolling window.
Once more, in order to not capture the aggregate effect, I control for the cash flow of all industries
together, the whole sample. The same process is employed to construct Beta Gap.
Table 1.11 shows the descriptive statistics for the all the alternative betas beforehand defined.
The ones constructed from market data: Beta Equity, Beta Cash, Beta OneFactor, Beta TWM,
Beta IFS, Beta Tail and Beta Portfolio present, for each subsample of negatively and positively
exposed firms, mean values whose magnitude is comparable to the one of the baseline Beta FX.
Conversely, the ones estimated from financial statements data display lower mean values: the
average of Beta Cash Flow (-0.059) for negatively exposed firms is around a 19th of the average of
Beta FX (-1.118). This outcome is not unexpected, while all variables employed on the estimation
of market based betas are at percentage levels (change), the regressions for financial statements
beta have a change on a percentage variable (exchange rate) on the right side linked to a ratio
level (cash flow/assets) on the left side. The size of the latter is twentyfold the size of the first.
Nevertheless, the coefficient of variation for Beta FX (0.76) and Beta CashFlow (0.67) are similar.
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Table 1.12 displays the correlations among all betas: the ones that are constructed from market
data have higher correlation among them, on the other hand betas built from information on
financial statements possess a less correlated pattern. Beta Gap is the only alternative beta to have
a negative, but small correlation to the baseline beta. For firms with good investment opportunities,
there is a positive relationship between required external funds on the present date and expected
future cash flow, that in turn is positively correlated to equity return. Therefore, required external
funds will be positively related to equity returns. Finally, as Beta Gap is constructed from the
negative of required external funds, then it is expected to present a stronger negative relation to
Beta FX the more are there firms with good prospects in the sample.
Table 1.13 shows the estimation of model (1.3) substituting Beta FX by each one of the alter-
native betas.26 In general, the results give evidence that the relationship between currency betas
and the choice between lines of credit and cash holds when other proxies for currency exposure are
evaluated. As expected, the alternative betas that have a high correlation with Beta FX, above
0.9, such as Beta Equity, Beta Cash, Beta TWM, Beta IFS, and Beta Portfolio, present similar re-
lationships to LC-to-Cash when compared to the baseline beta. According to the results shown on
columns 7, 8, 13 and 14, the market based information about exposure to currency risk brought by
Beta TWM and Beta IFS, that is not captured be the baseline beta, is also related to LC-to-Cash.
It is interesting to highlight the results for the betas whose correlation with Beta FX is low.
Beta Cash Flow and Beta Gap carry orthogonal information to the baseline beta about provision
of liquidity that is correlated with exchange rate. Columns 9 to 12 present the results for these two
alternative betas separated by the negative and positive exposure subsamples. For these regressions,
in place of controlling for a variation of Beta MKT, I use as a proxy for aggregate beta the estimated
sensitivity of each industry cash flow or Gap to the aggregated ones. Although the result for θ5 at
26All subsamples are constructed using the sign of their respective alternative beta. Besides, the subsamples are
limited to the firm-years with whose alternative beta’s p-value is highly significant (bottom 35%).
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column 9 is statistically weak, the ones presented on columns 10 to 11 give evidence that this new
information on exposure to currency risk matters for liquidity management. At a first sight the
estimated θ5 for Beta Cash Flow and Beta Gap may indicate a five to tenfold higher quantitative
effect on LC-to-Cash compared to the market betas. However, a closer look at their distribution
shows that the difference is not too large. A two-standard deviation change in Beta Cash Flow is
related to a decrease of (2 x 0.059 x 1.090=) 12.86 p.p. in LC-to-Cash for positively exposed firms,
compared to a decrease of 16.99 p.p. for a similar change in Beta FX.27
The only alternative beta that do not show strong results for θ5 either on the negative or the
positive subsample is Beta Tail. Even in that case, the interaction of the beta at the fourth
or at the third quintile of Globalization presents an estimated coefficient statistically significantly
different from zero. Overall, the results reported on Table 1.13 suggest that the concerns previously
mentioned about Beta FX do not play a significant role to challenge the documented negative
relation between currency exposure and liquidity management. Even when new information about
exposure to currency risk is evaluated, the results also hold.
1.5 Time Series Analysis
The previous analyses documented that cross-section heterogeneity on exposure to currency risk
among firms is related to distinct policies on liquidity. In this section, I evaluate the time varying
role of the underlying currency risk on these firms to explain changes on the use and cost of
liquidity instruments. I claim that on periods when currency markets present higher volatility: (i)
the contractual terms for companies highly exposed to currency risk worsen, and (ii) the necessity
to create a liquidity buffer increases. By consequence, in these times, firms are expected to initiate
less agreements on lines of credit and to rely more on cash for liquidity. Differently from the
27Estimation for Beta FX based on results from Table 1.7 Panel B column 3, (2 x 0.879 x 0.109=) 19.16 p.p.
38
aggregate volatility mechanism found on Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2013), not all firms
will be affected by changes on the underlying risk: banks are not expected to increase spreads on
new lines for firms with low exposure to currency risk, either the need for cushion is increased for
these firms. To evaluate this claim, I regress a modified version their time series SUR model to
estimate the effect of expected currency volatility on credit lines initiations, on cash holdings, on
spread, and on maturity:
LC Initiationt = ζ0 + ζ1 FXiV olt−1 + ζ2 ∆FXt + ζ3 V IXt−1 + ζ4CP Spreadt−1
+ ζ5 ∆GDPt−1 + ζ6TimeTrendt + ξt (1.6)
The dependent variable in the equation above, LC Initiation, is the aggregate amount of lines of
credit initiated on fiscal year t over aggregate assets. FXiVol is the predicted volatility of monthly
∆FX for the next three months, constructed from a GARCH(1,1) model. It is at a proxy for the
expected volatility of currencies. VIX, the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index options, is a
proxy for aggregate risk volatility. Other control variables include CP Spread, the three−month
spread of commercial paper over Treasury bills; ∆GDPt−1, the percentage change on real economic
growth of the U.S.; and a time trend.
Model (1.6) is estimated separately for each quintile of negative Beta FX firms and for each
quintile of positive Beta FX firms. If my claim holds, then ζ1 is expected to be negative on the
regressions involving the highly exposed firms, specifically the bottom quintile of negative Beta
FX firms and the top quintile of positive Beta FX firms. On the other hand, the parameter ζ1
is expected to be zero on the regressions involving less exposed firms, specifically the top quintile
of negative Beta FX firms and the bottom quintile of positive Beta FX firms. Moreover, the
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difference on ζ1 between the highly exposed groups and their corresponding less exposed ones is
expected to be positive.
As mentioned before, besides the estimation of model (1.6) using LC Initiation as dependent
variable, I evaluate the time series effect of currency volatility on the aggregate change in cash
holdings (Change in Cash), on the average spread charged by banks on the drawn portion of credit
lines (Avg. Spread) and on the average maturity of lines of credit (Avg. Maturity). Also, I report
the regression of model (1.6) for other two additional dependent variables: (i) on the residuals of
the estimation of model (1.3) for LC Initiation; and (ii) the residuals of model (1.4) for Change in
Cash. The time series analyses involving the residuals from these models mitigate concerns over
the role of covariates on the determination of initiation of lines of credit and cash holdings.
While for the Avg. Maturity analysis I expect ζ1 to have a similar pattern to the LC Initiation
analysis, for the Avg. Spread and Change in Cash regressions, I expect ζ1 to be positive on the
regressions involving highly exposed firms, so that they reflect a worsening of contractual terms on
periods of high volatility on currency markets and higher need for a liquidity buffer.
Table 1.14 presents the results of the estimation of model (1.6) for the six variables related to
liquidy management previously discussed. Panel A reports the result for LC Initiation and Panel
B the results for its residuals from model (1.2). The estimated coefficients presented on column 1 of
both panels replicates the findings of Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2013) on my sample: when
the aggregate volatility of the economy is higher it reduces the aggregate initiation of lines of credit.
The findings on columns 3 to 6 provide evidence that currency volatility also plays an important
role to explain initiations of lines of credit. Particularly, for highly exposed firms, either negative or
positive, column 3 of Panel B show that an increase in one-standard deviation in FXiVol reduces
LC Initiation by (0.0069 × 1.007 =) 0.69 p.p. Given that the average of LC Initiation is 0.0520
and its standard deviation is 0.0175, this change in currency volatility decreases the initiation of
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credit of lines by (0.69/5.20=) 13.26%, at the mean, and it is able to explain (0.69 / 1.75 =) 57%
of the variation in LC Initiation of highly negatively exposed firms. As expected, the results for
less exposed firms, columns 4 and 5, shows that the effect of currency volatility on new lines of
credit is not significant. Moreover, using the SUR properties, the difference between ζ1 for highly
exposed firms and the one for less exposed ones is statistically significantly different from zero at
the 1% level on the residual analysis.
The estimated coefficients for FXiVol on Table 1.14 Panels C and D give evidence that in times
of higher volatility on currency markets firms increase their cash holdings. Although the results on
Panel C just show a significant effect for negatively exposed firms, the results on Panel D, that are
net of other explanatory variables for cash holdings, show a significant effect for all highly exposed
firms. Particularly, an increase of one-standard deviation in FXiVol raises cash holdings by (0.0069
× 0.979 =) 6.8 p.p for the bottom quintile of negatively exposed firms. As the time average of
aggregate cash holdings is 0.1289, for the first quintile of negatively exposed firms, a one-standard
deviation increase in currency volatility increases their cash holdings by (6.8 / 12.89 =) 52.75% at
the mean.
Table 1.14 Panel E shows the results of the time series analysis for Avg. Spread. As expected,
the results on the estimation of ζ1 for highly exposed firms show that higher currency volatility
increases the average spread charged by banks on new lines of credit. For the bottom quintile of
negatively exposed firms, a one-standard deviation change in FXiVol raises the spread by (0.0069
× 9.649 =) 6.65 basis points. Given that the average spread on lines of credit is 189.48 basis
points, this change in volatility raises the cost by (6.65 / 189,48 =) 3.51%. This effect supports the
previous results as a reason for firms to initiate less lines of credit when volatility is high. Implicitly,
the spread-elasticity of new lines of credit is predicted to be elastic at (0.1326 / 0.0351 =) 3.78.
On a similar analysis for the credit lines spread-elasticity of cash holdings, the value of (0.5275 /
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0.0351 =) 15.03 seems unreal. It suggests that the increase of cash holdings from higher currency
volatility is due to other motifs harder than the cost of lines of credit. Precautionary reasons is
one suitable candidate to complement the predicted variation in cash.
Finally, Table 1.14 Panel F shows the results for the time series analysis on average maturity.
Differently from the aggregate volatility, there is no evidence that currency volatility reduces the
maturity of new lines of credit. Although economically negative, the estimated ζ1 for all subsamples
is not statistically significantly different from zero. Furthermore, ζ1 for the bottom quintile of neg-
atively exposed firms is economically stronger than the one for highly exposed firms, contradicting
the expected behavior of banks in bad times.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
In this study, I claim that firms exposed to currency risk shape their liquidity policy to secure that
profitable investments are not foregone due to currency-driven liquidity shortfalls. Specifically,
exposed firms should present higher cash holdings and less lines of credit compared to not exposed
firms. My results confirm these hypotheses by showing that highly globalized firms indeed display
a negative correlation between currency exposure and the choice of credit lines over cash. I show
that this association is statistically significant, economically sizable, and independent from the
systematic exposure effect. I also show that exposure to currency risk limits the availability of lines
of credit, increasing the spread charged by banks. Several measures to capture exposure to currency
risk are employed and the results are robust to most of them. Besides, I present empirical evidence
that on times of high volatility on currency markets, the initiation of new credit lines diminishes,
the spread charged on them increases, and that the accumulation of cash holdings accelerates. All
together, the results suggest that a mix of precautionary reasons and higher cost of credit lines
drives an increase on cash holdings and a decrease in the availability of lines of credit for firms
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exposed to currency risk.
While this study sheds light on the determinants of globalized firms’ liquidity policy, it is still an
avenue for future research to differentiate the effects of firms with foreign subsidiaries vs. exporting
firms with U.S.-only operations. Another source of currency risk exposure to be inspected in future
work is that of firms importing a large share of their inputs from foreign markets. Finally, it was
inferred from the results on the cost and availability of credit lines that exposure to currency risk is
correlated to the likelihood of breaking up covenants or defaulting. Conditional on data availability,
it would be complementary to empirically analyze this relationship.
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1.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Currency Exposure and the Choice between Lines of Credit and Cash Holdings
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This figure shows the relationship between exposure to currency risk (Beta FX ) and the ratio
of credit lines to total liquidity (LC-to-Cash), by quintiles of foreign sales over total sales (Glob-
alization). The availability of lines of credit as a proportion of total liquidity is decreasing on
Globalization. The sensitivity of liquidity to exposure urrency risk is increasing on Globalization:
the higher the exposure to currency risk, the lower is the availability of lines of credit.
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Figure 1.2: Currency Exposure and Lines of Credit by Ebitda
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This figure presents the relationship between exposure to currency risk (Beta FX ) and the
availability of at least one credit line, by quintiles of Ebitda. The availability of lines of credit
is increasing on Ebitda. The sensitivity of the availability of lines of credit to exposure to
currency risk is not dependent on Ebitda.
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Figure 1.3: Currency Exposure and Lines of Credit as a Proportion of Assets
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This figure shows the relationship between exposure to currency risk (Beta FX ) and the ratio of
credit lines to total assets (LC-to-Assets), by quintiles of foreign sales over total sales (Global-
ization). The availability of lines of credit as a proportion of total liquidity is mostly decreasing
on Globalization. The sensitivity of LC-to-Assets to exposure currency risk is higher for highly
globalized firms.
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Figure 1.4: Currency Exposure and Cash Holdings
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This figure presents the relationship between exposure to currency risk (Beta FX ) and the ratio of
cash holdings to total assets (Cash-to-Assets), by quintiles of foreign sales over total sales (Global-
ization). Highly globalized firms hold more cash. The sensitivity of cash holdings to currency risk
has a clear increasing pattern on exposure to currency risk only for positively exposed and highly
globalized firms.
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Figure 1.5: TWEXB against U.S. dollar
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This figure shows the monthly time series of a trade weighted basket of currencies (TWEXB) from
a broad set of major trade partners of the United States. The series is normalized to 100 on
January 1998, denoting U.S. dollars per unit of foreign currency. A depreciation (appreciation) of
the U.S. is represented by a decrease (increase) on TWEXB. The time window from January 1998
to December 2012 matches the whole estimation period of currency exposure (Beta FX ), where the
monthly return on TWEXB is used as a factor.
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Figure 1.6: Frequency of Beta FX
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This figure presents the frequency of firms’ exposure to currency risk (Beta FX ) estimated using
equation 1.1. Its symmetry implies the quantity of negative and positively exposed firms are similar.
Beta FX is winsorized at 5% level on each tail.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for selected variables used in empirical analyses. The sample is a
match between Compustat Annual North America Fundamentals and LPC Dealscan for firm-years with
estimated Beta FX. The sample period include fiscal years between 1998 and 2012. Each panel summarizes
the variables related to a different source. The sample consists of 30,300 observations for 2,604 unique
firms. See Appendix D for definition of variables.
Variables Mean St.Dev. p25 Median p75 Firm-years
Assets (USD 2000 Millions) 2,801 16,684 77 312 1,270 30,300
Sales (USD 2000 Millions) 2,437 10,709 72 305 1,222 30,300
Cash 0.182 0.193 0.031 0.107 0.277 30,300
Cash Flow 0.041 0.127 0.022 0.069 0.110 27,880
Ebitda 0.083 0.142 0.046 0.110 0.165 30,259
Tangibility 0.249 0.212 0.081 0.179 0.357 30,265
Networth 0.309 0.250 0.181 0.347 0.486 30,297
Q 1.862 1.250 1.097 1.454 2.131 30,290
Age 20.966 14.271 10.000 16.000 29.000 30,300
IndSalesVol 0.134 1.118 0.042 0.059 0.081 30,254
ProfitVol 0.080 0.141 0.025 0.049 0.096 30,244
Leverage 0.215 0.215 0.015 0.172 0.334 30,300
Acquisitions 0.021 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.013 29,207
Capex 0.051 0.059 0.017 0.032 0.061 30,151
Dividends 0.318 0.466 0.000 0.000 1.000 30,300
Debt Issuance 0.007 0.066 -0.017 0.000 0.011 28,407
Equity Issuance 0.009 0.074 -0.009 0.000 0.008 27,368
Non Cash NWC 0.077 0.176 -0.030 0.070 0.190 29,536
R&D 0.066 0.124 0.000 0.003 0.074 30,300
LC-to-Assets 0.232 0.669 0.000 0.083 0.307 30,300
LC-to-Cash 0.418 0.413 0.000 0.363 0.869 30,300
All-In Drawn Spread 1.736 1.159 0.750 1.500 2.500 6,846
Undrawn Fee 0.303 0.212 0.010 0.150 0.250 5,991
Globalization 0.226 0.278 0.000 0.105 0.391 30,300
Beta FX 0.038 1.429 -0.866 0.045 0.942 30,300
Beta FX (negative) -1.125 0.867 -1.703 -0.904 -0.406 14,723
Beta FX (positive) 1.138 0.879 0.418 0.912 1.702 15,577
P-Value (Beta FX) 0.468 0.295 0.210 0.454 0.722 30,300
Beta MKT 1.101 0.733 0.539 0.964 1.545 30,300
P-Value (Beta MKT) 0.124 0.222 0.001 0.014 0.127 30,300
Panel D: Estimated Baseline Betas
Panel A: Compustat North America Variables
Panel B:  LPC Credit Line Variables
Panel C: Compustat Segment Variables
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Table 1.2: Sample Comparison
This table shows summary statistics for the main variables by subsamples based on the level of Globalization,
on the sign of Beta FX, and on the statistical significance of Beta FX (low or high p-value). The whole sample
consists of 30,300 observations for 2,604 unique firms. See Appendix D for definition of variables.
All firms Domestic
Variables All All All
Negative     
Beta FX
Positive      
Beta FX
Low                 
p -value
High                
p -value
1st Quintile    
Glob.
5th Quintile 
Glob.
Assets (USD 2000 Millions) 2,801 1,328 3,519 3,742 3,300 3,792 3,208 2,280 3,983
(16,684) (6,184) (19,843) (21,822) (17,692) (17,966) (19,884) (14,924) (15,991)
Sale (USD 2000 Millions) 2,437 1,332 2,976 3,273 2,685 3,156 2,725 2,029 3,643
(10,709) (4,909) (12,567) (14,507) (10,314) (12,138) (10,583) (8,633) (17,139)
Cash 0.182 0.154 0.197 0.180 0.212 0.188 0.205 0.189 0.254
(0.193) (0.192) (0.192) (0.188) (0.194) (0.189) (0.197) (0.207) (0.197)
Cash-Flow 0.041 0.033 0.045 0.049 0.040 0.051 0.040 0.028 0.040
(0.127) (0.135) (0.122) (0.121) (0.124) (0.118) (0.125) (0.148) (0.125)
Ebitda 0.083 0.080 0.085 0.090 0.079 0.094 0.077 0.069 0.074
(0.142) (0.150) (0.138) (0.138) (0.137) (0.134) (0.141) (0.164) (0.139)
Tangibility 0.249 0.327 0.211 0.234 0.188 0.236 0.193 0.225 0.198
(0.212) (0.251) (0.179) (0.196) (0.157) (0.196) (0.162) (0.193) (0.175)
Networth 0.309 0.308 0.309 0.318 0.301 0.318 0.306 0.294 0.284
(0.250) (0.263) (0.244) (0.234) (0.253) (0.236) (0.247) (0.289) (0.231)
Q 1.862 1.717 1.933 1.926 1.939 1.945 1.927 1.967 1.957
(1.250) (1.186) (1.274) (1.278) (1.271) (1.282) (1.269) (1.398) (1.228)
Age 20.966 18.575 22.131 22.698 21.576 23.157 21.575 18.538 22.368
(14.271) (12.110) (15.076) (15.406) (14.725) (15.584) (14.766) (12.120) (15.388)
IndSalesVol 0.134 0.129 0.137 0.143 0.131 0.129 0.135 0.141 0.129
(1.118) (1.290) (1.024) (1.146) (0.888) (1.004) (0.985) (1.057) (1.059)
ProfitVol 0.080 0.083 0.079 0.078 0.080 0.080 0.079 0.096 0.089
(0.141) (0.108) (0.154) (0.105) (0.190) (0.229) (0.103) (0.126) (0.264)
Leverage 0.215 0.255 0.195 0.202 0.188 0.199 0.188 0.226 0.163
(0.215) (0.238) (0.200) (0.193) (0.205) (0.197) (0.199) (0.234) (0.178)
Acquisitions 0.021 0.016 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.020
(0.045) (0.041) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.049) (0.043)
Capex 0.051 0.064 0.044 0.049 0.039 0.048 0.041 0.050 0.043
(0.059) (0.076) (0.047) (0.052) (0.041) (0.052) (0.043) (0.062) (0.044)
Dividends 0.318 0.295 0.330 0.356 0.304 0.359 0.306 0.240 0.292
(0.466) (0.456) (0.470) (0.479) (0.460) (0.480) (0.461) (0.427) (0.455)
Debt Issuance 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.004
(0.066) (0.070) (0.064) (0.065) (0.063) (0.064) (0.062) (0.072) (0.060)
Equity Issuance 0.009 0.014 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.017 0.006
(0.074) (0.079) (0.071) (0.072) (0.070) (0.067) (0.075) (0.085) (0.070)
Non Cash NWC 0.077 0.058 0.086 0.089 0.084 0.089 0.085 0.087 0.070
(0.176) (0.187) (0.170) (0.164) (0.175) (0.165) (0.173) (0.193) (0.149)
R&D 0.066 0.044 0.076 0.070 0.083 0.070 0.081 0.071 0.112
(0.124) (0.128) (0.121) (0.118) (0.123) (0.116) (0.125) (0.142) (0.131)
LC-to-Assets 0.232 0.261 0.218 0.235 0.201 0.210 0.222 0.297 0.157
(0.669) (0.851) (0.559) (0.594) (0.523) (0.323) (0.708) (1.100) (0.438)
LC-to-Cash 0.418 0.437 0.409 0.444 0.375 0.428 0.397 0.424 0.300
(0.413) (0.436) (0.401) (0.405) (0.394) (0.403) (0.400) (0.422) (0.358)
All-In Drawn Spread 1.736 1.996 1.620 1.575 1.670 1.579 1.596 1.946 1.606
(1.159) (1.109) (1.162) (1.144) (1.181) (1.133) (1.190) (1.177) (1.165)
Undrawn Fee 0.303 0.347 0.285 0.279 0.291 0.284 0.278 0.332 0.284
(0.212) (0.216) (0.207) (0.198) (0.217) (0.216) (0.194) (0.221) (0.202)
Globalization 0.226 0.000 0.336 0.337 0.336 0.350 0.330 0.007 0.757
(0.278) (0.000) (0.280) (0.278) (0.282) (0.282) (0.282) (0.011) (0.158)
Beta FX 0.038 0.075 0.021 -1.118 1.135 -0.008 0.014 0.038 0.041
(1.429) (1.435) (1.426) (0.863) (0.884) (2.092) (0.425) (1.488) (1.512)
Beta FX (negative) -1.125 -1.139 -1.118 -1.118 . -1.930 -0.310 -1.169 -1.164
(0.867) (0.874) (0.863) (0.863) . (0.724) (0.279) (0.877) (0.905)
Beta FX (positive) 1.138 1.144 1.135 . 1.135 1.978 0.325 1.213 1.224
(0.879) (0.871) (0.884) . (0.884) (0.772) (0.285) (0.906) (0.950)
P-Value (Beta FX) 0.468 0.475 0.465 0.460 0.470 0.117 0.834 0.481 0.456
(0.295) (0.292) (0.296) (0.298) (0.294) (0.077) (0.096) (0.291) (0.303)
Beta MKT 0.733 0.928 1.185 0.996 1.370 1.192 1.185 1.106 1.432
(0.733) (0.665) (0.749) (0.687) (0.762) (0.777) (0.733) (0.735) (0.792)
P-Value (Beta MKT) 0.124 0.174 0.099 0.134 0.066 0.102 0.098 0.134 0.072
(0.222) (0.256) (0.200) (0.228) (0.161) (0.207) (0.196) (0.227) (0.177)
Number of Observations 30,300 9,925 20,375 10,076 10,299 6,204 6,042 3,155 4,609
Globalized
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Table 1.3: Currency Exposure and Lines of Credit (Extensive Margin)
This table reports regressions output from equation (1.2). The dependent variable is a
dummy that takes the value of 1 if a firm has at least one line of credit open at year t.
Beta FX is a proxy for exposure to currency risk. Each Quintile is a dummy for the qth
quintile of firm-years with positive Globalization and Domestic is a dummy for domestic
firms. Columns 1 to 3 reports the regression using the whole sample, while 4 to 7 are
estimated separately for subsamples based on the sign of Beta FX. See Appendix D for
definition of variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
|Beta FX| * 5th Quintile -0.025** -0.024* -0.028* -0.019
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
|Beta FX| * 4th Quintile -0.007 -0.003 -0.035*** -0.027***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.007)
|Beta FX| * 3th Quintile -0.012 -0.008 -0.000 0.007
(0.011) (0.013) (0.025) (0.026)
|Beta FX| * 2nd Quintile -0.011 -0.007 -0.022* -0.016
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
|Beta FX| * 1st Quintile 0.023 0.025 0.003 0.010
(0.022) (0.022) (0.008) (0.008)
|Beta FX| * Domestic -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.015)
5th Quintile -0.091*** -0.077*** -0.061 -0.048 -0.064 -0.057
(0.022) (0.030) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040)
4th Quintile -0.009 0.001 -0.021 -0.016 0.048 0.049
(0.032) (0.042) (0.050) (0.050) (0.045) (0.045)
3th Quintile 0.029 0.045 0.060* 0.059* 0.032 0.033
(0.029) (0.033) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028)
2nd Quintile 0.037 0.045* 0.044 0.042 0.068** 0.069**
(0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029)
1st Quintile 0.035*** 0.049*** 0.013 0.013 0.041 0.042
(0.013) (0.013) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
Beta MKT -0.044*** -0.057*** -0.025*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Ebitda 0.391*** 0.375*** 0.346*** 0.337*** 0.273*** 0.453*** 0.422***
(0.038) (0.041) (0.054) (0.057) (0.049) (0.074) (0.088)
Tangibility 0.093 0.092 0.094 0.094* 0.072 0.118 0.110
(0.059) (0.059) (0.064) (0.051) (0.047) (0.088) (0.084)
Size 0.110*** 0.113*** 0.115*** 0.117*** 0.120*** 0.107*** 0.109***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Networth 0.024 0.015 0.025 0.012 0.020 0.029 0.030
(0.028) (0.032) (0.032) (0.037) (0.038) (0.030) (0.029)
Q -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.050*** -0.063*** -0.062***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
Age 0.010 0.009 0.008* 0.013 0.004 0.015 0.011
(0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
IndSalesVol -0.001 -0.001 -0.002** -0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
ProfitVol 0.015 0.021 0.052 0.019 0.082 -0.020 0.021
(0.039) (0.036) (0.052) (0.065) (0.064) (0.040) (0.045)
Observations 41,266 41,266 29,355 14,230 14,230 15,125 15,125
Pseudo R-squared 0.263 0.269 0.281 0.302 0.308 0.260 0.260
Ind. fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at industry one-digit level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Positive Beta FXNegative Beta FXAll firms
Dependent variable: firm has line of credit {0,1}
Logit (marginal effects)
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Table 1.4: Currency Exposure and the Choice between Cash and Lines of Credit
This table reports regressions output from equation (1.3). The dependent variable is LC-to-Cash.
Beta FX is a proxy for exposure to currency risk. Each Quintile is a dummy for the qth quintile
of firm-years with positive Globalization and Domestic is a dummy for domestic firms. Columns
1 to 2 reports the regression using the whole sample, while 3 to 6 are estimated separately for
subsamples based on the sign of Beta FX. See Appendix D for definition of variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
|Beta FX| * 5th Quintile -0.034* -0.034* -0.058*** -0.039***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011)
|Beta FX| * 4th Quintile -0.016 -0.013 -0.041** -0.027
(0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016)
|Beta FX| * 3th Quintile -0.024 -0.020 -0.046*** -0.030***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.008) (0.006)
|Beta FX| * 2nd Quintile 0.001 -0.001 -0.033 -0.019
(0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.016)
|Beta FX| * 1st Quintile -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.021) (0.021)
|Beta FX| * Domestic -0.010 -0.012 -0.013** 0.000
(0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006)
5th Quintile -0.131*** -0.094 -0.084 -0.130*** -0.117***
(0.031) (0.051) (0.046) (0.023) (0.020)
4th Quintile -0.072** -0.067 -0.065 -0.055* -0.050
(0.030) (0.049) (0.049) (0.029) (0.029)
3th Quintile -0.040 -0.010 -0.011 -0.033 -0.032
(0.024) (0.038) (0.039) (0.030) (0.029)
2nd Quintile -0.002 -0.015 -0.009 0.014 0.017
(0.020) (0.032) (0.032) (0.023) (0.023)
1st Quintile -0.008 -0.004 -0.003 -0.018 -0.017
(0.015) (0.026) (0.026) (0.034) (0.033)
Beta MKT -0.068*** -0.060*** -0.063*** -0.048***
(0.019) (0.015) (0.017) (0.012)
Ebitda 0.207*** 0.198*** 0.277*** 0.217*** 0.207** 0.159**
(0.050) (0.048) (0.041) (0.038) (0.069) (0.067)
Tangibility 0.166** 0.146* 0.176** 0.164** 0.141* 0.131
(0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.075) (0.075)
Size -0.017*** -0.011** -0.008 -0.007 -0.018*** -0.017***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Networth 0.088*** 0.084** 0.073 0.076* 0.093*** 0.093***
(0.024) (0.027) (0.040) (0.040) (0.025) (0.025)
Q -0.078*** -0.075*** -0.077*** -0.074*** -0.075*** -0.073***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Age 0.015 0.018 0.011 0.006 0.030** 0.026*
(0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
IndSalesVol -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ProfitVol -0.215 -0.221 -0.202 -0.120 -0.427 -0.346
(0.216) (0.211) (0.237) (0.199) (0.233) (0.201)
Observations 16,886 16,886 8,559 8,559 8,327 8,327
R-squared 0.234 0.257 0.230 0.245 0.270 0.279
Ind. fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at industry one-digit level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: LC-to-Cash
All firms Negative Beta FX Positive Beta FX
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Table 1.5: Currency Exposure and Lines of Credit
This table reports regressions output from equation (1.3) using LC-to-Assets as the dependent
variable in place of LC-to-Cash. Beta FX is a proxy for exposure to currency risk. Each Quintile
is a dummy for the qth quintile of firm-years with positive Globalization and Domestic is a dummy
for domestic firms. Columns 1 and 2 reports the regression using the whole sample, while 3 to
6 are estimated separately for subsamples based on the sign of Beta FX. See Appendix D for
definition of variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
|Beta FX| * 5th Quintile -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.061*** -0.065***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.007) (0.016)
|Beta FX| * 4th Quintile -0.018 -0.015 -0.053*** -0.056**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.012) (0.018)
|Beta FX| * 3th Quintile -0.070* -0.067* -0.017* -0.020
(0.033) (0.032) (0.008) (0.015)
|Beta FX| * 2nd Quintile -0.026 -0.027 0.013 0.010
(0.014) (0.015) (0.031) (0.034)
|Beta FX| * 1st Quintile -0.093** -0.092** -0.032 -0.035
(0.032) (0.032) (0.077) (0.086)
|Beta FX| * Domestic -0.031 -0.033 0.007 0.005
(0.060) (0.061) (0.014) (0.015)
5th Quintile -0.093 -0.079 -0.071 0.009 0.007
(0.076) (0.140) (0.138) (0.052) (0.052)
4th Quintile -0.090* -0.122 -0.121 -0.002 -0.003
(0.046) (0.132) (0.133) (0.021) (0.022)
3th Quintile -0.058 -0.022 -0.023 -0.027 -0.028
(0.037) (0.095) (0.098) (0.028) (0.028)
2nd Quintile -0.051 -0.089 -0.085 -0.014 -0.014
(0.034) (0.115) (0.117) (0.030) (0.031)
1st Quintile 0.060 0.140 0.141 0.091 0.091
(0.088) (0.191) (0.191) (0.145) (0.145)
Beta MKT -0.030 -0.025 -0.044** 0.009
(0.024) (0.020) (0.014) (0.031)
Ebitda 0.057 0.050 0.018 -0.023 0.051 0.060
(0.143) (0.145) (0.250) (0.250) (0.112) (0.103)
Tangibility -0.062 -0.082 -0.113 -0.122 -0.021 -0.019
(0.097) (0.091) (0.112) (0.108) (0.125) (0.119)
Size -0.062*** -0.056*** -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.056*** -0.056***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Networth -0.203** -0.199** -0.253 -0.251 -0.149*** -0.149***
(0.074) (0.076) (0.154) (0.155) (0.039) (0.039)
Q -0.072*** -0.069*** -0.082*** -0.080*** -0.057*** -0.057***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014)
Age -0.010 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006
(0.025) (0.022) (0.030) (0.030) (0.022) (0.021)
IndSalesVol 0.001 0.001 -0.004** -0.004** 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
ProfitVol 0.251 0.229 0.482 0.539 -0.203 -0.219
(0.336) (0.341) (0.357) (0.343) (0.146) (0.147)
Observations 16,886 16,886 8,559 8,559 8,327 8,327
R-squared 0.031 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.051 0.051
Ind. fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at industry one-digit level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: LC-to-Assets
All firms Negative Beta FX Positive Beta FX
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Table 1.6: Currency Exposure and Cash Holdings
This table reports the estimation of model (1.4). The dependent variable is Cash-
to-Assets and Beta FX is a proxy for exposure to currency risk. Each Quintile
is a dummy for the qth quintile of firm-years with positive Globalization and
Domestic is a dummy for domestic firms. Columns 1 and 2 report the regression
using the whole sample, while 3 to 6 are estimated separately for subsamples
based on the sign of Beta FX. See Appendix D for the definition of variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
|Beta FX| * 5th Quintile 0.002 0.002 0.015*** 0.008**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003)
|Beta FX| * 4th Quintile 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010)
|Beta FX| * 3th Quintile 0.010 0.009 0.012 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
|Beta FX| * 2nd Quintile -0.006 -0.005 -0.002* -0.007***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
|Beta FX| * 1st Quintile 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.004
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
|Beta FX| * Domestic -0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
5th Quintile 0.027** 0.014 0.012 0.033** 0.029**
(0.009) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.012)
4th Quintile 0.008 -0.004 -0.005 0.012 0.011
(0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
3th Quintile 0.012*** -0.008 -0.008 0.013 0.013
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011)
2nd Quintile 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.008 0.007
(0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005)
1st Quintile 0.009* 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.011
(0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Beta MKT 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Cash Flow 0.080*** 0.076*** 0.042 0.047 0.098*** 0.104***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.031) (0.031) (0.014) (0.013)
Q 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Size -0.004** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004 -0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Capex -0.346*** -0.335*** -0.338*** -0.334*** -0.344*** -0.342***
(0.064) (0.068) (0.056) (0.057) (0.091) (0.093)
Acquisitions -0.437*** -0.433*** -0.427*** -0.421*** -0.457*** -0.448***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.034) (0.033)
Leverage -0.167*** -0.164*** -0.165*** -0.161*** -0.171*** -0.164***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.027) (0.026) (0.023) (0.022)
IndSalesVol 0.108** 0.110** 0.114*** 0.097*** 0.154** 0.122*
(0.036) (0.036) (0.031) (0.023) (0.061) (0.059)
ProfitVol 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Non Cash NWC -0.170*** -0.170*** -0.169*** -0.170*** -0.167*** -0.168***
(0.022) (0.020) (0.025) (0.024) (0.020) (0.018)
R&D 0.520*** 0.496*** 0.509*** 0.496*** 0.506*** 0.491***
(0.057) (0.061) (0.082) (0.082) (0.051) (0.054)
Dividends -0.013** -0.013** -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.018** -0.014*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007)
Debt Issuance 0.232*** 0.230*** 0.217*** 0.219*** 0.235*** 0.242***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.035) (0.037) (0.016) (0.016)
Equity Issuance 0.047 0.049 0.099** 0.090** 0.006 -0.000
(0.029) (0.028) (0.040) (0.038) (0.025) (0.025)
Observations 12,959 12,959 6,617 6,617 6,342 6,342
R-squared 0.417 0.421 0.397 0.400 0.435 0.442
Ind. fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at industry one-digit level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: Cash-to-Assets
All firms Negative Beta FX Positive Beta FX
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Table 1.7: Beta FX ’s Statistical Significance: LC-to-Cash Analysis
This table reports regressions output from equation (1.3) for subsamples formed on
the sorting of Beta FX ’s p-value. The dependent variable is LC-to-Cash. Beta FX
is a proxy for exposure to currency risk. Each Quintile is a dummy for the qth quin-
tile of firm-years with positive Globalization and Domestic is a dummy for domestic
firms. Panels A and B report the estimation for the negatively and positively exposed
subsample, respectively. See Appendix D for the definition of variables.
p-value             
< 0.05
p-value             
< 0.10
p-value             
< 0.25
0.25 <                 
p-value               
< 0.50
0.50 <                 
p-value               
< 0.75
0.75 <                 
p-value               
< 1.00
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
|Beta FX| * 5th Quintile -0.179*** -0.121*** -0.098*** -0.061** -0.103*** -0.019
(0.024) (0.018) (0.010) (0.023) (0.030) (0.100)
|Beta FX| * 4th Quintile -0.088 -0.082** -0.060*** -0.070** -0.155*** -0.122
(0.060) (0.036) (0.012) (0.022) (0.035) (0.079)
|Beta FX| * 3th Quintile -0.089** -0.094*** -0.072*** -0.061** -0.137** -0.075
(0.036) (0.021) (0.015) (0.019) (0.046) (0.085)
|Beta FX| * 2nd Quintile -0.069** -0.034 -0.022** -0.099*** -0.027 0.012
(0.023) (0.022) (0.008) (0.029) (0.035) (0.035)
|Beta FX| * 1st Quintile -0.097** -0.070** -0.059** -0.014 -0.035 0.143
(0.040) (0.023) (0.023) (0.032) (0.047) (0.146)
|Beta FX| * Domestic -0.148*** -0.107*** -0.064*** -0.068*** -0.110*** -0.133**
(0.026) (0.022) (0.017) (0.008) (0.029) (0.042)
5th Quintile -0.068 -0.104* -0.059 -0.114** -0.108 -0.098
(0.058) (0.050) (0.044) (0.040) (0.059) (0.054)
4th Quintile -0.211* -0.125* -0.072 -0.080 -0.043 -0.058
(0.099) (0.060) (0.052) (0.064) (0.061) (0.046)
3th Quintile -0.178** -0.055 -0.017 -0.035 -0.012 -0.005
(0.054) (0.046) (0.057) (0.039) (0.046) (0.045)
2nd Quintile -0.172 -0.149 -0.073 0.012 -0.031 -0.027
(0.103) (0.084) (0.049) (0.025) (0.040) (0.036)
1st Quintile -0.132 -0.080 -0.029 -0.069 -0.055 -0.029
(0.107) (0.092) (0.071) (0.045) (0.038) (0.029)
Beta MKT 0.039 -0.004 -0.037 -0.033** -0.039** -0.068**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.012) (0.015) (0.025)
Ebitda 0.173 0.197* 0.139* 0.204** 0.289*** 0.193
(0.108) (0.094) (0.071) (0.063) (0.053) (0.169)
Tangibility 0.175* 0.177** 0.171** 0.171* 0.171** 0.125
(0.079) (0.062) (0.063) (0.075) (0.064) (0.068)
Size -0.019 -0.016 -0.010 -0.017* -0.013 -0.011**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004)
Networth 0.083 0.055 0.078 0.016 0.093 0.105**
(0.070) (0.069) (0.048) (0.044) (0.058) (0.036)
Q -0.070*** -0.068*** -0.071*** -0.075*** -0.084*** -0.070***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013)
Age -0.024* -0.015 -0.001 0.009 -0.005 0.006
(0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015)
IndSalesVol -0.000 -0.004** -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ProfitVol 0.033 0.036 0.046 -0.080 -0.360** -0.279
(0.137) (0.142) (0.151) (0.163) (0.151) (0.223)
Observations 780 1,355 2,761 2,060 1,920 1,818
R-squared 0.283 0.278 0.253 0.260 0.292 0.259
Ind. fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at industry one-digit level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: LC-to-Cash
Panel A: Negative Beta FX
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Table 1.7 (cont’d): Beta FX ’s Statistical Significance: LC-to-Cash Analysis
p-value             
< 0.05
p-value             
< 0.10
p-value             
< 0.25
0.25 <                 
p-value               
< 0.50
0.50 <                 
p-value               
< 0.75
0.75 <                 
p-value               
< 1.00
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
|Beta FX| * 5th Quintile -0.163*** -0.156*** -0.109*** -0.071*** 0.002 0.110
(0.031) (0.014) (0.005) (0.018) (0.065) (0.113)
|Beta FX| * 4th Quintile -0.079* -0.093*** -0.103*** -0.115** -0.038 -0.038**
(0.037) (0.022) (0.014) (0.037) (0.039) (0.015)
|Beta FX| * 3th Quintile -0.149* -0.129*** -0.095*** -0.048** -0.059** -0.234**
(0.073) (0.026) (0.004) (0.015) (0.024) (0.082)
|Beta FX| * 2nd Quintile -0.041 -0.084* -0.079*** -0.052 -0.131** -0.089
(0.063) (0.040) (0.013) (0.036) (0.043) (0.096)
|Beta FX| * 1st Quintile -0.103 -0.103 -0.066** -0.007 -0.002 0.031
(0.090) (0.064) (0.028) (0.047) (0.026) (0.072)
|Beta FX| * Domestic -0.048 -0.020 -0.037** 0.004 -0.004 -0.028
(0.035) (0.021) (0.013) (0.014) (0.028) (0.040)
5th Quintile 0.027 0.120 -0.043 -0.056 -0.160*** -0.159***
(0.085) (0.072) (0.030) (0.036) (0.033) (0.044)
4th Quintile -0.075 0.078 0.054 0.051 -0.062 -0.079**
(0.098) (0.076) (0.045) (0.045) (0.039) (0.030)
3th Quintile 0.066 0.152 0.053 -0.006 -0.021 -0.022
(0.179) (0.098) (0.041) (0.047) (0.032) (0.036)
2nd Quintile -0.064 0.136 0.071 0.084 0.061 0.008
(0.149) (0.120) (0.054) (0.051) (0.033) (0.027)
1st Quintile 0.047 0.143 0.039 0.007 0.009 -0.059
(0.212) (0.152) (0.070) (0.039) (0.026) (0.043)
Beta MKT 0.003 0.002 -0.005 -0.044** -0.046* -0.070***
(0.017) (0.012) (0.007) (0.016) (0.020) (0.012)
Ebitda 0.186 0.264* 0.151 0.107 0.269** 0.118
(0.136) (0.112) (0.106) (0.065) (0.107) (0.086)
Tangibility 0.068 0.138 0.110 0.160* 0.134 0.147**
(0.108) (0.113) (0.097) (0.073) (0.084) (0.061)
Size -0.028 -0.031** -0.031*** -0.023*** -0.011* -0.013*
(0.019) (0.013) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Networth 0.085 0.074* 0.090*** 0.079** 0.107** 0.109**
(0.064) (0.031) (0.027) (0.029) (0.034) (0.045)
Q -0.082*** -0.084*** -0.079*** -0.069*** -0.074*** -0.072***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
Age -0.011 0.003 0.016* 0.023 0.033** 0.022
(0.018) (0.010) (0.007) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017)
IndSalesVol -0.076 -0.004 0.003** -0.002 -0.005*** 0.003
(0.055) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
ProfitVol -0.634 -0.582 -0.669** -0.190 -0.152 -0.275
(0.421) (0.409) (0.248) (0.147) (0.267) (0.246)
Observations 602 1,048 2,365 2,162 1,907 1,893
R-squared 0.339 0.323 0.328 0.275 0.290 0.288
Ind. fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at industry one-digit level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel B: Positive Beta FX
Dependent variable: LC-to-Cash
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Table 1.8: Beta FX ’s Statistical Significance: LC-to-Assets Analysis
This table reports regressions output from equation (1.3) for subsamples formed
on the sorting of Beta FX ’s p-value. The dependent variable is LC-to-Assets in
place of LC-to-Cash. Beta FX is a proxy for exposure to currency risk. Each
Quintile is a dummy for the qth quintile of firm-years with positive Globalization
and Domestic is a dummy for domestic firms. Panels A and B report the
estimation for the negatively and positively exposed subsample, respectively.
See Appendix D for the definition of variables.
p-value             
< 0.05
p-value             
< 0.10
p-value             
< 0.25
0.25 <                 
p-value               
< 0.50
0.50 <                 
p-value               
< 0.75
0.75 <                 
p-value               
< 1.00
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
|Beta FX| * 5th Quintile -0.097** -0.085** -0.080** -0.138** -0.402** -0.439
(0.034) (0.031) (0.034) (0.047) (0.157) (0.244)
|Beta FX| * 4th Quintile -0.086* -0.053 -0.032 -0.176** -0.325*** -0.475***
(0.038) (0.035) (0.044) (0.063) (0.024) (0.090)
|Beta FX| * 3th Quintile -0.017 -0.035 -0.067* -0.151*** -0.353* 0.007
(0.060) (0.050) (0.035) (0.041) (0.180) (0.138)
|Beta FX| * 2nd Quintile -0.092*** -0.068 -0.060** -0.090* -0.081 -0.126
(0.020) (0.047) (0.018) (0.042) (0.135) (0.255)
|Beta FX| * 1st Quintile -0.011 -0.036 -0.002 -0.224** -0.073 2.655
(0.143) (0.077) (0.059) (0.093) (0.152) (2.415)
|Beta FX| * Domestic -0.063 -0.094 -0.008 -0.090 -0.339* -0.141
(0.180) (0.111) (0.084) (0.058) (0.154) (0.129)
5th Quintile -0.032 -0.130 0.007 0.080 -0.192 -0.068
(0.461) (0.294) (0.171) (0.126) (0.145) (0.125)
4th Quintile 0.016 -0.128 -0.030 0.094 -0.216 -0.132
(0.429) (0.268) (0.150) (0.139) (0.198) (0.086)
3th Quintile -0.225 -0.207 0.023 0.144 -0.185 -0.082
(0.448) (0.272) (0.190) (0.116) (0.121) (0.066)
2nd Quintile -0.051 -0.161 0.011 0.031 -0.318* -0.122
(0.469) (0.273) (0.167) (0.091) (0.165) (0.076)
1st Quintile -0.154 -0.129 -0.098 0.422 -0.211 -0.442
(0.551) (0.357) (0.183) (0.348) (0.267) (0.590)
Beta MKT 0.020 -0.006 -0.027* -0.018 -0.013 -0.035
(0.030) (0.014) (0.013) (0.041) (0.012) (0.034)
Ebitda 0.048 0.313** 0.249 0.536** -0.488 -0.594
(0.201) (0.127) (0.157) (0.201) (0.573) (0.624)
Tangibility 0.070 0.032 0.008 -0.160 -0.169 -0.211
(0.094) (0.095) (0.091) (0.133) (0.184) (0.152)
Size -0.052** -0.055*** -0.051*** -0.068*** -0.074** -0.095**
(0.019) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.024) (0.030)
Networth -0.217 -0.234* -0.197* -0.276** -0.322 -0.380
(0.158) (0.110) (0.092) (0.108) (0.296) (0.280)
Q -0.045*** -0.043** -0.056*** -0.110*** -0.077*** -0.064***
(0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.027) (0.020) (0.008)
Age -0.033 -0.029* -0.027** -0.057 -0.002 0.062
(0.029) (0.015) (0.008) (0.037) (0.052) (0.067)
IndSalesVol -0.026*** -0.017*** -0.001 -0.006** 0.006 -0.003**
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001)
ProfitVol 0.537* 0.591** 0.486 1.091* 0.466 -0.052
(0.242) (0.233) (0.277) (0.570) (0.265) (0.347)
Observations 780 1,355 2,761 2,060 1,920 1,818
R-squared 0.142 0.146 0.106 0.072 0.031 0.053
Ind. fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at industry one-digit level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel A: Negative Beta FX
Dependent variable: LC-to-Assets
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Table 1.8 (cont’d): Beta FX ’s Statistical Significance: LC-to-Assets Analysis
p-value             
< 0.05
p-value             
< 0.10
p-value             
< 0.25
0.25 <                 
p-value               
< 0.50
0.50 <                 
p-value               
< 0.75
0.75 <                 
p-value               
< 1.00
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
|Beta FX| * 5th Quintile -0.084 -0.112*** -0.127*** -0.051 -0.109 0.124
(0.057) (0.032) (0.022) (0.051) (0.083) (0.194)
|Beta FX| * 4th Quintile -0.032 -0.030 -0.080*** -0.162*** -0.169** -0.108
(0.030) (0.026) (0.019) (0.033) (0.069) (0.060)
|Beta FX| * 3th Quintile -0.099 -0.053* -0.034* -0.030 -0.140* -0.260***
(0.065) (0.026) (0.016) (0.033) (0.072) (0.038)
|Beta FX| * 2nd Quintile 0.104 0.042 0.006 0.054 -0.207*** -0.083
(0.093) (0.058) (0.041) (0.104) (0.046) (0.092)
|Beta FX| * 1st Quintile 0.068 0.056 0.041 0.024 -0.105 0.990
(0.097) (0.077) (0.063) (0.082) (0.116) (0.983)
|Beta FX| * Domestic -0.004 0.053 0.018 0.080* 0.184 0.009
(0.078) (0.037) (0.011) (0.040) (0.171) (0.095)
5th Quintile -0.108 0.138 0.094** 0.202 0.128 -0.079
(0.230) (0.087) (0.035) (0.118) (0.127) (0.049)
4th Quintile -0.092 0.078 0.095* 0.213*** 0.177* -0.047
(0.110) (0.074) (0.042) (0.048) (0.093) (0.064)
3th Quintile 0.059 0.138 0.050 0.082 0.128 0.004
(0.133) (0.074) (0.058) (0.046) (0.085) (0.051)
2nd Quintile -0.228 0.027 0.015 0.087 0.211** -0.026
(0.308) (0.148) (0.093) (0.097) (0.091) (0.032)
1st Quintile -0.199 -0.009 -0.039 0.054 0.258 -0.070
(0.117) (0.130) (0.096) (0.072) (0.141) (0.068)
Beta MKT 0.074 0.084*** 0.050*** -0.018 0.014 -0.019
(0.064) (0.021) (0.015) (0.021) (0.045) (0.042)
Ebitda 0.289 0.184 -0.055 -0.111 0.344 -0.005
(0.156) (0.258) (0.268) (0.155) (0.187) (0.139)
Tangibility -0.131 -0.004 -0.018 0.075 0.001 -0.070
(0.203) (0.162) (0.124) (0.100) (0.168) (0.116)
Size -0.038** -0.050*** -0.053*** -0.065*** -0.058*** -0.043**
(0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.011) (0.013)
Networth -0.305*** -0.218*** -0.162*** -0.157*** -0.164 -0.090
(0.063) (0.044) (0.033) (0.037) (0.090) (0.074)
Q -0.067*** -0.050*** -0.041*** -0.048*** -0.058* -0.074**
(0.015) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.025) (0.023)
Age -0.027 0.016 0.005 0.002 -0.007 -0.032
(0.027) (0.024) (0.008) (0.029) (0.031) (0.043)
IndSalesVol -0.094** -0.007 0.005** 0.006 -0.004* 0.021*
(0.036) (0.005) (0.001) (0.012) (0.002) (0.010)
ProfitVol -0.162 -0.531* -0.431* -0.064 -0.136 -0.303
(0.334) (0.278) (0.215) (0.134) (0.233) (0.360)
Observations 602 1,048 2,365 2,162 1,907 1,893
R-squared 0.188 0.157 0.118 0.078 0.056 0.052
Ind. fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at industry one-digit level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel A: Positive Beta FX
Dependent variable: LC-to-Assets
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Table 1.9: Beta FX ’s Statistical Significance: Cash-to-Assets Analysis
This table reports regressions output from equation (1.4) for subsamples formed on
the sorting of Beta FX ’s p-value. The dependent variable is Cash-to-Assets. Beta
FX is a proxy for exposure to currency risk. Each Quintile is a dummy for the
qth quintile of firm-years with positive Globalization and Domestic is a dummy for
domestic firms. Panels A and B report the estimation for the negatively and positively
exposed subsample, respectively. See Appendix D for the definition of variables.
p-value             
< 0.05
p-value             
< 0.10
p-value             
< 0.25
0.25 <                 
p-value               
< 0.50
0.50 <                 
p-value               
< 0.75
0.75 <                 
p-value               
< 1.00
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
|Beta FX| * 5th Quintile 0.005 0.004 0.003 -0.005 0.016 -0.001
(0.014) (0.012) (0.007) (0.019) (0.031) (0.045)
|Beta FX| * 4th Quintile 0.020 0.013 0.004 0.014 0.004 0.029
(0.017) (0.010) (0.005) (0.018) (0.018) (0.046)
|Beta FX| * 3th Quintile 0.012 0.005 0.005 0.014* 0.003 -0.073
(0.038) (0.021) (0.012) (0.007) (0.013) (0.043)
|Beta FX| * 2nd Quintile 0.031* 0.032** 0.025** 0.032** -0.008 -0.051
(0.017) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.021) (0.032)
|Beta FX| * 1st Quintile -0.028 -0.018 -0.006 0.003 -0.009 -0.006
(0.068) (0.041) (0.020) (0.010) (0.013) (0.055)
|Beta FX| * Domestic 0.010 0.012 -0.004 -0.003 0.005 -0.037
(0.030) (0.019) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.034)
5th Quintile 0.025 0.031 0.004 -0.001 0.003 0.007
(0.065) (0.045) (0.023) (0.020) (0.030) (0.019)
4th Quintile -0.020 -0.008 -0.023 -0.036 -0.002 -0.028*
(0.059) (0.038) (0.021) (0.024) (0.012) (0.012)
3th Quintile -0.023 -0.007 -0.030* -0.025* -0.010 -0.015
(0.032) (0.021) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010)
2nd Quintile -0.063 -0.053 -0.069*** -0.066*** -0.008 -0.011
(0.062) (0.046) (0.013) (0.019) (0.010) (0.008)
1st Quintile 0.122 0.089 0.011 0.007 0.006 -0.011
(0.132) (0.092) (0.045) (0.012) (0.016) (0.018)
Beta MKT 0.026 0.018* 0.019*** 0.018** 0.024** 0.026***
(0.016) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Cash Flow -0.011 0.006 0.008 0.053* 0.068 0.186***
(0.100) (0.069) (0.060) (0.027) (0.061) (0.044)
Q 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.023***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Size -0.006 -0.002 -0.005* -0.006** -0.013*** -0.011***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Capex -0.446*** -0.471*** -0.435*** -0.448*** -0.535*** -0.525***
(0.045) (0.075) (0.055) (0.106) (0.110) (0.071)
Acquisitions -0.499** -0.586*** -0.514*** -0.507*** -0.544*** -0.581***
(0.175) (0.095) (0.057) (0.127) (0.077) (0.076)
Leverage -0.219*** -0.242*** -0.256*** -0.238*** -0.268*** -0.269***
(0.047) (0.042) (0.032) (0.035) (0.028) (0.030)
IndSalesVol -0.004* -0.003** -0.002* 0.008*** -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
ProfitVol 0.159 0.143*** 0.148*** 0.068** -0.038* -0.023
(0.092) (0.037) (0.032) (0.022) (0.019) (0.038)
Non Cash NWC -0.142** -0.178*** -0.198*** -0.200*** -0.255*** -0.253***
(0.057) (0.046) (0.017) (0.035) (0.032) (0.029)
R&D 0.453*** 0.508*** 0.557*** 0.688*** 0.486*** 0.628***
(0.125) (0.076) (0.061) (0.047) (0.046) (0.064)
Dividends -0.008 -0.014 -0.010 -0.011** -0.020** -0.011**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005)
Debt Issuance 0.346*** 0.367*** 0.312*** 0.269*** 0.298*** 0.277***
(0.077) (0.040) (0.039) (0.062) (0.076) (0.071)
Equity Issuance 0.051 0.086 0.080** 0.038 0.070 0.102**
(0.084) (0.059) (0.030) (0.032) (0.049) (0.044)
Observations 882 1,559 3,299 2,633 2,487 2,417
R-squared 0.548 0.542 0.550 0.586 0.577 0.553
Ind. fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at industry one-digit level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel A: Negative Beta FX
Dependent variable: Cash-to-Assets
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Table 1.9 (cont’d): Beta FX ’s Statistical Significance: Cash-to-Assets Analysis
p-value             
< 0.05
p-value             
< 0.10
p-value             
< 0.25
0.25 <                 
p-value               
< 0.50
0.50 <                 
p-value               
< 0.75
0.75 <                 
p-value               
< 1.00
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
|Beta FX| * 5th Quintile 0.048** 0.022* 0.011* 0.004 0.024 0.031
(0.016) (0.012) (0.006) (0.015) (0.020) (0.033)
|Beta FX| * 4th Quintile 0.012 -0.001 0.002 0.016** -0.017 -0.001
(0.014) (0.020) (0.008) (0.005) (0.019) (0.045)
|Beta FX| * 3th Quintile 0.039 0.030** 0.023*** -0.011* -0.029* 0.019
(0.032) (0.013) (0.006) (0.005) (0.014) (0.026)
|Beta FX| * 2nd Quintile -0.001 -0.015 -0.008 0.000 -0.031* -0.066**
(0.025) (0.018) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.027)
|Beta FX| * 1st Quintile -0.019 -0.006 -0.005 -0.036*** -0.025*** -0.047
(0.033) (0.025) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.067)
|Beta FX| * Domestic 0.013 -0.001 0.005 -0.009 -0.032*** -0.050**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.019)
5th Quintile -0.046 -0.032 0.020 -0.016 -0.011 0.005
(0.060) (0.049) (0.016) (0.030) (0.023) (0.013)
4th Quintile -0.013 -0.013 0.003 -0.036** 0.006 -0.019*
(0.076) (0.081) (0.025) (0.012) (0.019) (0.010)
3th Quintile -0.036 -0.050 -0.026 -0.014 0.009 -0.006
(0.090) (0.060) (0.017) (0.016) (0.011) (0.007)
2nd Quintile 0.021 0.017 0.013 -0.039** -0.000 -0.014
(0.090) (0.061) (0.029) (0.013) (0.018) (0.008)
1st Quintile 0.082 0.027 0.031* 0.021 0.001 -0.001
(0.077) (0.067) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.021)
Beta MKT 0.024*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.027*** 0.024**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009)
Cash Flow 0.091 0.184*** 0.171*** 0.091*** 0.100** 0.068
(0.050) (0.035) (0.021) (0.012) (0.033) (0.053)
Q 0.020*** 0.019** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.027***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Size -0.016* -0.014** -0.011*** -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Capex -0.622** -0.699*** -0.629*** -0.654*** -0.475*** -0.422**
(0.202) (0.203) (0.132) (0.084) (0.115) (0.131)
Acquisitions -0.778*** -0.802*** -0.622*** -0.671*** -0.642*** -0.501***
(0.091) (0.095) (0.052) (0.056) (0.047) (0.062)
Leverage -0.240*** -0.237*** -0.244*** -0.266*** -0.271*** -0.253***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.026) (0.029) (0.038) (0.034)
IndSalesVol 0.008 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.002** -0.000
(0.007) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
ProfitVol -0.100 0.092 0.108* 0.062 0.032 0.004
(0.103) (0.121) (0.056) (0.074) (0.055) (0.065)
Non Cash NWC -0.315*** -0.295*** -0.271*** -0.232*** -0.238*** -0.175***
(0.039) (0.051) (0.025) (0.025) (0.044) (0.018)
R&D 0.509*** 0.567*** 0.569*** 0.598*** 0.530*** 0.651***
(0.051) (0.032) (0.021) (0.059) (0.055) (0.083)
Dividends -0.001 -0.009 -0.011 -0.012 -0.022** -0.015**
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005)
Debt Issuance 0.396*** 0.465*** 0.318*** 0.296*** 0.313*** 0.268***
(0.072) (0.068) (0.033) (0.039) (0.041) (0.022)
Equity Issuance -0.067 -0.055 -0.049 0.055 -0.025 0.001
(0.072) (0.048) (0.053) (0.065) (0.036) (0.046)
Observations 838 1,469 3,326 2,874 2,607 2,486
R-squared 0.572 0.554 0.552 0.563 0.534 0.565
Ind. fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at industry one-digit level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel B: Positive Beta FX
Dependent variable: Cash-to-Assets
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Table 1.10: Currency Exposure and the Cost of Lines of Credit
This table reports regressions output from equation (1.5). The dependent variable for Panel A is
All-In Drawn Spread, while for Panel B it is Undrawn Fee. Columns 1 and 5 report the estimation
for the whole negatively and positively exposed subsample, respectively, formed on the sign of
Beta FX. The other columns present the estimation on samples constructed from the level of Beta
FX ’s p-value. Beta FX is a proxy for exposure to currency risk. Each Quintile is a dummy for
the qth quintile of Globalization and Domestic is a dummy for domestic firms. See Appendix D for
the definition of variables.
All All
Low                
p-value
High                
p-value All All
Low                
p-value
High                
p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
|Beta FX| * 5th Quintile 0.129** 0.213** -0.313** 0.091** 0.266** 0.239
(0.050) (0.070) (0.133) (0.030) (0.099) (0.290)
|Beta FX| * 4th Quintile 0.050*** 0.201** 0.307** 0.031 0.320*** 0.697**
(0.014) (0.074) (0.097) (0.071) (0.078) (0.227)
|Beta FX| * 3th Quintile -0.009 0.224* 0.331 0.046 0.077 0.217
(0.071) (0.099) (0.211) (0.042) (0.051) (0.307)
|Beta FX| * 2nd Quintile 0.100* 0.278* 0.282 0.040 0.046 1.118**
(0.051) (0.122) (0.167) (0.050) (0.109) (0.436)
|Beta FX| * 1st Quintile 0.055 0.099 1.306 0.049 0.076 0.911**
(0.072) (0.080) (0.981) (0.082) (0.109) (0.325)
|Beta FX| * Domestic 0.002 0.096 0.672** 0.007 0.117 0.192
(0.055) (0.097) (0.204) (0.036) (0.078) (0.260)
5th Quintile -0.201** -0.300** 0.236 -0.169* -0.237 -0.187**
(0.068) (0.121) (0.170) (0.078) (0.261) (0.072)
4th Quintile -0.171* -0.342 -0.036 -0.058 -0.296* -0.124
(0.082) (0.268) (0.104) (0.074) (0.153) (0.073)
3th Quintile -0.084 -0.387 0.102 -0.112 0.109 -0.144
(0.113) (0.312) (0.130) (0.070) (0.117) (0.089)
2nd Quintile -0.159** -0.353 0.047 -0.096 0.140 -0.292**
(0.064) (0.254) (0.096) (0.070) (0.172) (0.121)
1st Quintile -0.094 -0.138 -0.258 0.006 0.259 -0.325*
(0.171) (0.276) (0.148) (0.095) (0.262) (0.158)
Beta MKT 0.149*** 0.152*** 0.047 0.071** 0.060* 0.044* 0.008 -0.024
(0.037) (0.039) (0.066) (0.030) (0.023) (0.036) (0.036) (0.022)
LC Initiation -0.161 -0.159 -0.007 -0.428*** -0.325 -0.332 -0.374 -0.294
(0.113) (0.115) (0.187) (0.101) (0.182) (0.188) (0.243) (0.209)
Libor -0.028 -0.029 -0.081 0.081 -0.113*** -0.112*** -0.110* -0.032
(0.020) (0.022) (0.053) (0.059) (0.023) (0.022) (0.055) (0.041)
Ebitda -2.339*** -2.356*** -2.162** -2.609*** -2.357*** -2.351*** -1.454* -2.142***
(0.332) (0.336) (0.813) (0.409) (0.161) (0.162) (0.736) (0.492)
Tangibility 0.153 0.110 0.031 0.143 0.264* 0.235** 0.419*** 0.210*
(0.099) (0.099) (0.153) (0.097) (0.116) (0.097) (0.114) (0.110)
Size -0.267*** -0.257*** -0.236*** -0.273*** -0.276*** -0.270*** -0.240*** -0.309***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.028) (0.007) (0.015) (0.014) (0.019) (0.029)
Networth -1.269*** -1.259*** -1.144*** -1.403*** -1.309*** -1.308*** -1.356*** -1.474***
(0.106) (0.111) (0.119) (0.181) (0.111) (0.103) (0.213) (0.158)
Q -0.223*** -0.217*** -0.238*** -0.183*** -0.187*** -0.186*** -0.236*** -0.194***
(0.026) (0.023) (0.045) (0.043) (0.014) (0.015) (0.046) (0.035)
Age -0.191*** -0.180*** -0.171** -0.123** -0.201*** -0.196*** -0.177*** -0.127**
(0.040) (0.040) (0.056) (0.051) (0.028) (0.030) (0.048) (0.046)
IndSalesVol 0.018*** 0.018** 0.018** 0.021* 0.004 0.003 -0.038 0.067***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.030) (0.005)
ProfitVol 1.128 1.065 0.267 2.016*** 0.735* 0.710* 1.020 0.689
(0.688) (0.677) (0.530) (0.486) (0.383) (0.375) (1.150) (0.463)
Observations 3,420 3,420 1,174 969 3,224 3,224 879 1,004
R-squared 0.517 0.520 0.506 0.564 0.577 0.579 0.592 0.602
Ind. fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at industry one-digit level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Negative Beta FX Positive Beta FX
Panel A: Dependent variable: All-In-Drawn Spread
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Table 1.10 (cont’d): Currency Exposure and the Cost of Lines of Credit
All All
Low                
p-value
High                
p-value All All
Low                
p-value
High                
p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
|Beta FX| * 5th Quintile 0.012 0.043** -0.128*** 0.007 0.002 0.019
(0.010) (0.018) (0.032) (0.014) (0.024) (0.071)
|Beta FX| * 4th Quintile 0.011 0.036** 0.021 -0.009 0.014 0.080
(0.012) (0.013) (0.061) (0.011) (0.025) (0.061)
|Beta FX| * 3th Quintile 0.011 0.037* 0.149 0.007 -0.012 -0.008
(0.014) (0.019) (0.085) (0.013) (0.021) (0.118)
|Beta FX| * 2nd Quintile 0.023*** 0.046* 0.092*** 0.015** 0.011 0.174***
(0.006) (0.023) (0.026) (0.006) (0.023) (0.049)
|Beta FX| * 1st Quintile -0.026* -0.047 -0.138 0.036 0.063 0.171
(0.011) (0.039) (0.087) (0.027) (0.049) (0.108)
|Beta FX| * Domestic -0.006 -0.003 0.067 0.003 0.007 0.157
(0.014) (0.017) (0.082) (0.012) (0.020) (0.090)
5th Quintile -0.027 -0.097** 0.042 -0.010 -0.003 0.036
(0.018) (0.039) (0.039) (0.013) (0.062) (0.035)
4th Quintile -0.037* -0.094** -0.019 0.005 -0.020 0.034
(0.019) (0.035) (0.042) (0.015) (0.046) (0.026)
3th Quintile -0.039** -0.113** -0.024 0.019 0.050 0.049
(0.015) (0.044) (0.037) (0.017) (0.034) (0.035)
2nd Quintile -0.045** -0.103* -0.029 -0.013 0.007 -0.009
(0.018) (0.049) (0.035) (0.015) (0.030) (0.033)
1st Quintile 0.004 0.056 0.011 -0.015 -0.034 -0.004
(0.032) (0.073) (0.059) (0.027) (0.070) (0.045)
Beta MKT 0.029** 0.030** 0.020 0.023 0.023** 0.023** 0.031 0.015*
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.018) (0.008) (0.008) (0.020) (0.008)
LC Initiation 0.027 0.029 0.064 -0.089 -0.035 -0.035 -0.072 -0.047
(0.031) (0.031) (0.054) (0.057) (0.031) (0.032) (0.054) (0.035)
Libor -0.008 -0.007 -0.023** 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.007 -0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014) (0.003) (0.002) (0.018) (0.007)
Ebitda -0.259*** -0.262*** -0.238*** -0.412 -0.239** -0.242** -0.134 -0.289**
(0.065) (0.065) (0.056) (0.232) (0.104) (0.102) (0.154) (0.090)
Tangibility 0.029 0.024 0.060*** -0.020 0.053** 0.055** 0.057 0.061***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.013) (0.048) (0.021) (0.020) (0.040) (0.016)
Size -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.035***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Networth -0.212*** -0.210*** -0.230*** -0.214*** -0.237*** -0.239*** -0.283*** -0.225***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.027) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.060) (0.023)
Q -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.046*** -0.039***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006)
Age -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.034** -0.033* -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.049*** -0.038***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
IndSalesVol 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.021*** 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.008 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001)
ProfitVol 0.120 0.115 -0.074 0.231 0.034 0.030 0.213 0.122
(0.089) (0.085) (0.097) (0.174) (0.081) (0.075) (0.167) (0.206)
Observations 2,998 2,998 1,033 860 2,823 2,823 781 877
R-squared 0.322 0.326 0.372 0.326 0.386 0.391 0.450 0.458
Ind. fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at industry one-digit level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel B: Dependent variable: Undrawn Fee
Negative Beta FX Positive Beta FX
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Table 1.11: Descriptive Statistics for Alternative Betas
This table presents the summary statistics for the alternative betas introduced on section 1.4. For
each beta, I report the mean, standard deviation, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile, and number
of observations (firm-years), for the whole sample, and conditional on its sign.
Alternative Beta Mean St.Dev. p25 Median p75 Firm-years
Beta Equity 0.039 1.596 -0.996 0.050 1.066 30,300
Beta Equity (negative) -1.270 0.959 -1.920 -1.034 -0.463 14,723
Beta Equity (positive) 1.276 0.966 0.475 1.026 1.912 15,577
Beta Cash 0.060 1.803 -0.970 0.050 1.072 30,300
Beta Cash (negative) -1.333 1.174 -1.938 -1.011 -0.444 14,723
Beta Cash (positive) 1.376 1.206 0.470 1.033 1.989 15,577
Beta OneFactor -1.590 1.545 -2.553 -1.441 -0.484 30,300
Beta OneFactor (negative) -1.983 1.334 -2.800 -1.729 -0.936 25,672
Beta OneFactor (positive) 0.592 0.360 0.258 0.596 0.928 4,628
Beta TWM 0.078 0.951 -0.517 0.072 0.672 30,300
Beta TWM (negative) -0.725 0.573 -1.086 -0.578 -0.254 14,065
Beta TWM (positive) 0.773 0.602 0.277 0.618 1.166 16,235
Beta Cash Flow 0.003 0.074 -0.042 0.006 0.048 30,300
Beta Cash Flow (negative) -0.059 0.046 -0.092 -0.047 -0.020 14,034
Beta Cash Flow (positive) 0.056 0.045 0.019 0.045 0.077 16,266
Beta Gap 0.003 0.081 -0.056 0.006 0.054 30,300
Beta Gap (negative) -0.066 0.043 -0.103 -0.058 -0.031 14,431
Beta Gap (positive) 0.065 0.049 0.028 0.052 0.090 15,869
Beta IFS 0.010 0.780 -0.488 -0.003 0.498 10,308
Beta IFS (negative) -0.604 0.475 -0.851 -0.487 -0.228 5,168
Beta IFS (positive) 0.628 0.481 0.243 0.499 0.915 5,140
Beta Tail -1.399 2.122 -2.685 -1.292 0.001 20,198
Beta Tail (negative) -2.276 1.635 -3.234 -1.898 -0.999 15,144
Beta Tail (positive) 1.228 0.881 0.438 1.057 2.004 5,054
Beta Portfolio -0.014 1.546 -0.925 0.019 0.927 30,300
Beta Portfolio (negative) -1.232 1.022 -1.793 -0.950 -0.401 15,008
Beta Portfolio (positive) 1.181 0.911 0.436 0.927 1.797 15,292
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Table 1.12: Alternative Betas Correlations
This table presents the correlations among all currency betas. The baseline currency beta is Beta FX and
the others are alternative betas constructed for robustness and complementary tests. All correlations are
calculated using a common sample for which there is information about Beta FX. See section 1.4 for the
definition of each alternative beta.
Beta        
FX
Beta 
Equity
Beta     
Cash
Beta      
OneFactor
Beta   
TWM
Beta      
Cash Flow
Beta     
Gap
Beta          
IFS
Beta      
Tail
Beta Equity 0.993
Beta Cash 0.971 0.954
Beta One Factor 0.676 0.672 0.656
Beta TWM 0.926 0.919 0.901 0.627
Beta Cash Flow 0.009 0.006 0.015 -0.031 -0.001
Beta Gap -0.043 -0.043 -0.040 0.041 -0.033 0.615
Beta IFS 0.624 0.618 0.611 0.410 0.658 0.008 -0.023
Beta Tail 0.433 0.431 0.423 0.630 0.421 -0.036 0.037 0.292
Beta Portfolio 0.980 0.986 0.943 0.666 0.910 0.005 -0.041 0.614 0.420
65
T
a
b
le
1
.1
3
:
A
lt
er
n
a
ti
ve
B
et
a
s
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
o
f
m
o
d
el
(1
.3
)
u
si
n
g
a
lt
er
n
a
ti
v
e
p
ro
x
ie
s
fo
r
ex
p
o
su
re
to
cu
rr
en
cy
ri
sk
in
p
la
ce
o
f
th
e
b
a
se
li
n
e
B
et
a
F
X
.
A
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
a
re
es
ti
m
a
te
d
se
p
a
ra
te
ly
fo
r
su
b
sa
m
p
le
s
b
a
se
d
o
n
th
e
si
g
n
o
f
th
e
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
in
g
a
lt
er
n
a
ti
v
e
b
et
a
.
E
a
ch
Q
u
in
ti
le
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
fo
r
th
e
qt
h
q
u
in
ti
le
o
f
fi
rm
-y
ea
rs
w
it
h
p
o
si
ti
v
e
G
lo
ba
li
za
ti
o
n
a
n
d
D
o
m
es
ti
c
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
fo
r
d
o
m
es
ti
c
fi
rm
s.
S
ee
se
ct
io
n
1
.4
fo
r
th
e
d
efi
n
it
io
n
o
f
a
lt
er
n
a
ti
v
e
b
et
a
s
a
n
d
A
p
p
en
d
ix
D
fo
r
th
e
d
efi
n
it
io
n
o
f
o
th
er
va
ri
a
b
le
s.
N
eg
at
iv
e
Po
si
tiv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
Po
si
tiv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
Po
si
tiv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
Po
si
tiv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
Po
si
tiv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
Po
si
tiv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
Po
si
tiv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
Po
si
tiv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
Po
si
tiv
e
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
(1
3)
(1
4)
(1
5)
(1
6)
(1
7)
(1
8)
|A
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
B
et
a| 
* 
5t
h 
Q
ui
nt
ile
-0
.0
60
**
*
-0
.0
79
**
*
-0
.1
22
**
*
-0
.1
25
**
*
-0
.0
34
**
*
-0
.4
12
**
*
-0
.1
08
**
*
-0
.1
83
**
*
-0
.3
78
-1
.0
90
**
*
-0
.4
68
**
-0
.6
68
**
*
-0
.0
73
**
-0
.1
05
**
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
24
*
-0
.0
30
*
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
69
)
(0
.0
31
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.5
39
)
(0
.2
89
)
(0
.1
86
)
(0
.0
77
)
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
15
)
|A
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
B
et
a| 
* 
4t
h 
Q
ui
nt
ile
-0
.0
20
-0
.0
75
**
*
-0
.1
02
**
*
-0
.1
28
**
*
-0
.0
36
**
*
-0
.3
18
**
-0
.0
84
**
*
-0
.1
49
**
*
-0
.7
43
-0
.4
96
-0
.3
32
0.
08
5
-0
.0
41
*
-0
.0
84
*
-0
.0
18
*
-0
.0
32
*
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
14
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.1
00
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.5
62
)
(0
.5
44
)
(0
.3
93
)
(0
.1
92
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
25
)
|A
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
B
et
a| 
* 
3t
h 
Q
ui
nt
ile
-0
.0
32
**
-0
.0
49
**
*
-0
.1
04
**
*
-0
.1
17
**
*
-0
.0
22
**
-0
.1
87
**
*
-0
.0
93
**
*
-0
.1
36
**
*
-1
.0
24
**
-0
.4
21
-0
.9
10
**
*
0.
07
6
-0
.0
41
-0
.0
65
-0
.0
08
-0
.0
16
**
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
13
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.3
25
)
(0
.8
15
)
(0
.2
33
)
(0
.2
20
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
13
)
|A
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
B
et
a| 
* 
2n
d 
Q
ui
nt
ile
0.
01
8
-0
.0
33
**
-0
.0
64
**
*
-0
.1
10
**
*
-0
.0
10
**
-0
.2
79
**
*
-0
.0
35
-0
.0
91
**
*
0.
18
4
-0
.1
12
-0
.2
32
0.
15
6
0.
03
4
0.
03
1
-0
.0
12
0.
00
5
0.
02
2*
-0
.0
12
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.4
33
)
(0
.6
27
)
(0
.2
52
)
(0
.2
42
)
(0
.0
33
)
(0
.0
66
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
26
)
|A
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
B
et
a| 
* 
1s
t Q
ui
nt
ile
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
30
-0
.1
14
**
*
-0
.0
91
**
*
-0
.0
11
-0
.2
46
*
-0
.0
63
-0
.0
64
0.
08
7
-0
.1
17
0.
04
1
-0
.1
76
0.
20
1
-0
.0
43
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
26
**
*
0.
00
1
0.
00
3
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.1
29
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.5
14
)
(1
.0
72
)
(0
.2
63
)
(0
.3
49
)
(0
.1
71
)
(0
.0
31
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
27
)
|A
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
B
et
a| 
* 
D
om
es
tic
-0
.0
18
0.
01
1
-0
.1
10
**
*
-0
.0
84
**
*
-0
.0
08
**
*
-0
.1
83
**
*
-0
.1
46
**
*
-0
.0
54
**
*
0.
45
6*
-0
.0
27
-0
.1
85
0.
03
6
0.
00
4
-0
.0
07
-0
.0
01
0.
02
2*
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.1
98
)
(0
.5
38
)
(0
.1
38
)
(0
.1
54
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
12
)
5t
h 
Q
ui
nt
ile
-0
.0
48
0.
00
5
-0
.0
69
-0
.0
66
**
*
-0
.0
71
0.
02
7
-0
.1
63
**
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
39
-0
.0
38
-0
.1
63
**
*
-0
.0
77
**
*
0.
18
9
-0
.0
85
-0
.1
03
*
-0
.1
98
**
*
-0
.0
98
*
-0
.1
07
**
*
(0
.0
47
)
(0
.0
33
)
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.0
56
)
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.0
35
)
(0
.0
35
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.2
59
)
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
47
)
(0
.0
28
)
4t
h 
Q
ui
nt
ile
-0
.0
68
0.
10
8
-0
.0
64
0.
02
3
-0
.0
08
0.
04
9
-0
.1
40
**
0.
04
5
0.
08
1
-0
.0
14
-0
.0
71
*
-0
.0
69
**
0.
24
6
-0
.0
25
-0
.0
42
-0
.0
71
**
-0
.0
76
-0
.0
30
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.0
47
)
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.0
31
)
(0
.1
04
)
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.0
43
)
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.0
35
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.2
72
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.0
30
)
3t
h 
Q
ui
nt
ile
-0
.0
07
0.
07
5
-0
.0
29
0.
02
4
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
63
-0
.0
88
0.
04
5
0.
11
5*
*
0.
00
9
-0
.0
10
-0
.0
31
0.
28
3
-0
.0
54
-0
.0
14
-0
.0
49
*
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
12
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.0
48
)
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.0
62
)
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
55
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.2
75
)
(0
.0
78
)
(0
.0
35
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.0
22
)
2n
d 
Q
ui
nt
ile
-0
.0
74
0.
08
6
-0
.0
75
0.
04
2
0.
00
7
0.
06
5
-0
.1
23
**
0.
04
7
0.
00
9
0.
03
6
-0
.0
28
-0
.0
04
0.
26
8
-0
.0
19
0.
02
5
-0
.0
16
-0
.0
43
0.
04
9
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.0
47
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
84
)
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.0
60
)
(0
.0
35
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.2
52
)
(0
.0
69
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.0
30
)
1s
t Q
ui
nt
ile
-0
.0
61
0.
06
8
0.
00
7
0.
00
1
-0
.0
03
0.
04
2
-0
.1
17
*
-0
.0
10
0.
03
6
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
34
0.
00
7
0.
01
8
-0
.0
10
-0
.0
10
0.
02
5
(0
.0
78
)
(0
.0
66
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.0
31
)
(0
.1
36
)
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.0
80
)
(0
.0
52
)
(0
.0
99
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
43
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
32
)
A
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
B
et
a 
M
K
T
-0
.0
24
0.
00
6
-0
.0
48
**
-0
.0
18
**
*
-0
.0
42
**
-0
.0
15
**
-0
.0
10
-0
.0
06
0.
00
4
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
72
*
-0
.0
46
**
0.
00
3
0.
01
5*
*
-0
.0
25
-0
.0
32
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
33
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.0
27
)
Eb
itd
a
0.
16
6*
0.
17
8
0.
10
4*
0.
09
8
0.
25
4*
**
0.
18
2*
**
0.
16
0*
*
0.
00
7
0.
21
0*
0.
20
4*
0.
28
9*
**
0.
24
7*
**
0.
11
2
0.
30
8*
*
0.
26
6*
**
0.
20
1*
**
0.
27
8*
**
0.
20
4*
*
(0
.0
79
)
(0
.1
09
)
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.0
96
)
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.0
33
)
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.1
13
)
(0
.0
96
)
(0
.1
08
)
(0
.0
77
)
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.0
90
)
(0
.0
97
)
(0
.0
62
)
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
56
)
(0
.0
75
)
Ta
ng
ib
ili
ty
 
0.
18
4*
*
0.
12
7
0.
14
7*
*
0.
08
7
0.
18
4*
*
0.
08
1
0.
15
3*
*
0.
13
1
0.
13
9*
*
0.
26
7*
**
0.
13
7*
*
0.
18
6*
*
0.
17
2*
0.
23
3*
*
0.
18
2*
*
0.
11
0
0.
18
9*
*
0.
14
6
(0
.0
65
)
(0
.1
00
)
(0
.0
61
)
(0
.0
93
)
(0
.0
69
)
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.0
64
)
(0
.0
80
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
74
)
(0
.0
55
)
(0
.0
65
)
(0
.0
79
)
(0
.0
96
)
(0
.0
72
)
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
67
)
(0
.0
86
)
Si
ze
 
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
25
**
*
-0
.0
18
**
-0
.0
38
**
*
-0
.0
17
**
*
-0
.0
09
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
27
**
*
-0
.0
08
-0
.0
17
**
*
-0
.0
13
**
-0
.0
12
**
-0
.0
21
**
-0
.0
35
**
*
-0
.0
16
**
-0
.0
13
*
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
18
**
*
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
05
)
N
et
w
or
th
 
0.
04
5
0.
08
0*
*
0.
08
8*
0.
07
9*
*
0.
09
0*
*
0.
02
9
0.
08
2*
0.
06
4*
0.
04
5
0.
05
2
0.
03
8
0.
03
2
0.
06
4
0.
07
1
0.
09
8*
**
0.
04
2
0.
05
6
0.
06
9*
*
(0
.0
52
)
(0
.0
31
)
(0
.0
45
)
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
51
)
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.0
67
)
(0
.0
31
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
64
)
(0
.0
55
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
45
)
(0
.0
43
)
(0
.0
23
)
Q
 
-0
.0
73
**
*
-0
.0
79
**
*
-0
.0
65
**
*
-0
.0
70
**
*
-0
.0
77
**
*
-0
.0
83
**
*
-0
.0
63
**
*
-0
.0
65
**
*
-0
.0
57
**
*
-0
.0
78
**
*
-0
.0
60
**
*
-0
.0
72
**
*
-0
.0
79
**
*
-0
.0
78
**
*
-0
.0
79
**
*
-0
.0
80
**
*
-0
.0
80
**
*
-0
.0
76
**
*
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
11
)
A
ge
 
0.
00
5
0.
01
6
-0
.0
09
0.
00
7
0.
02
5*
*
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
06
0.
01
2
0.
00
1
0.
01
5
0.
01
4
0.
02
1
0.
01
3
0.
02
3*
*
0.
03
1*
0.
01
0
0.
01
4
0.
03
1*
*
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
11
)
In
dS
al
es
Vo
l 
-0
.0
01
0.
00
2*
*
-0
.0
02
**
0.
00
3*
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
01
0.
00
1
-0
.0
02
**
-0
.0
52
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
01
0.
00
0
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
01
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
86
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
Pr
of
itV
ol
 
-0
.0
26
-0
.8
28
**
*
0.
15
4
-0
.3
95
-0
.2
61
-0
.4
76
**
*
-0
.0
11
-0
.4
58
**
-0
.3
61
**
-0
.2
14
-0
.2
48
-0
.1
88
-0
.6
96
*
-1
.0
46
**
*
-0
.2
28
-0
.2
93
-0
.1
38
-0
.4
83
*
(0
.1
91
)
(0
.2
29
)
(0
.0
99
)
(0
.2
14
)
(0
.2
65
)
(0
.1
20
)
(0
.1
42
)
(0
.1
57
)
(0
.1
10
)
(0
.1
34
)
(0
.1
80
)
(0
.1
31
)
(0
.3
55
)
(0
.1
81
)
(0
.2
62
)
(0
.2
40
)
(0
.2
02
)
(0
.2
38
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
2,
82
3
2,
43
1
2,
82
1
2,
42
5
12
,7
03
1,
00
3
2,
70
3
2,
78
8
3,
09
6
3,
42
4
8,
30
2
9,
04
7
1,
10
0
82
2
8,
73
7
2,
48
6
6,
00
0
5,
55
7
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
23
4
0.
30
4
0.
32
2
0.
38
2
0.
25
3
0.
26
7
0.
25
3
0.
28
5
0.
21
4
0.
26
8
0.
24
6
0.
25
5
0.
33
1
0.
37
3
0.
24
1
0.
25
0
0.
23
1
0.
27
1
In
d.
 fi
xe
d 
ef
fe
ct
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
ar
 fi
xe
d 
ef
fe
ct
 
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
St
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s i
n 
pa
re
nt
he
se
s, 
cl
us
te
re
d 
at
 in
du
st
ry
 o
ne
-d
ig
it 
le
ve
l
**
* 
p<
0.
01
, *
* 
p<
0.
05
, *
 p
<0
.1
Be
ta
 T
ai
l
Be
ta
 C
as
h 
Fl
ow
Be
ta
 P
or
tfo
lio
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 L
C
-to
-C
as
h
Be
ta
 C
as
h
Be
ta
 G
ap
Be
ta
 IF
S
Be
ta
 E
qu
ity
Be
ta
 O
ne
Fa
ct
or
Be
ta
 T
W
M
66
Table 1.14: Time Series Analysis
This table reports the estimation of model (1.6) for six different dependent variables: LC Initiations, Residuals
from LC Initiations, Change in Cash, Residuals from Change in Cash, Average Spread, and Average Maturity.
Each panel presents the outputs for a particular dependent variable. See Appendix D for the definition of
variables.
All All
1st Quintile 
Negative Beta FX
5th Quintile 
Negative Beta FX
1st Quintile 
Positive Beta FX
5th Quintile 
Positive Beta FX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FXvol -0.099 -1.061*** -0.757 -0.002 -3.949*
(0.104) (0.311) (0.535) (0.196) (1.731)
ΔFX 0.348 0.530 3.049* -0.403 1.517
(0.906) (1.048) (1.555) (0.879) (2.924)
VIX -0.107*** -0.105** -0.021 0.002 -0.154* 0.325
(0.025) (0.031) (0.095) (0.106) (0.074) (0.270)
CP Spread -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.012)
Real GDP Growth 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.004 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007)
Time Trend -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Constant 0.080*** 0.084*** 0.109*** 0.109* 0.067** 0.127
(0.016) (0.014) (0.028) (0.053) (0.024) (0.090)
Observations 15 15 15 15 15 15
R-squared 0.619 0.631 0.534 0.660 0.451 0.722
All All
1st Quintile 
Negative Beta FX
5th Quintile 
Negative Beta FX
1st Quintile 
Positive Beta FX
5th Quintile 
Positive Beta FX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FXvol -0.352** -1.007*** -0.285 0.051 -0.813***
(0.146) (0.177) (0.263) (0.303) (0.150)
ΔFX 0.171 0.360 0.185 -0.054 0.624
(0.916) (1.197) (1.237) (1.209) (0.584)
VIX -0.091** -0.075** 0.006 -0.069 -0.228*** 0.027
(0.029) (0.032) (0.069) (0.058) (0.058) (0.050)
CP Spread -0.002 -0.003 0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Real GDP Growth 0.003 0.003 -0.000 0.005 0.004 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Time Trend -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant 0.027* 0.037*** 0.027 0.041 0.069** 0.028
(0.012) (0.010) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.020)
Observations 15 15 15 15 15 15
R-squared 0.498 0.554 0.725 0.573 0.537 0.724
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel A: Dependent Variable: LC Initiations
Sample
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Residuals from LC Initiations
Sample
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Table 1.14 (cont’d): Time Series Analysis
All All
1st Quintile 
Negative Beta FX
5th Quintile 
Negative Beta FX
1st Quintile 
Positive Beta FX
5th Quintile 
Positive Beta FX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FXvol -0.007 5.667*** 0.926 -0.110 3.992
(0.055) (1.414) (0.797) (1.383) (3.310)
ΔFX -0.519 -1.095 -0.824 -1.425 -11.073
(0.321) (2.264) (2.333) (2.837) (6.075)
VIX 0.061** 0.065** 0.084 0.083 -0.057 1.374*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.295) (0.244) (0.278) (0.715)
CP Spread -0.001 -0.001 0.040*** -0.002 -0.002 0.063
(0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.046)
Real GDP Growth -0.001 -0.001* 0.006 0.007* 0.016** 0.008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.014)
Time Trend -0.000 -0.000 -0.006 0.001 0.001 -0.007
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.011)
Constant 0.001 -0.001 -0.331*** -0.071 -0.016 -0.614
(0.009) (0.008) (0.083) (0.096) (0.082) (0.374)
Observations 15 15 14 14 14 14
R-squared 0.616 0.704 0.858 0.329 0.408 0.595
All All
1st Quintile 
Negative Beta FX
5th Quintile 
Negative Beta FX
1st Quintile 
Positive Beta FX
5th Quintile 
Positive Beta FX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FXvol 0.343*** 0.979*** 0.338 0.111 0.629**
(0.099) (0.221) (0.354) (0.215) (0.243)
ΔFX -2.071*** -2.589** -2.643*** -0.410 -1.622
(0.521) (0.848) (0.638) (0.475) (1.415)
VIX 0.096 0.096** 0.110 -0.033 0.129*** 0.115
(0.060) (0.041) (0.060) (0.070) (0.035) (0.105)
CP Spread -0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.009** -0.002 0.013**
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
Real GDP Growth 0.000 -0.000 0.005* -0.000 -0.002** -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Time Trend -0.000 -0.001* -0.003** -0.002* -0.001** -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Constant -0.017 -0.034** -0.059** 0.023 -0.017 -0.067*
(0.023) (0.014) (0.021) (0.024) (0.013) (0.032)
Observations 15 15 15 15 15 15
R-squared 0.326 0.761 0.776 0.793 0.827 0.412
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel C: Dependent Variable: Change in Cash
Sample
Panel D: Dependent Variable: Residuals from Change in Cash
Sample
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Table 1.14 (cont’d): Time Series Analysis
All All
1st Quintile 
Negative Beta FX
5th Quintile 
Negative Beta FX
1st Quintile 
Positive Beta FX
5th Quintile 
Positive Beta FX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FXvol 0.093 9.649** -2.844 -3.639 14.231**
(2.255) (3.732) (4.414) (2.569) (5.271)
ΔFX -3.474 6.209 4.870 6.497 30.646*
(10.450) (20.873) (21.983) (14.142) (16.130)
VIX 7.232*** 7.256*** 4.918** 7.522*** 10.288*** 4.171**
(0.710) (0.752) (1.572) (1.101) (1.195) (1.637)
CP Spread 0.065* 0.069** -0.022 0.092 0.144** -0.101
(0.029) (0.029) (0.098) (0.055) (0.059) (0.060)
Real GDP Growth -0.091*** -0.091*** -0.039 -0.122*** -0.127*** -0.010
(0.018) (0.018) (0.053) (0.035) (0.031) (0.030)
Time Trend 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.010 0.032** 0.066*** 0.022
(0.005) (0.006) (0.018) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017)
Constant 0.261 0.245 0.678 -0.149 -1.004* 0.790
(0.209) (0.211) (0.609) (0.331) (0.451) (0.487)
Observations 15 15 15 15 15 15
R-squared 0.965 0.966 0.724 0.892 0.958 0.870
All All
1st Quintile 
Negative Beta FX
5th Quintile 
Negative Beta FX
1st Quintile 
Positive Beta FX
5th Quintile 
Positive Beta FX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FXvol -22.475 -130.624 -249.393 -28.692 -217.484
(57.034) (71.762) (150.681) (38.779) (146.643)
ΔFX -153.880 -17.099 -76.811 90.943 133.840
(241.460) (309.196) (470.357) (209.419) (463.528)
VIX -65.934*** -63.536*** -37.779 -81.604** -89.382*** -35.311
(9.900) (11.873) (22.882) (24.994) (11.901) (45.998)
CP Spread 0.494 0.628 1.589 -0.033 0.098 1.269
(0.991) (0.943) (1.176) (1.773) (1.188) (1.534)
Real GDP Growth 2.140*** 2.114*** 1.645*** 2.259** 2.123*** 1.398
(0.512) (0.511) (0.453) (0.975) (0.502) (0.850)
Time Trend 1.707*** 1.732*** 1.710*** 2.006*** 1.810*** 1.760**
(0.196) (0.253) (0.310) (0.430) (0.344) (0.597)
Constant 32.384*** 32.359*** 30.594** 45.908*** 39.221*** 32.569**
(4.045) (5.530) (9.364) (10.722) (7.429) (13.495)
Observations 15 15 15 15 15 15
R-squared 0.920 0.926 0.868 0.829 0.926 0.657
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel E: Dependent Variable: Avg. Spread
Sample
Panel F: Avg. Maturity
Sample
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Chapter 2
CASH RETENTIONS FROM DEBT IN FOREIGN
CURRENCY: A HEDGING INSTRUMENT
2.1 Introduction
Multinational companies and exporters are exposed to many risks not directly faced by domestically-
focused firms, such as country risk, international political risk, and foreign currency risk. Being
one of the hardest macroeconomic variable to forecast, exchange rates and their volatility can be
permanent concerns for globalized companies for their significant impact on profitability and their
valuation. If firms exposed to a foreign currency are not able to hedge against fluctuations in ex-
change rate, they might be unable to meet the hurdle necessary to undertake profitable investment
opportunities. This inability in making profitable investments can consequently hamper the firm’s
ability to maximize shareholder value.
Besides guaranteeing liquidity to undertake profitable investment opportunities, hedging against
currency movements can be explained by additional theories. If managers have risk averse utilities
and they have a large amount of their wealth in the firm’s stock, they can benefit from hedging
policies at the company level (Stulz, 1984). The convexity of the tax code also makes hedging
desirable by reducing profit volatility (Smith and Stulz, 1985). And even if shareholders are able
hedge on their own, if managers possess private information on the firm’s expected profits, hedging
can increase value (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995).
In this study, I analyze one of the hedging mechanisms companies exposed to currency risk
(multinationals and exporters) have against currency risk: issuance of debt in foreign currency
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(DFC) and the retention of its proceedings. Most of literature has tackled the role of DFC as a
hedging mechanism by providing evidence on the strong link between a firm’s exposure to foreign
markets and the use of DFC (Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper, 2003; Kedia and Mozumdar, 2003).
However, exposed companies could be issuing DFC to other reasons rather than hedging, such
as to finance capital expenditures abroad or to acquire foreign companies. Therefore, I take one
additional step in asking: if exposed firms indeed make more use of debt in foreign currency for
hedging purposes, then are these proceedings kept as cash, or cash equivalents, as predicted by
even the simplest hedging models?
A Simple Example How could a firm hedge against currency risk through cash retentions of
DFC? The intuition behind this mechanism is straightforward and presented in Figure 2.1. Let’s
consider the example of an American firm that has a steady annual income of EUR 100 from its
exports to the Eurozone.1 If the company does not use any hedging instrument, its U.S. dollar
payoff will float accordingly to the USD/EUR exchange rate, bringing a currency risk to this stream
of income. Now, if this firm issues EUR 100 in debt, converts all the proceedings into U.S. dollar,
and retain these in assets, say, cash, it creates a hedge. Figure 2.1 depicts the firm’s balance
sheet in two periods: before (t = 1) and after (t = 2) a U.S. dollar appreciation against the Euro
takes place: the exchange rate goes from 1.5 to 2.0 USD/EUR. In period t = 1, this firm sells
to the Eurozone and makes EUR 100 in income. It also raises debt in foreign currency (Euro)
that amounts to EUR 100 and immediately exchanges all of its Euro debt into U.S. dollars that
amounts to (100 EUR × 2 = ) USD 200, keeping these dollars as cash holdings. At this exchange
rate of 2 USD/EUR, the assets’ side of the firm’s balance sheet registers USD 200 in cash, whereas
the liabilities side registers EUR 100, but because the firm is American, its balance sheet must be
1Without any loss of generality, I assume income profits are entirely distributed to equity holders
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reported in U.S. dollars, resulting in a foreign currency debt of (EUR 100 × 2.0 = ) USD 200.2
The equity holders’ payoff in (t = 1) is then USD 200.
Now, what happens in t = 2, after the value of the U.S. dollar has gone up with respect to the
Euro? The same debt – liabilities side – raised by the firm in t = 1 is now equivalent to (EUR 100
× 1.5 =) USD 150, and the cash retained – assets side – still amounts to USD 200. As this firm
has the same Euro-denominated value of income in the Eurozone (EUR 100), the new exchange
rate implies that income now translates into less U.S. dollars: r2 = EUR 100 × 1.5 = USD 150.
Even though the firm has a lower income when converting to U.S. dollars, the reduction in liability
makes up the loss due to the exchange rate movement. To see this, notice that the translation
gain inputted in equity is b2 = $200 − $150 = $50, exactly the amount foregone by the effect of
currency movements on income. In the end, the equity holders’ payoff in the second period is
pi2 = $50 + $150 = $200, the same observed for the first period.
3 The conclusion is that converting
foreign currency debt into domestic currency and retaining this amount as cash holdings works as
a hedging instrument for firm’s exposed to exchange rate fluctuations. The illustration depicted a
debt strategy that perfectly hedged the equity value from one period to the other. Firms may still
engage in hedging through DFC even if less than 100% of the income is covered, and even if they
do not re-balance their DFC periodically.
The focus of this study is to evaluate if American multinationals and exporters make use of this
hedging instrument. The retention in U.S. dollars of the proceedings from DFC can indicate if
a firm is making use of this strategy. Therefore, I analyze how much cash firms hold from their
issuances of DFC. Particularly, I compare debt issued in U.S. dollars versus debt issued in foreign
2If the foreign sales of the American company are under the hood of its foreign subsidiary, then changes in the
value of liabilities from exchange rate movements are directly computed as change in equity as well (SFAS 52: All-
current method). If the American firm only sells to foreign markets through exports, then all liabilities are under the
parent company. If this firms also has non-monetary assets or liabilities, then changes in their value due to currency
movements are also inputted in the income statement (SFAS 52: Temporal method).
3The same mechanism would work reversely in the case of a U.S. dollar depreciation, and the same amount would
be accrued to equity holders regardless of exchange rate movements.
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currencies. If companies retain more cash from their issuances of debt in foreign currency, then there
is evidence that this mechanism is in place. Indeed, I find suggestive evidence that multinationals
and exporters with a higher ratio of foreign currency-to-total debt retain significantly more cash
from their issuance of DFC, compared to U.S. dollar denominated debt. This result of higher cash
retention is statistically and economically significant, reaching up to 3.49x the retention rate for
issuances of debt in U.S. dollars.
I also test for characteristics within firms that could potentially explain the intensity in which
this hedging instrument is used. By exploiting firm-level heterogeneity, I test whether firms with
no use of alternative hedging instruments (e.g. lines of credit, derivatives) are more likely to use
cash holdings mechanism as a hedging strategy. I find evidence that an average firm that does
not have credit lines available retains 2.07x more cash from their DFC issuances than an average
firm that uses this instrument. Similarly, the average firm that does not use derivatives retains
19% more cash from its DFC issuance than the average firm that does not use derivatives. Taken
together, these results point to the direction of a substitution between these three distinct hedging
strategies (Elliott, Huffman, and Makar, 2003).
The second currency-level heterogeneity I exploit is the fact that some countries have a floating
exchange rate regime for their currencies whereas others adopt some kind of official management of
the exchange rate. Even though most countries follow a free-floating exchange rate regime, there
are globally-relevant countries that still operate through fixed-exchange rate regimes, e.g. China
and Singapore. The international macroeconomics literature provides abundant evidence that these
exchange rate regimes imply different consequences to currency volatility and financial stability.
To test whether firms perceive these differences in their hedging decisions, I separate currencies
between floating and managed exchange rate regimes. Results show that the proceedings from
debt issued in currencies of floating regimes are retained in cash at a rate 4.94x higher than debt
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issued in currencies of managed regimes. On the other hand, in line with our expectations, I find no
evidence that the retention rate of proceedings from debt issued in managed currencies are different
from U.S. dollar issuances.
Finally, I test if domestic and non-exporter firms also present distinct retention rate in their
debt issuances. The intuition is that multinationals and exporters firms have incentives to hedge
against currency risk – consequently retaining more cash from DFC issuance – whereas firms with
no relevant exposure to foreign markets should not react similarly. Results show that this happens
to be the case: while highly globalized firms retain 3.64x more cash from DFC issuance, domestic or
lowly globalized firms do not present any significant distinction on their retention rate by currency.
All together, the results presented in this study give an additional piece of evidence of hedging
purposes of DFC by evaluating the presence of a necessary step of the hedging strategy: the
retentions of DFC issuances.
Chapter Outline The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides
a brief review of the literature. Section 2.3 offers the empirical design by describing the main
questions and hypotheses to be tested. Section 2.4 describes the data sets used in my empirical
exercise. It also details the sample selection process and the construction of the main variables,
including the proxies for issuance of debt in foreign currency. Section 2.5 presents the empirical
results on the relation of currency exposure and liquidity policy. Section 2.6 provides additional
tests on several alternative specifications to assess the robustness of my results. Finally, Section
2.7 presents concluding remarks.
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2.2 Related Literature
This study is related to several strands of the literature, as I discuss below. First, it contributes
to the literature of corporate hedging. This is a relevant resource used by firms to actively man-
age risks. Most of the literature has focused on well-known hedging instruments such as foreign
currency derivatives and lines of credit Take the case of derivatives. According to the recent lit-
erature on foreign currency derivatives, mostly larger firms have access to this costlier instrument
of hedging. For instance, Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and Disatnik, Duchin, and Schmidt (2014)
focus their study on the S&P 500 firms, Allayannis and Weston (2001) on companies with more
than $500 million in assets, and Allayannis, Lel, and Miller (2012) on international firms with
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). The work of Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011) is a
recent contribution showing that hedging has a first-order effect on firm financing and investment.
The authors simultaneously investigate the impact of hedging on the cost of debt, the likelihood of
capital expenditure restrictions, and investment.
However, whereas Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011) and others (Guay, 1999; Guay and Kothari,
2003) are mostly focused on hedging through derivatives, another branch of the literature docu-
ments another instrument for hedging: the use of DFC. Ge´czy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) estab-
lish the connection between direct exposure to international markets, through foreign sales, and a
higher propensity to issue DFC. Using a disaggregated data at the debt level, Kedia and Mozumdar
(2003) find that foreign sales is the most significant predictor for firms to have DFC. They also
show that there is a higher likelihood of DFC in currencies in which the information asymmetry
between domestic and foreign investors is low. However, they find no evidence that tax arbitrage,
liquidity of underlying debt markets, or even legal regimes influence the decision to issue DFC.
On the other hand, McBrady and Schill (2007) find that firms take advantage of the cross-country
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heterogeneity in domestic interest rates when making decisions about which currency they will
choose to issue their debt.
Although the literature has taken additional steps on understanding other drivers to DFC rather
than hedging, it has not advanced on providing the full picture on the connection between DFC
and hedging. Studies are consistent in documenting the strong relationship between foreign sales
and DFC. However, they establish the connection between DFC and hedging reasons only through
its positive correlation to foreign sales. My study strengthens the literature on the use of DFC for
hedging purposes by documenting that firms make use of a another step of this hedging mechanism:
they keep a high proportion of the proceedings from DFC as cash.
Naturally, my study also contributes to a large and increasing literature on the determinants of
firms’ cash holdings. Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) investigate why U.S. firms’ cash holdings has
gone up in the recent years. They conclude that volatility of cash flow raised for precautionary
reasons, i.e. cash became more desirable to firms in order to avoid the risk of financial distress.
Since at least Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), researchers have been puzzled by
the overwhelming amount of cash retained by firms, especially American ones. There have been
important contributions to finding the determinants of cash holdings, and precautionary holding
of cash for liquidity has been established as an important driver by many studies. As the popular
saying goes, “Cash is King” in the sense that cash’s liquidity is higher than any other type of asset
held by firms (Almeida, Campello, Cunha, and Weisbach, 2014). This result has been shown to
be also applicable to multinational firms exposed to currency risk as measured by exchange rate
volatility of the currencies of countries to which firms sell their products (see Chapter 1). There,
it is shown that high currency risk increases the cost of lines of credit for U.S. firms, strengthening
the use of cash as the main liquidity provider. More importantly, in times of high volatility on
currency markets, reliance on cash increases for highly-exposed firms, but not for less-exposed ones.
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Finally, my study also relates to previous studies that documented a positive relationship between
cash holdings and a firm’s ratio of foreign-to-domestic income. A recent contribution in this sense
is made by Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2016), who relates high R&D expenditures with
higher cash holdings of multinational companies. Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite (2007) study
cash parked at foreign countries for tax avoidance. The issuance of debt issuance hedging channel
presented in my study is an additional contribution broadly related to this literature.
2.3 Empirical Design
The goal of this study is to evaluate if firms retain cash from DFC issuances as a simple method to
hedge against exchange rate movements. Particularly, I focus on a hedging strategy similar to the
example described in Figure 2.1, that is appealing to companies whose assets or sales are directly
affected by exchange rates. In a nutshell, it involves three steps: (i) the issuance of debt in foreign
currency (DFC); (ii) the conversion of the proceedings to U.S. dollars, and (iii) retention of these
dollars as cash, or short-term liquidity investments.
The first step has already been documented by the literature, papers like Kedia and Mozumdar
(2003) show that companies with higher proportion of foreign sales are more likely to issue DFC.
The second and third steps, as far as I am aware, have not been documented yet. Limitations on
the availability of data on the currency of cash instruments at the balance sheet prevents analyzing
whether exposed companies convert their DFC proceedings to U.S. dollar. Therefore, the second
step is left for future research, conditional on the availability of data. To extend the evaluation of
strategic issuances of of DFC, I focus on the third step of this mechanism: the retention of DFC
issuances.
I analyze if issuances of DFC from globalized companies are related to a higher rate of cash
retention compared to U.S. dollar issuances. With the usual data available to researchers (i.e.
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excluding proprietary or confidential data sets), it is not possible to directly observe a firm’s
breakdown of cash holdings from DFC with the desired granularity. Thus, to overcome this data
limitation, I develop a method to proxy for the degree with which a firm is likely to be issuing
DFC and converting this debt to U.S. dollars, retaining them as cash holdings. Under a few mild
assumptions, I am able to test whether firms with a higher stock of DFC are holding more cash
from issuances in foreign currency than they already hold from domestic-currency debt issuance.
I identify globalized companies by their share of foreign sales to total sales. These firms are more
likely to face situations similar to the one presented by Figure 2.1. I then evaluate if the cash
retention for the debt issuance of these globalized firms is higher for debt denominated in foreign
currency, compared to U.S. dollar denominated debt. To give more evidence on the hedging motives
for cash retention, I further evaluate the retention rate between companies that already have other
hedging instruments such as lines of credit and derivatives to companies that don’t report them.
In order to tackle the hedging reasons of cash retentions from another perspective, I also evaluate
whether the retention rate of issuance of debt in currencies from emerging markets are higher than
the retention from debt issue in currencies from developed countries. Similarly, I test if the retention
from currencies under a floating exchange rate regime is higher than the retention from debt of
managed-regime currencies. If the hedging story holds, then one should observe higher retentions
from debt issued in more volatile currencies (floating) and currencies whose derivative markets are
less developed (emerging markets).
Foreign Currency Debt Measurement The empirical strategy employed in this study is
shaped to overcome the limited availability of data on issuance of DFC. Data on debt issuance
from the statement of cash flow is available through Compustat North America Fundamentals,
including the sum of debt issued in U.S. dollars with debt issued in any other currency (measured
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in U.S. dollars - net). One limitation in the data is that it does not discriminate the amount issued
in U.S. dollars or any foreign currency. In order to separate DFC issuance from the issuance of total
debt in U.S. dollars, I make use of the Capital IQ Debt Structure database. It provides information
at the loan-level, including its denominated currency. However, because the source of each debt is
the balance sheet, the information on debt measures the overall level of DFC, not its issuance. In
other words, we observe only the stock of debt, rather than its time-varying flow. Therefore, to
overcome measurement problems associated with time-varying amounts of DFC from Capital IQ,
I employ several methodologies to identify firms with respect to their share of DFC issuance.
The construction of the first measure of DFC issuance is as follows. First, I gather the proportion
of long-term DFC stock over long-term debt outstanding from Capital IQ for each firm-year (DFC-
to-All Debt). Assuming that the DFC proportion reported in the end of year t − 1 is maintained
throughout the entire year t, I calculate the issuance of DFC as DFC-to-All Debt * All Debt
Issuance, where the latter is the U.S. dollar amount of all long-term debt issued in t over total assets
from the statement of cash flow. Given that I consider only long-term debt, the assumption that
a firm will keep its proportion of DFC-to-All Debt throughout the following year is not extremely
strong.
This specific way of calculating DFC issuance described above is what I call “Level Method,”
since it depends on the level of DFC-to-All Debt in time t. I also consider three additional methods.
More specifically, I compute the average, the median and the minimum of DFC-to-All Debt over
all the years of the company in the sample. The assumption behind these methods follows the idea
that companies with a higher average, median, or minimum share of DFC stock must have issued
more DFC as a proportion of its total debt compared to companies with lower average, median,
or minimum share of DFC. Thus, I construct the amount of DFC issuance from the proportion
of DFC stock to total debt (balance sheet) and from all debt issuance (cash flow statement). To
79
summarize, all proxies for DFC issuance are shown in equation (2.1):
DFC Issuancei,t (Levelmethod) = All Debt Issuancei,t ∗ DFCi,t
All Debti,t
DFC Issuancei,t (Averagemethod) = All Debt Issuancei,t ∗Average
{
DFCi,t
All Debti,t
}
i
DFC Issuancei,t (Medianmethod) = All Debt Issuancei,t ∗Median
{
DFCi,t
All Debti,t
}
i
DFC Issuancei,t (Minmethod) = All Debt Issuancei,t ∗Min
{
DFCi,t
All Debti,t
}
i
(2.1)
Thus, for example, a company whose average DFC-to-All Debt ratio over a 12 year period is 10%
issues $100 million in debt in 2010. Under this assumption, 10% of this issuance ($10 million) is
denominated in foreign currency, and $90 million is denominated in U.S. dollars. The same concept
apply to the other two methods. A company that in 12 years (2001-2012) had the lowest share
of DFC over total debt at 20% must have issued, on average, at least 20% of its debt in foreign
currency. In sum, under the three last methods, I use the data of debt issuance from Compustat
Annual as the time-varying part of my sample, and the data from Capital IQ as a time-invariant,
aggregate piece of information used to separate a cross-sectional heterogeneity among companies.
Baseline Regressions In order to estimate if cash retentions from issuance of DFC are higher
than retentions from issuance of debt in U.S. dollar, I regress the following equation. The controls
on model (2.2) are based on Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), a standard reference
in the literature concerned with cash regressions. The baseline regressions are included in the
following family of specifications:
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Cash-to-Assetsi,t = α4 + β DFC Issuancei,t + γ1All Debt Issuancei,t
+ γ2Globalizationi,t + γ3CashF lowi,t + γ4Qi,t + γ5 Sizei,t
+ γ6Capexi,t + γ7Acquisitionsi,t + γ8 IndSalesV oli,t
+ γ9 ProfitV oli,t + γ10 Leveragei,t + γ11Non-CashNWCi,t
+ γ12R&Di,t + γ13Dividendsi,t + γ14Equity Issuancei,t
+ i,t,
(2.2)
where, for each firm i and year t, DFC Issuance is one of the measures of issuance of debt in foreign
currency as described on equation (2.1); All Debt Issuance is the dollar amount of all issuances of
long term debt (including both domestic and foreign currencies) from the statement of cash flow,
divided by total assets; Globalization is the share of foreign sales to total sales; Q is Tobin’s Q;
Size is the firm’s size as measured by the natural logarithm of assets; Capex is capital expenditure
over total assets; Acquisitions is the value of acquisitions divided by total assets; ProfitVol is the
standard deviation of Ebitda over sales at the firm level for the last 5 years; Leverage is the total
book debt over total assets; Non-Cash NWC is short-term assets minus current liabilities minus
cash; R&D is research and development expenditures over total sales; Dividends is a dummy that
takes the value of one if the firm pays dividends at year t ; finally, Equity Issuance is the amount
of firm’s issuance of equity at year t over total assets and  is a normally-distributed i.i.d. error.
Our coefficient of interest is β. It measures the amount of cash retained given an extra monetary
unit of debt issuance denominated in foreign currency. To understand why this coefficient measures
this difference in cash retention, recall that coefficient γ1 measures the propensity to retain cash
from debt issuance of any currency. In a different fashion, β estimates the difference in the marginal
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propensity to retain cash from debt issuance for the four different methods used to measure DFC
issuance (Level, Average, Median, and Minimum).
To identify companies that face hedging needs due to currency movements, I focus the empirical
analysis on companies whose Globalization is at the upper two quintiles. This cut-off translates to
a selection of companies whose share of foreign sales is above 32.9% of their total. Nevertheless,
I also perform robustness tests on less globalized firms that suggest that hedging through cash is
not in place for these firms.
2.4 Data
I combine many data sets to perform my empirical analysis. First, I use Compustat’s Annual North
America Fundamentals data set. Starting with the universe of Compustat firms, I drop financial-
and utilities-sector firms due to their different idiosyncratic characteristics with respect to most
businesses. I drop firms with market value and sales lower than 10 million U.S. dollars, deflated by
CPI at the year 2000. CPI data is taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRED data
base.
In order to add information on foreign sales, I merge my firm fundamentals data with Compustat’s
Geographic Segment. Moreover, in order to add information on lines of credit, I merge the data
with DLC Dealscan. Finally, I add Capital IQ data on debt structure to build the final sample.
It consists of 35,836 firm-years for the years between 2001 and 2012. The coverage of Capital IQ
Debt Structure increases by a factor of ten on year 2001. Therefore, I set this year as starting date.
Also, I end my sample in 2012 because Compustat-Capital IQ matched data is available only up
to this year.
I use Capital IQ data to identify debt instruments broken down by each currency. Figure 2.2
shows the time series of debt in foreign currency for highly globalized, lowly globalized and domestic
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firms. One can see that globalized firms have a much higher share of their total long-term debt
denominated in foreign currency, whereas domestic firms hold virtually all of their total long-term
debt in domestic currency. Moreover, the figure shows that there was an increasing trend on the
share of DFC in the period running up to the Global Financial Crisis, which was reversed in 2008
and keeps falling up to 2012, the end of my sample.
Table 2.1 presents the average amount of long-term debt at the loan level by currency. Capital
IQ Debt Structure has 116,041 entries for long-term debt, from 2001 to 2012, that pertains to this
sample of companies.4 Naturally, most of debt instruments for American companies are in U.S.
dollar. Euro is the currency most used in DFC of American firms, followed by Japanese yen, British
pound and Canadian dollar. Due to the low quantity of reported debt by each foreign currency in
relation to U.S. dollar issuance, I do not analyze the retention rate for each one of them. Rather, I
employ analyses at the consolidated level of all foreign currency, and in a less aggregated instance,
by exchange rate regime and level of economic development.
Table 2.2 presents a comprehensive set of summary statistics for highly globalized companies,
that are the focus of the empirical analysis. In Panel A, I include the variables used as controls
and variables employed to define firms’ intensity in the use of hedging-like instruments. In Panel
B, I describe variables used to characterize a firm’s issuance of debt in foreign currency. One can
notice that most firms have zero issuance of debt in foreign currency, as shown by the percentile
breakdown: all variables display zero DFC issuance up to at least the 75th percentile. To provide
a better illustration of the distribution, I condition the summary statistics of DFC variables to
be positive (i.e. DFC > 0) in Panel C. One can see now that the number of observations vary
along each of the groups. For instance, only 212 observations are comprised in the group of firms
4Long term debt is defined as debt entries with the following classification: Bank Loans, Bonds and Notes,
Mortgage Loans, Mortgage Bonds, Capital Leases, Debentures, Mortgages Notes, Notes Payable, Other Debt, or
Term Loan.
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that issue DFC in currencies that belong to developed economies and that follow a managed
exchange rate regime. Naturally, the case of DFC issuance to currencies of developed economies
and floating regimes represents most of the sample, because important currencies like the Euro fit
in this category.
2.5 Results
I present the baseline results in Table 2.3. One preliminary step taken before tackling directly the
cash retention from DFC issuance is to show that firms in my sample behave broadly in line with
those studied by the literature concerned with cash regressions. This is shown in column 1. One
can see that the signal of the coefficient of All-Debt Issuance is positive and significant at 0.215.
This values translate to a retention rate of 21.5% of the proceedings of any debt issuance into cash
holdings (or 21.5 cents of a monetary unit).
Now, moving to the main objective of this study, I use three dependent variables of cash: (1)
Cash/Assets; (2) Cash/Net Assets; and (3) Delta Cash. The first dependent variable (Cash/Assets)
is the most commonly used in the literature, which is simply the level of cash holdings normalized
by the firm’s total assets. The second measure (Cash/Net Assets) is a refinement of the first one,
but discounts cash from the firm’s total assets, making it a net measure of cash. Finally, the third
measure (Delta Cash) is the time-series operation of first-difference applied to a firm’s level of cash:
Delta Cashi,t = (Cashi,t − Cashi,t−1)/Assetsi,t−1, and measures the change in cash from year t−1
to year t.
Recall that our coefficients of interest are those of DFC Issuance for the different methods of
measurement. These are shown in the first four rows of Table 2.3. Focusing on columns 2 to 13,
we have twelve regressions using all possible combinations of the three dependent variables and the
four methods of measuring DFC issuance. For all of the twelve specifications (columns 2 to 13), the
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coefficient is positive as predicted by the hedging-like mechanism hypothesis. For nine out of twelve
specifications, the coefficient on DFC Issuance is statistically significant. Importantly, because all
dependent variables of cash and all measures of issuance in DFC are normalized by assets, we can
interpret the coefficient of the regression as the retention rate of cash for each monetary unit raised
by debt issuance. For instance, in column 5 one can see that for each monetary unit raised in
DFC, firms retain 47.8 cents more than the debt issuances in U.S. dollar. This translates to a
total retention rate of (47.8 + 19.2 =) 67.0 cents of a dollar for DFC. As the retention rate for
U.S. dollar is 19.2 cents, DFC’s rate is (67.0/19.2 =) 3.49x times higher. For the specifications
in which the effect is statistically significant, the coefficients also show economic significance. The
main takeaway from Table 2.3 is that firms retain more cash from DFC issuance than they do for
US-dollar-denominated debt issuance, which is in line with the described hedging mechanism.
Now I investigate whether the results for the hedging mechanism show up for firms that should
arguably use it more than others. Firms without access to alternative hedging instruments – such
as lines of credit – are more likely, at least in theory, to use cash retentions from DFC as a hedging
instrument against currency risk. This is the case because firms like these have less alternatives
when it comes to shielding themselves against currency risk. To do this, I separate my sample
between firms without lines of credit and firms with at least one line of credit. To evaluate this
mechanism for firms whose currency risk exposure is a plausible concern, I also consider only highly
globalized firms. Results are shown in Table 2.4, where I report only the most standard measure
of cash (Cash/Assets) as dependent variable in order to keep the number of tables to a reasonable
one.5 Columns with odd numbers (1, 3, 5, and 7) show results for firms with no access to lines of
credit, i.e. those firms for which we would expect a positive and significant coefficient of our DFC
Issuance variables. As one can see, all four specifications show the positive coefficient predicted
5Results for the other measures are similar to the ones reported here and are available upon request from the
author.
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by the previous rationale, and three out of four regressions display strong statistical and economic
significance of the cash retention coefficient. The cash retention coefficients for firms with access
to lines of credit shown in even-numbered columns (2, 4, 6, and 8) turn out to be statistically-
insignificant. This fact strengthens the suspicion that the use of the hedging mechanism may be
the reason behind the different behavior in the two groups of firms within the sample.
A deeper interpretation of the results is more straightforward under the Average method. Column
3 shows that firms without credit lines available retain (0.816 + 0.120 = ) 93.6% of their DFC
proceedings in cash. This number contrast with their retention of U.S. dollar denominated debt:
12.0%. These numbers mean that the retention rate for DFC issuances is (93.6/12.0=) 7.8x higher
than U.S. dollar ones. Column 4 shows the same set of results but for companies with credit lines
available to them. The retention rate of these companies’ DFC proceedings is (0.255 + 0.228 =)
48.3%. Therefore, it is estimated that firms without lines of credit retain (93.6/45.3=) 2.07x more
cash from DFC issuances than companies with lines of credit.
As I discussed above, another instrument available to firms when hedging against currency risk
is the use of derivatives. In the same spirit of Table 2.4, I now investigate if firms with no access
to derivatives display higher retention of cash raised by DFC Issuance. In order to do so, I divide
the sample between highly globalized firms with actual derivative hedging activity – making use of
Capital IQ’s Summary data on Amount of Derivative Hedging/Total Debt – and highly globalized
firms with no derivative hedging activity whatsoever. I separate firms in three different ways:
(1) firms with high level of Hedge/Debt (Level); (2) firms with high Average Hedge/Debt ; and
(3) firms with high Min Hedge/Debt. For keeping the number of tables reasonable, I report in
Table 2.5 only results for the Average Method of measuring DFC Issuance.6 The first row reports
the cash retention coefficient that is of our interest. Focusing first on the Average Hedge/Debt
6Again, results are similar for other measures and are available upon request.
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measure, we see that cash retention is significantly greater for firms with zero (column 1) and low
(column 2) exposure to derivative hedging and non-significantly different from zero in the case of
more derivative-exposed firms (column 3).7 This is also true for the case of Average Hedge/Debt
method, albeit in this case only firms with zero derivative-exposure as measured by this metric have
significantly more cash retentions (column 4). Finally, the method of Min Hedge/Debt also delivers
a similar result: firms with at least some exposure to derivatives hedging (Min Hedge/Debt > 0)
do not show a statistically-significant coefficient. Taken together, Tables 2.4 and 2.5 reinforce the
message that the DFC works as a hedging instrument and displays substitutability to some degree
in the sense that only firms without alternative hedging instruments (lines of credit, derivatives)
behave differently in terms of DFC cash retention. These results are consistent with the findings
of Allayannis and Ofek (2001) that show currency hedging instruments are substitutes.
I further exploit currency-level heterogeneity and ask: do firms use the hedging instrument
differently depending on whether the foreign currency is floating vs. managed? Also, does it depend
on whether a currency is from a developed or an emerging country? I investigate both questions
in Table 2.6, where the first four rows represent each the debt issuance in these currency types. I
report results for the Average Method of measuring DFC, but results are qualitatively similar for
other methods. We can see from columns 1 to 4 that the only currencies that are significant in the
regression are the issuance of debt in emerging and floating currencies (column 1) and the issuance
of debt in developed and floating currencies (column 3). This means that firms hold more cash as
a hedging mechanism against currency risk of countries that do not manage their exchange rates,
either developed or emerging. The results are in line with the hedging mechanism depicted in 2.1.
Cash retention should be a valuable instrument only for currencies whose movements provide a risk
for firms. Managed exchange rate regimes provides a lower uncertainty for the future value of the
7The DFC retention rate estimated for firms without derivatives is (0.418 + 0.203 =) 62.1%.
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currency. Therefore, the higher precision in forecasting exchange rates for managed currencies is
what probably explains the lack of statistical significance in all specifications considering managed
currencies (columns 2 and 4). In line with Kedia and Mozumdar (2003), we do not observe distinct
retention rates between issuances of developed versus emerging countries. The latter have financial
markets whose cost of hedging are, generally, higher than the first. From this perspective, cash as
a hedging-like instrument was expected to be more pronounced on emerging markets. However,
there may be other reasons why we don’t observe this distinction. For these countries, interest
rates are already high to account for the country risk involved, so that the costs of holding debt in
emerging currencies may be too high for firms to handle, canceling the benefits of cash as a cheaper
hedging instrument. Last, column 5 shows that debt issued in more than one currency (e.g. a debt
that can be denominated mixing Euros and Japanese yens) display no significant difference in the
cash retention hedging mechanism, suggesting that the mechanism is used only in a single-currency
context.
Finally, I extend this study to investigate if there are other destinations for the DFC proceed-
ings. For example, do firms convert DFC proceedings into assets other than cash? In order to
analyze this, I consider five possible destination of DFC: Inventory, Capex, Acquisitions, Research
& Development, and Non-Cash Net Working Capital. Results are shown in Table 2.7, for which
the first row presents the coefficient of interest. In each column, the dependent variable for the
possible alternative uses of DFC issuance is regressed against controls and the variable of interest
as measured by the Average Method. One can see from column 1 that firms do not react differently
in terms of increasing their inventory from DFC proceedings with respect to their U.S.dollar debt
proceedings. On column 2, evidence points towards the direction that firms react differently by
investing more proceedings in capital goods and equipment from DFC as compared to proceedings
from U.S. dollar debt. the same pattern is found on column 3, suggesting DFC is also used in
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acquisition of other companies. A reasonable explanation would relate theses results to an increase
in capital expenditures on foreign subsidiaries or due to financing imported machinery. Column 4
shows that firms also invest significantly less in R&D from DFC with respect to U.S. dollar debt.
One reasonable explanation for this results is that American firms’ R&D facilities are generally
located within the U.S., and their cost are therefore paid in U.S. dollars. Finally, column 5 shows
that firms do not react differently in terms of Non-Cash Net Working Capital (Current Assets mi-
nus Current Liabilities) with respect to US-dollar debt proceedings. This suggests long-term DFC
is not used distinctively from U.S. dollar issuances to reduce short-term debt. Taken as a whole,
this analysis shows that the proceedings from DFC have other destinations rather than cash, such
as capital expenditures and acquisitions. Although it is less likely that a firm uses one of these
two to hedge against currency movements, the estimated conversion rate for Capex (28.1%) and
for Acquisitions (47.1%) are lower than the one for cash.
2.6 Robustness
So far, I have only presented results for firms with high level of Globalization. The reasoning
behind this was that we wanted to know if firms that actually have an implicit currency risk to be
hedged – recall the intuitive example in Figure 2.1 – would do so in our proposed hedging strategy.
One concern is that our results only hold for some mechanical correlation between the variables
of interest and has nothing to do with the exposure to currency risk. To address this potential
alternative interpretation, I run the same family of regressions under a second identification for
exposure besides Globalization. To do so, I construct Beta FX, that is the correlation of the return
on a firm’s assets and the return on a basket of currencies, net of the market return. Beta FX is
build following the same procedures employed and discussed on Chapter 1.
According to the example on Figure 2.1, the hedging-like mechanism by issuing DFC and retain-
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ing cash in U.S. dollars is effective for companies whose dollar income is negatively correlated with
the exchange rate. Therefore, firms with negative Beta FX are expected to present a higher reten-
tion rate of their DFC issuances compared to firms with positive Beta FX. The results on Table
2.9 show that the retention rate for debt issuances in DFC are higher than U.S. dollar issuances
only for firms whose exposure is highly negative, i.e. their Beta FX is below -1 (column 1). In
line with the hypothesis behind the hedging mechanism, firms with low negative exposure (column
2) and firms with positive exposure (columns 3 and 4) do not present significant different between
their DFC and U.S. dollar issuances.
I also test if retention rates do not differ by currency for firms that are domestic or lowly globalized.
So far, all analyses have focused on highly globalized companies. One expects domestic or lowly-
globalized firms to not be exposed to changes in U.S. dollar income due to currency movements.
The rationale behind this test is the following: if I find the same statistically- and economically-
significant results for domestic firms, then it is an important warning that something is wrong with
our interpretation.
Results for this robustness check is shown in Table 2.8. I separate firms into groups of domestic
(Globalization = 0, i.e. zero share of foreign sales for all years) and low globalization level (lower
three quintiles of Globalization). Columns 1 to 8 show that only one out of eight specifications
display a statistically significant coefficient for DFC Issuance. This one specification (column 6)
has only weak evidence (10% level) that the coefficient of interest is significantly different from
zero.8 The lack of significant results as found in the previous section points toward a significant
role of the DFC cash retention as a hedging mechanism.
8In column 8, DFC Issuance using the Min method is zero for all domestic firms, therefore the coefficient for it
cannot be estimated.
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2.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I analyzed whether American firms make use of a simple, but rather important
hedging instrument: cash retentions from foreign currency debt issuance. I found suggestive ev-
idence that firms with a higher ratio of foreign currency-to-total debt retain significantly more
cash than comparable firms with a lower ratio. These results are statistically and economically
significant, reaching up to more than thrice the average value of cash retention from U.S. dollar
retentions. These results strengthen the evidence of the current literature on the use of DFC as
hedging instrument against currency risk.
I also exploited firms’ characteristics that potentially explain the intensity in which this hedging
instrument is used. I tested if firms with no alternative hedging instruments – such as lines of credit
or derivatives – are more likely to retain cash from foreign currency debt. I found evidence that an
average firm without available credit lines retains 2.07x more cash from their DFC issuance than
an average firm that have lines of credit available. Similarly, the average firm that does not use
derivatives retains 19% more cash from its DFC issuance than the average firm that does not have
derivatives. Taken together, these results point to the direction of a substitution between DFC and
these other two hedging strategies.
I then exploited heterogeneity among currencies. Some countries allow the value of their curren-
cies to float whereas others adopt an official management of the exchange rate of their currency. I
tested whether firms perceive these differences in their hedging decisions. Separating issuances of
debt between currencies of floating and managed exchange rate regimes, I found that firms retain
more cash from the issuance of floating currencies compared to U.S. dollar denominated debt. On
the other hand, I found no evidence of distinct retentions on issuances of debt denominated in
managed currencies. Still on heterogeneous retention rates among currencies, I haven’t found a
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differences on the retention rate between proceedings from debt in currencies of emerging countries
compared to developed countries.
Finally, I tested if domestic firms also present a distinct retention rate in their debt issuances by
currency. The intuition is that highly globalized firms have incentives to hedge against currency risk
– consequently retaining more cash from DFC issuance – whereas firms with no relevant exposure
to foreign markets (i.e. domestics) should not react similarly. Results showed that this happens to
be the case: while highly globalized firms hold around 3.49x more cash from DFC issuance, domestic
or even lowly globalized firms do not present any distinction on their retention rate by currency.
In sum, my study unveils one important step of a simple accessible instrument of exchange rate
hedging available to a wide range of firms. Future research includes the analysis of more detailed
data – possibly proprietary data such as the one maintained by the Bureau for Economic Analysis
– with information on which currency each firm keeps their cash holdings.
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2.8 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: An Example of Cash Retention from Issuance of Debt in Foreign Currency
US DOLLAR
APPRECIATION
Time Period: t = 1                                                                   t = 2
Exchange Rate: 2 USD ($) = 1 EUR (€)                                  1.5 USD ($) = 1 EUR (€)
Income (distributed):   r1 = $200 [ = €100 ]                                     r2 = $ 150 [ = €100 ]
Translation gain: b1 = $0                                  b2 = – ($150 – $200) = $50
Payoff: π1 = $200 + $0 = $200                                  π2 = $150 + $50 = $200
Assets                  Liabilities
$ 200          $ 200 [ = € 100]
Assets                  Liabilities
$ 200          $ 150 [ = € 100 ]
Equity
$50
Equity
$0
This figure illustrates the example of an American firm exposed to the Euro that retains cash in
U.S. dollars from the proceedings of a debt issuance in Euros as a hedging mechanism. The firm
faces an appreciation of the U.S. dollar from t = 1 to t = 2 and it is able to counterweight the
loss in U.S. dollar income with translation gains. The balance sheet in both periods contains cash
holdings on assets and the Euro-denominated debt on liabilities.
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Figure 2.2: Stock of Long-Term Debt in Foreign Currency as share of All Long-Term Debt
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This figure shows the time series of debt in foreign currency (DFC) for domestic, lowly globalized
and highly globalized firms as a proportion of all long-term debt. Highly globalized firms are firms in
the upper two quintiles of Globalization. Lowly globalized firms are ones in the lower three quintiles
of Globalization. Domestic firms are those firms whose Globalization is zero for all years. Highly
globalized firms have a higher proportion of DFC compared to lowly globalized of domestic firms.
Data only comprises long-term debt.
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Table 2.1: Currency of Debt Instruments
This table reports the quantity of long-term loans and their average value by denominated
currency. Exchange rate regime is a variable that consolidate at the floating and managed
levels the myriad of regimes reported by the IMF from 2003 to 2012. Unreported Foreign Cur-
rency are non-U.S. dollar denominated debt whose currency is not reported. Multi-currency
are loans with two or more denominated currencies. Disaggregated report by currency in this
table is restricted to currencies whose number of observations (debt-year) is above 20. All
other foreign currency denominated debt is consolidated at All other. They comprise loans in
currencies from 27 other countries.
Currency
Observations 
(Debt-Year)
Average Value            
(U.S. dollar)
Exchange 
Rate Regime 
Economic 
Development
U.S. Dollar 112,232 280.9 N.A. Developed 
Euro 1,565 222.1 Floating Developed 
Japanese Yen 437 166.8 Floating Developed 
British Pound 335 190.9 Floating Developed 
Unreported Fgn. Currency 324 418.2 N.A. N.A.
Canadian Dollar 267 73.9 Floating Developed 
Chinese Renminbi (Yuan) 110 30.6 Managed Emerging
Multi-Currency 82 220.8 N.A. N.A.
Brazilian Real 80 13.3 Floating Emerging
Swiss Franc* 69 216.9 Floating Developed 
Singapore Dollar 60 11.2 Managed Developed 
Australian Dollar 58 31.7 Floating Developed 
Danish Krone** 48 27.5 Floating Developed 
Thai Baht 39 4.9 Floating Emerging
Norwegian Krone 26 10.3 Floating Developed 
Taiwan Dollar 26 6.2 Floating Emerging
Mexican Peso 23 90.9 Floating Emerging
South Korean Won 22 15.1 Floating Emerging
All other 213 126.8 N.A. N.A. 
Total 116,041 277.8
*Capped to Euro (until 15/Jan/2015), floating towards U.S. dollar. 
*Pegged to Euro, floating towards U.S. dollar.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the variables used in empirical analysis. Panel A includes variables
used as controls and variables employed to define firms’ intensity in the use of hedging-like instruments. Panel B
describes variables used to characterize a firm’s issuance of debt in foreign currency. One can notice that most
firms have zero issuance of debt in foreign currency, as shown by the percentile breakdown: all variables display
zero DFC issuance up to at least the 75th percentile. To provide a better illustration of the distribution, Panel
C conditions the summary statistics of DFC variables to be positive (i.e. DFC > 0). This sample includes only
highly globalized companies, i.e. firms whose Globalization is at the two highest quintiles.
Mean St. Dev. p25 Median p75 Obs
Assets 4,917 28,335 124 545 2,339 9,648                
Sales 3,773 16,492 93 418 1,881 9,648                
Cash 0.238 0.202 0.070 0.179 0.366 9,648                
All Debt Issuance 0.006 0.063 -0.014 0.000 0.003 9,198                
Globalization 0.620 0.202 0.451 0.571 0.759 9,648                
Cash Flow 0.028 0.137 0.012 0.065 0.104 8,664                
Q 1.970 1.229 1.190 1.594 2.304 9,084                
Capex 0.039 0.042 0.015 0.027 0.048 9,634                
Acquisitions 0.021 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.016 9,212                
ProfitVol 0.090 0.227 0.025 0.051 0.105 9,221                
Leverage 0.196 0.216 0.005 0.143 0.300 9,597                
Non Cash NWC 0.054 0.163 -0.033 0.063 0.158 9,550                
R&D 0.107 0.136 0.007 0.051 0.162 9,648                
Dividends 0.282 0.450 0.000 0.000 1.000 9,648                
Inventory 0.114 0.104 0.026 0.095 0.169 9,612                
Equity Issuance 0.015 0.084 -0.008 0.001 0.010 8,655                
Hedging 1.767 2.688 0.256 0.912 2.218 841                   
Line of Credit 0.513 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 9,648                
Mean St. Dev. p25 Median p75 Obs
DFC-to-All Debt 0.054 0.172 0.000 0.000 0.000 7,050                
DFC Issuance (Average method) 0.046 0.120 0.000 0.000 0.016 8,914                
DFC Issuance (Median method) 0.034 0.126 0.000 0.000 0.000 8,914                
DFC Issuance (Min method) 0.005 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 8,914                
DFC Issuance (Emerging and floating) 0.003 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 8,914                
DFC Issuance (Emerging and managed) 0.001 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 8,914                
DFC Issuance Developed and floating) 0.032 0.093 0.000 0.000 0.000 8,914                
DFC Issuance (Developed and managed) 0.002 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 8,914                
Mean St. Dev. p25 Median p75 Obs
DFC-to-All Debt 0.285 0.300 0.048 0.169 0.419 1,334                
DFC Issuance (Average method) 0.143 0.175 0.019 0.072 0.209 2,873                
DFC Issuance (Median method) 0.218 0.249 0.036 0.111 0.320 1,377                
DFC Issuance (Min method) 0.132 0.158 0.009 0.079 0.168 344                   
DFC Issuance (Emerging and floating) 0.077 0.132 0.003 0.021 0.102 321                   
DFC Issuance (Emerging and managed) 0.030 0.050 0.003 0.014 0.041 322                   
DFC Issuance Developed and floating) 0.129 0.150 0.020 0.067 0.200 2,231                
DFC Issuance (Developed and managed) 0.078 0.151 0.011 0.023 0.059 212                   
Panel C: Debt in Foreign Currency variables (only positive values)
Panel B: Debt in Foreign Currency variables
Panel A: Main variables
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Table 2.4: Cash Retention by Availability of Credit Lines
This table reports output results of equation (2.2) using subsamples based on the availability of lines of
credit. DFC Issuance is issuance of debt in foreign currency (DFC) over total assets. It is constructed as the
multiplication of All Debt Issuance and (i) the level, (ii) average, (iii) median, and (iv) minimum of DFC-to-All
Debt. All Debt Issuance is the dollar amount of all issuance of long-term debt from the statement of cash flow
over total assets. Globalization is the share of foreign sales to total sales. The sample includes only highly
globalized companies, i.e. firms whose Globalization is at the two highest quintiles. See text for detailed
description of controls.
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DFC Issuance (Level method) 0.491*** -0.078
(0.185) (0.105)
DFC Issuance (Average method) 0.816*** 0.225
(0.287) (0.237)
DFC Issuance (Median method) 0.723*** 0.294
(0.247) (0.237)
DFC Issuance (Min method) 0.603 1.019
(0.387) (0.710)
DFC-to-All Debt -0.038** -0.004
(0.016) (0.015)
All Debt Issuance 0.135* 0.239*** 0.120* 0.228*** 0.127* 0.230*** 0.151** 0.238***
(0.073) (0.030) (0.072) (0.029) (0.071) (0.027) (0.070) (0.027)
Globalization 0.078** 0.005 0.036 0.004 0.035 0.004 0.034 0.004
(0.035) (0.014) (0.032) (0.015) (0.032) (0.015) (0.032) (0.015)
Cash Flow 0.098* 0.188*** 0.165*** 0.186*** 0.164*** 0.186*** 0.164*** 0.185***
(0.058) (0.045) (0.047) (0.049) (0.047) (0.049) (0.047) (0.049)
Q 0.020*** 0.010** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.012***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Size 0.007 -0.006 -0.012 -0.009 -0.012 -0.009 -0.012 -0.009
(0.017) (0.008) (0.016) (0.008) (0.017) (0.008) (0.017) (0.008)
Capex -0.382*** -0.330*** -0.439*** -0.307*** -0.431*** -0.307*** -0.424*** -0.308***
(0.085) (0.067) (0.079) (0.065) (0.078) (0.065) (0.078) (0.065)
Acquisitions -0.544*** -0.403*** -0.647*** -0.447*** -0.646*** -0.447*** -0.637*** -0.445***
(0.079) (0.036) (0.065) (0.034) (0.066) (0.034) (0.066) (0.034)
ProfitVol 0.097* 0.080 0.062* 0.130* 0.061* 0.130* 0.060* 0.128
(0.051) (0.089) (0.035) (0.079) (0.035) (0.078) (0.035) (0.078)
Leverage -0.015 -0.117*** -0.051 -0.108*** -0.051 -0.108*** -0.051 -0.110***
(0.051) (0.023) (0.046) (0.023) (0.046) (0.023) (0.046) (0.023)
Non Cash NWC -0.189*** -0.264*** -0.158*** -0.270*** -0.158*** -0.270*** -0.158*** -0.272***
(0.050) (0.035) (0.048) (0.037) (0.048) (0.037) (0.048) (0.037)
R&D 0.161 -0.166** 0.243*** -0.079 0.242*** -0.079 0.241*** -0.080
(0.110) (0.071) (0.079) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080)
Dividends 0.032** -0.001 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.007
(0.016) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.016) (0.008)
Equity Issuance 0.109* 0.163*** 0.121** 0.180*** 0.121** 0.180*** 0.125** 0.178***
(0.057) (0.034) (0.052) (0.038) (0.052) (0.038) (0.052) (0.038)
Observations 1,548 2,889 2,361 3,328 2,361 3,328 2,361 3,328
R-squared 0.821 0.839 0.799 0.837 0.800 0.837 0.799 0.837
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at firm level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Line of Credit
Dependent variable: Cash/Assets
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Table 2.5: Cash Retention by Hedging Activity
This table reports output results of equation (2.2) using subsamples based on the use of derivatives for hedging
purposes. DFC Issuance is issuance of debt in foreign currency (DFC) over total assets. It is constructed as
the multiplication of All Debt Issuance and the average of DFC-to-All Debt. All Debt Issuance is the dollar
amount of all issuance of long-term debt from the statement of cash flow over total assets. Globalization is the
share of foreign sales to total sales. The sample includes only highly globalized companies, i.e. firms whose
Globalization is at the two highest quintiles. See text for detailed description of controls.
Zero 0 < Hedge < 1% >1% Zero 0 < Hedge < 1% >1%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DFC Issuance (Average method) 0.418* 0.830** 0.280 0.554** 0.169 0.267 0.218
(0.213) (0.350) (0.210) (0.265) (0.405) (0.203) (0.198)
All Debt Issuance 0.203*** 0.163** 0.240** 0.170*** 0.338*** 0.228*** 0.298***
(0.037) (0.069) (0.106) (0.042) (0.054) (0.066) (0.044)
Globalization 0.033* -0.017 0.132** 0.041** 0.019 -0.032 -0.000
(0.019) (0.039) (0.062) (0.021) (0.032) (0.044) (0.029)
Cash Flow 0.168*** -0.149 0.038 0.164*** 0.156 0.169 0.165**
(0.033) (0.116) (0.176) (0.035) (0.102) (0.116) (0.080)
Q 0.014*** 0.027*** 0.013 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015 0.014***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005)
Size -0.012 0.012 0.015 -0.006 -0.055*** -0.047*** -0.051***
(0.010) (0.032) (0.047) (0.011) (0.019) (0.017) (0.014)
Capex -0.330*** -0.193 -0.893*** -0.320*** -0.403*** -0.431*** -0.425***
(0.052) (0.212) (0.183) (0.058) (0.130) (0.109) (0.093)
Acquisitions -0.549*** -0.154** -0.406*** -0.554*** -0.533*** -0.395*** -0.473***
(0.038) (0.071) (0.126) (0.044) (0.076) (0.078) (0.054)
ProfitVol 0.075** 0.442*** -0.046 0.076** 0.223*** 0.054 0.156*
(0.033) (0.163) (0.226) (0.033) (0.081) (0.153) (0.093)
Leverage -0.104*** -0.183** 0.022 -0.085*** -0.151*** -0.219*** -0.180***
(0.029) (0.082) (0.125) (0.032) (0.039) (0.082) (0.041)
Non Cash NWC -0.210*** -0.198** -0.601*** -0.204*** -0.290*** -0.260*** -0.278***
(0.032) (0.093) (0.140) (0.035) (0.057) (0.086) (0.052)
R&D 0.253*** -0.443 -1.018*** 0.258*** 0.003 -0.300 -0.242
(0.061) (0.587) (0.291) (0.063) (0.223) (0.253) (0.209)
Dividends 0.004 0.020 0.001 -0.001 0.016 0.031** 0.023**
(0.008) (0.017) (0.024) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010)
Equity Issuance 0.147*** 0.106 0.279** 0.134*** 0.246*** 0.264** 0.265***
(0.039) (0.071) (0.122) (0.040) (0.066) (0.104) (0.066)
Observations 5,194 222 258 4,262 836 708 1,544
R-squared 0.838 0.944 0.917 0.831 0.845 0.768 0.804
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at firm level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Min 
Hedge/Debt 
> 0
Dependent variable:  Cash/Assets
Hedge/Debt Average Firm Hedge/Debt
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Table 2.6: Cash Retention by Currency
This table reports output results of equation (2.2) restricting the issuance of debt in foreign currency (DFC)
by exchange rate regime and economic development. DFC Issuance is issuance of DFC over total assets.
It is constructed as the multiplication of All Debt Issuance and the average of DFC-to-All Debt. All Debt
Issuance is the dollar amount of all issuance of long-term debt from the statement of cash flow over total
assets. Globalization is the share of foreign sales to total sales. The sample includes only highly globalized
companies, i.e. firms whose Globalization is at the two highest quintiles. See text for detailed description of
controls.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DFC Issuance (Emerging & Floating) 0.555** 0.493**
(0.282) (0.224)
DFC Issuance (Emerging & Managed) -0.062 -0.447
(1.553) (1.566)
DFC Issuance (Developed & Floating) 0.513* 0.506*
(0.264) (0.264)
DFC Issuance (Developed & Managed) 0.438 0.334
(0.330) (0.385)
DFC Issuance (Multi-currency) -0.174 -0.273
(0.365) (0.290)
All Debt Issuance 0.214*** 0.215*** 0.198*** 0.215*** 0.215*** 0.197***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035)
Cash Flow 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.166*** 0.167*** 0.166***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Q 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Size -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Capex -0.345*** -0.340*** -0.344*** -0.342*** -0.340*** -0.348***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053)
Acquisitions -0.516*** -0.516*** -0.520*** -0.516*** -0.516*** -0.520***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
ProfitVol 0.073** 0.073** 0.074** 0.073** 0.073** 0.075**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Leverage -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.105***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Non Cash NWC -0.212*** -0.212*** -0.211*** -0.212*** -0.212*** -0.211***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
R&D 0.220*** 0.220*** 0.221*** 0.220*** 0.220*** 0.221***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
Dividends 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Equity Issuance 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.143*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.142***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Observations 5,806 5,806 5,806 5,806 5,806 5,806
R-squared 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.838
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at firm level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: Cash/Assets
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Table 2.7: Other Uses of Proceedings from DFC
This table reports output results of equation (2.2) substituting Cash by Inventory, Capex, Acquisitions,
R&D and Non-Cash NWC as dependent variables. DFC Issuance is issuance of DFC over total assets.
It is constructed as the multiplication of All Debt Issuance and the average of DFC-to-All Debt. All Debt
Issuance is the dollar amount of all issuance of long-term debt from the statement of cash flow over total
assets. Globalization is the share of foreign sales to total sales. The sample includes only highly globalized
companies, i.e. firms whose Globalization is at the two highest quintiles. See text for detailed description of
controls.
Dependent variable: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DFC Issuance (Average method) 0.033 0.232*** 0.228** -0.091** -0.121
(0.049) (0.077) (0.111) (0.044) (0.119)
All Debt Issuance -0.029*** 0.059*** 0.243*** -0.011 0.080***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.015) (0.025)
Globalization 0.008 -0.009** 0.001 -0.008 0.002
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.014)
Cash Flow -0.058*** 0.012 0.026*** -0.266*** 0.184***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.022) (0.029)
Q -0.001 0.002*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.005**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Size -0.017*** 0.000 0.008*** 0.006* 0.008
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006)
Capex 0.089*** -0.125*** 0.092** 0.057
(0.025) (0.018) (0.041) (0.052)
Acquisitions 0.009 -0.058*** 0.055*** -0.047*
(0.010) (0.009) (0.016) (0.026)
ProfitVol -0.005 0.022 0.006 -0.017 -0.024
(0.011) (0.022) (0.011) (0.049) (0.033)
Leverage 0.035*** -0.014*** -0.006 -0.041*** -0.144***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.020)
Non Cash NWC 0.168*** 0.008 -0.014* -0.012
(0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013)
R&D -0.073*** 0.041** 0.053*** -0.040
(0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.045)
Dividends 0.000 0.001 0.004 -0.008*** -0.004
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007)
Equity Issuance -0.039*** -0.010 0.041*** -0.019 0.004
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.027)
Observations 5,781 5,799 5,799 5,799 5,799
R-squared 0.925 0.682 0.402 0.919 0.833
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at firm level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
R&D Non Cash NWCInventory Capex Acquisitions
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Table 2.8: Cash Retention by Globalization
This table reports output results of equation (2.2) using subsamples based on the level of Globalization. DFC
Issuance is issuance of debt in foreign currency (DFC) over total assets. It is constructed as the multiplication
of All Debt Issuance and the average of DFC-to-All Debt. All Debt Issuance is the dollar amount of all issuance
of long-term debt from the statement of cash flow over total assets. Globalization is the share of foreign sales
to total sales. The sample includes only highly globalized companies, i.e. firms whose Globalization is at the
two highest quintiles. See text for detailed description of controls.
Low Domestic Low Domestic Low Domestic Low Domestic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DFC Issuance (Level method) -0.148 0.218
(0.185) (0.256)
DFC Issuance (Average method) 0.294 0.107
(0.259) (1.248)
DFC Issuance (Median method) 0.186 1.127*
(0.208) (0.669)
DFC Issuance (Min method) 1.014 -
(0.697)
DFC-to-All Debt 0.012 -0.037
(0.016) (0.032)
All Debt Issuance 0.250*** 0.186*** 0.265*** 0.189*** 0.267*** 0.189*** 0.268*** 0.189***
(0.026) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020)
Globalization -0.055 -0.066* -0.066* -0.066*
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Cash Flow 0.052 0.063*** 0.046* 0.062*** 0.047* 0.061*** 0.047* 0.062***
(0.032) (0.022) (0.027) (0.021) (0.027) (0.021) (0.027) (0.021)
Q 0.007** 0.019*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Size -0.020*** -0.005 -0.020*** -0.003 -0.020*** -0.003 -0.020*** -0.003
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Capex -0.248*** -0.213*** -0.325*** -0.253*** -0.325*** -0.253*** -0.325*** -0.253***
(0.049) (0.031) (0.045) (0.029) (0.045) (0.029) (0.045) (0.029)
Acquisitions -0.440*** -0.313*** -0.509*** -0.370*** -0.508*** -0.370*** -0.507*** -0.370***
(0.035) (0.029) (0.033) (0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.033) (0.030)
ProfitVol -0.000*** -0.001 -0.000*** -0.001 -0.000*** -0.001 -0.000*** -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Leverage -0.153*** -0.125*** -0.192*** -0.143*** -0.192*** -0.143*** -0.192*** -0.143***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Non Cash NWC -0.167*** -0.130*** -0.188*** -0.146*** -0.188*** -0.146*** -0.188*** -0.146***
(0.024) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020)
R&D 0.181*** 0.188 0.174*** 0.164 0.174*** 0.164 0.175*** 0.164
(0.069) (0.141) (0.060) (0.118) (0.060) (0.118) (0.060) (0.118)
Dividends -0.010 0.005 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.007
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Equity Issuance 0.223*** 0.177*** 0.187*** 0.176*** 0.187*** 0.176*** 0.187*** 0.176***
(0.030) (0.022) (0.026) (0.019) (0.026) (0.019) (0.026) (0.019)
Observations 5,831 6,015 7,519 7,649 7,519 7,649 7,519 7,649
R-squared 0.834 0.852 0.832 0.849 0.832 0.849 0.832 0.849
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at firm level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: Cash/Assets
Globalization
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Table 2.9: Cash Retention by Currency Exposure
This table reports output results from equation (2.2) using subsamples based on the exposure of firms’
assets to currency movements (Beta FX ). DFC Issuance is issuance of debt in foreign currency (DFC) over
total assets. It is constructed as the multiplication of All Debt Issuance and the average of DFC-to-All
Debt. All Debt Issuance is the dollar amount of all issuance of long-term debt from the statment of cash
flow. Globalization is the share of of foreign sales to total sales. The sample includes only highly globalized
companies,i.e. firms whose Globalization is at the two highest quintiles.
Beta FX < -1 -1 < Beta FX < 0 0 < Beta FX < 1 Beta FX > 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DFC Issuance (Average method) 0.768** 0.554 0.216 0.395
(0.327) (0.451) (0.215) (0.302)
All Debt Issuance 0.123 0.296*** 0.167*** 0.134*
(0.093) (0.051) (0.048) (0.080)
Globalization 0.040 0.053* 0.032 -0.024
(0.046) (0.028) (0.027) (0.047)
Cash Flow 0.145 0.154** 0.185*** 0.153**
(0.100) (0.070) (0.052) (0.068)
Q 0.012** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Size 0.017 -0.027** -0.029** -0.013
(0.019) (0.013) (0.014) (0.022)
Capex -0.168** -0.427*** -0.417*** -0.338***
(0.082) (0.108) (0.140) (0.094)
Acquisitions -0.426*** -0.510*** -0.473*** -0.766***
(0.095) (0.069) (0.048) (0.093)
ProfitVol 0.116 0.097 0.145* 0.026
(0.125) (0.080) (0.084) (0.040)
Leverage -0.156* -0.208*** -0.044 -0.070
(0.084) (0.037) (0.041) (0.048)
Non Cash NWC -0.107 -0.240*** -0.347*** -0.069
(0.081) (0.046) (0.050) (0.066)
R&D 0.218* 0.126 0.273** 0.185*
(0.129) (0.098) (0.123) (0.104)
Dividends -0.004 0.021* 0.015 -0.009
(0.014) (0.010) (0.013) (0.026)
Equity Issuance 0.247*** 0.190** 0.135*** 0.066
(0.079) (0.082) (0.047) (0.064)
Observations 761 1,862 1,981 1,202
R-squared 0.831 0.837 0.855 0.808
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at firm level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: Cash/Assets
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Appendix A
GLOBALIZATION AND IDENTIFIED FOREIGN
SEGMENT (IFS)
This section presents the methodology employed to construct the variable Globalization and to
define Indentified Foreign Segment (IFS). Compustat Segment Data covers around 70% of firm-years
on the Compustat North America database for the period from 1998 to 2012. For each firm-year
the database reports at least one geographical segment and its financial statements information. I
use the information on each geographical segment to categorize them as domestic or foreign:
Domestic Segment. In order to be considered a domestic segment-year the following conditions
must apply. The segment-year must have positive sale and report the variable gareag1 with a string
“USA” and the variable geotp with a value of “2” (domestic). If the information for the variable
gareag1 is missing and if there is information on the variable smns, a segment-year is also set to
be domestic in the cases where one of the following strings is found in the smns variable: “United
States”, “United States of America”, “North America”, “principally U.S.”, “U.S.”, “USA”, “U.S.
Operations”, “United States and Puerto Rico”, “United States & Territories”, “United States Oper-
ations”, “United States and its Territories”, “United States/Puerto Rico”, “United states”, “North
America-US”, “United States & Puerto Rico”, “United States & Puerto Rico”, “United States and
it Territories”, “United Stated”, “Unites States”, “Domestic Sales”, or “Other Domestic”.
Foreign Segment. A segment-year is defined to be foreign if it presents a positive number at
the variable sale, a value of “3” (foreign) for the variable geotp, and a non-missing string either at
the variable gareag1 or smns. This string must not be any of the ones mentioned at the definition
of domestic segment that refers to the United States of America, and it must indicate a known
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country or region of the world.
Globalization. For every firm-year, Globalization is one minus the share of sale of the domestic
segment over total sales. A firm is defined to be domestic if for all firm-years Globalization is zero.
Identified Foreign Segment (IFS). The geographical information of a foreign segment of firm-
year may come at a continent, region, sub-continent or country level. An IFS is defined as a foreign
segment whose geographical information is linked to a single currency. This means that only foreign
segments reported at the country level are included as IFS. One exception to this rule is the case
of the Eurozone, where all foreign segments reporting a country of this region are agglutinated into
one single IFS. I also include in the Eurozone IFS firm-years that report ”Europe” as their foreign
segment.
Table A.1 shows the frequency of IFS by country for the period from 1998 and 2012. There are
5,746 IFS, and 29,484 IFS-years, Most of the reported foreign segments at the country level are
from developed markets. Table A.2 shows that around 45.2% of the firms in sample have only one
IFS.
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Table A.1: Currency Areas of Identified Foreign Segments
# Currency Area IFS IFS-years
1 Europe* 1,443 7,879
2 Canada 772 4,256
3 United Kingdom 649 3,259
4 Japan 411 2,391
5 Germany 366 1,906
6 China 282 1,427
7 France 193 994
8 Mexico 181 876
9 Australia 175 724
10 South Korea 133 701
11 Taiwan 123 792
12 Italy 115 509
13 Singapore 107 508
14 Netherlands 95 413
15 Brazil 93 406
16 Hong Kong 61 260
17 Spain 61 233
18 Malaysia 57 254
19 Switzerland 50 211
20 Belgium 47 187
21 India 43 145
22 Russia 38 149
23 Sweden 38 150
24 Israel 37 154
25 South Africa 36 100
26 Ireland 33 133
27 Argentina 25 99
28 Norway 25 138
29 Thailand 25 97
30 Philippines 18 81
31 Austria 14 52
Total 5,746 29,484
* Europe, reported as a region is the exception to the country-level rule.
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Table A.2: Quantity of Identified Foreign Segments per Firm
This table presents the sample size sorted by the quantity of IFS per firm. E.g., the third row shows
that 328 firms on sample have each 3 IFS, presenting a total of (3 × 328 =) 984 IFS. The whole
sample consists of 2,604 firms, 5,746 IFS and 29,484 IFS-years.
# IFS per 
Firm
# Firms # IFS # IFS-year
1 1,178 1,178 5,198
2 674 1,348 6,131
3 328 984 4,606
4 143 572 2,775
5 104 520 2,853
6 68 408 2,305
7 39 273 1,473
8 19 152 888
9 16 144 801
10 10 100 531
11 6 66 414
12 4 48 267
13 4 52 275
14 3 42 239
16 4 64 324
17 2 34 191
19 1 19 95
20 1 20 118
Total 2,604 5,746 29,484
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Appendix B
CONSTRUCTION OF BETA IFS
The idea behind Beta IFS is to be a proxy for the exposure to currency risk at each foreign market
to where a firm sells. It provides information about exposure to currency risk that is not captured
by Beta FX and that may be relevant for liquidity policy. The sample used to estimate Beta IFS
only includes firms with at least one IFS.1 This selection makes the amount of firm-years with an
estimated Beta IFS to be lower than my whole sample. To estimate this beta, I regress a slightly
different version of equation (1.1), only adding the IFS dimension to firm and year. As a result,
for each firm i, year t and IFS j, I regress the total monthly equity return (Ri,m) on the percentage
change of the exchange rate of IFS’s currency (∆FX IFSi,j,m) and on market return (MKTm):
Ri,m = λ0,i,t + λ1,i,j,t∆FX IFSi,j,m + λ2,i,j,tMKTm + ωi,j,t,m (B.1)
As I estimate one λ1,j,t per firm-year-IFS, there are firm-years with more than one λ1. For these
cases, I aggregate λ1,j,t at the firm-year level to be able to match the capillarity of the liquidity
management analyses.2 Instead of computing the simple average of all λ1,j,t at one firm-year, they
are aggregated in way that λ1 from an IFS with a higher market share has a higher weight. As
the information about sale is the only item from financial statements to be consistently reported
at the IFS level, I use it as the weight to construct the firm-year level Beta IFS :
1IFS are foreign segments whose currency can be identified at the country level. See Appendix A for a detailed
explanation on the definition of IFS.
2Another possibility to aggregation would be to regress the liquidity variables on all λ1. However, as the currencies
of distinct IFS are highly correlated, these regressions present a high degree of multicolinearity.
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Beta IFSi,t =
∑
j salei,j,tλ1,j,t∑
j salei,j,t
(B.2)
This beta is then employed as an alternative to the baseline Beta FX to evaluate the relation
between exposure to currency risk and liquidity management.3
3See Section 1.4 for the estimation of the relation between this beta and liquidity management.
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Appendix C
ADDITIONAL RESULTS
In this section, I evaluate if the variable Globalization is related to LC-to-Cash within each of
its quintiles. The vast majority of the regressions in this study employed an empirical strategy
that tested the role of Beta FX interacted to each quintile of positive Globalization firm-years. As
the latter is a continuous variable, there is variation within it that is not employed as control on
the empirical analyses. It could be the case that its covariations with the measures of liquidity
management within each quintile are jeopardizing the documented relation between Beta FX and
these measures. In order to test this hypothesis, I regress a slightly different version of model (1.3),
where the continuous Globalization is employed as a control. The regressions are estimated using
samples based on the quintiles of Globalization: currency exposure should be related to liquidity
at the highest levels of Globalization. Given the heterogeneity on Beta FX ’s quality, previously
discussed on section 1.3.4, I further sort the subsamples based on its p-values.
Table C.1 presents the results for these estimations and they suggest that the relation between
Beta FX and LC-to-Cash is robust when controlling for variations in Globalization within each
quintile. The results on Panel A column 5 (negative exposure sample) and on Panel B column 5
(positive exposure sample) shows that the coefficient for Beta FX is highly significant at the fifth
quintile of Globalization for high quality betas. It is also interesting to notice that the estimated
coefficients for Globalization are, in general, not statistically significantly different from zero, sug-
gesting that the use of dummies for its quintiles on the main analyses of this study are able to
capture most of its covariation with LC-to-Cash.
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Table C.1: The Role of Globalization within Each of its Quintiles
1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile 1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
|Beta FX| -0.065 -0.022 -0.055*** -0.037** -0.075** -0.050 0.046 -0.136** -0.054 0.063
(0.054) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.023) (0.131) (0.049) (0.037) (0.047) (0.038)
Globalization 1.902 0.866* -0.252 -0.174 -0.107 1.075 0.402 -0.726** -0.441*** 0.043
(1.348) (0.437) (0.189) (0.160) (0.074) (0.611) (0.281) (0.296) (0.062) (0.104)
Beta MKT -0.045 -0.046 -0.047*** -0.030 -0.023 -0.028 -0.035 -0.095** -0.039*** -0.104*
(0.070) (0.048) (0.009) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.027) (0.034) (0.011) (0.049)
Ebitda 0.015 0.073 0.104 -0.011 0.423** 0.133 0.421* 0.176 0.264 0.451**
(0.151) (0.160) (0.073) (0.119) (0.128) (0.195) (0.201) (0.246) (0.256) (0.148)
Tangibility 0.220** 0.259** 0.163** 0.284*** 0.175** 0.287** 0.267* 0.182 0.264 0.323*
(0.073) (0.079) (0.060) (0.080) (0.052) (0.082) (0.114) (0.113) (0.147) (0.152)
Size -0.016 -0.017 0.008 -0.010 -0.046* -0.036*** -0.005 -0.007 0.000 -0.037**
(0.016) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.023) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.007) (0.012)
Networth 0.165 0.131 0.081 0.053 0.072 0.122 0.132 -0.036 0.157 0.059
(0.119) (0.087) (0.056) (0.041) (0.116) (0.097) (0.150) (0.048) (0.085) (0.061)
Q -0.021 -0.057** -0.087** -0.074*** -0.085*** -0.063*** -0.095*** -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.060***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.032) (0.017) (0.012) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014)
Age 0.004 -0.032 -0.041** 0.039** 0.023 0.013 0.007 -0.021 0.007 0.038
(0.025) (0.023) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.033) (0.010) (0.024) (0.012) (0.031)
IndSalesVol -0.117*** -0.004* -0.001 0.160 -0.006** -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.031*** 0.016
(0.011) (0.002) (0.001) (0.104) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009)
ProfitVol -0.159 -0.091 -0.267 -0.683*** -0.937 -0.552** 0.119 -0.165 -0.533 -1.275***
(0.184) (0.156) (0.219) (0.194) (0.500) (0.191) (0.219) (0.267) (0.396) (0.339)
Observations 248 380 428 539 484 250 369 340 371 347
R-squared 0.296 0.257 0.322 0.360 0.337 0.281 0.345 0.354 0.408 0.389
Ind. fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at industry one-digit level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Low p-value High p-value
Dependent variable: LC-to-Cash
Panel A: Negative Beta FX
Globalization
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Table C.1 (cont’d): The Role of Globalization within Each of its Quintiles
1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile 1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
|Beta FX| -0.035 -0.070 -0.096** -0.110*** -0.127*** -0.023 -0.073 -0.098** 0.000 -0.034
(0.043) (0.044) (0.026) (0.013) (0.005) (0.060) (0.066) (0.028) (0.046) (0.080)
Globalization 2.093 -0.295 -0.105 0.007 -0.173 1.540 0.354 -0.137 0.128 -0.068
(1.374) (0.354) (0.215) (0.161) (0.120) (1.819) (0.195) (0.263) (0.128) (0.065)
Beta MKT -0.037* -0.002 -0.013 -0.019 0.016 -0.070 -0.005 -0.092*** -0.142*** -0.082*
(0.017) (0.030) (0.026) (0.025) (0.022) (0.055) (0.049) (0.020) (0.030) (0.038)
Ebitda -0.117 0.292 0.361 0.432* 0.037 -0.036 0.329* -0.122* 0.365*** 0.161
(0.245) (0.373) (0.267) (0.217) (0.076) (0.201) (0.171) (0.061) (0.095) (0.226)
Tangibility 0.066 0.104 0.229 0.186 0.310 -0.023 0.347*** 0.309* 0.204 0.165
(0.083) (0.124) (0.135) (0.131) (0.215) (0.088) (0.081) (0.132) (0.128) (0.131)
Size -0.027 -0.040 -0.033*** -0.047*** -0.071*** -0.029** -0.002 -0.011 -0.030** -0.043***
(0.015) (0.030) (0.008) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008)
Networth 0.291* 0.115 0.110 0.035 0.101 0.126 0.154** 0.112 0.074 -0.044
(0.136) (0.131) (0.077) (0.110) (0.104) (0.101) (0.052) (0.105) (0.084) (0.043)
Q -0.052* -0.079** -0.083*** -0.067*** -0.022 -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.059** -0.055* -0.026
(0.026) (0.028) (0.020) (0.015) (0.031) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.026) (0.023)
Age 0.105*** 0.021 0.010 0.012 0.062*** 0.061* 0.029** 0.001 0.076*** 0.036
(0.023) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.014) (0.027) (0.010) (0.037) (0.016) (0.043)
IndSalesVol -0.036** 0.000 0.029*** 0.007 -0.007*** 0.201 -0.072*** -0.013 0.011*** 0.063**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.061) (0.002) (0.261) (0.019) (0.036) (0.003) (0.024)
ProfitVol -0.536 -0.769 -0.448** -0.986* -1.615*** -0.501 -0.249 -0.404 -0.098 -1.460*
(0.438) (0.439) (0.163) (0.410) (0.071) (0.388) (0.332) (0.253) (0.231) (0.633)
Observations 253 352 348 356 305 240 381 347 384 338
R-squared 0.387 0.327 0.331 0.345 0.426 0.353 0.341 0.300 0.359 0.319
Ind. fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at industry one-digit level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel B: Positive Beta FX
Dependent variable: LC-to-Cash
Globalization
Low p-value High p-value
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Appendix D
VARIABLES DEFINITION
Variable Construction
Assets (USD Millions) at, deflated by year 2000 CPI
Sales (USD Millions) sale, deflated by year 2000 CPI
Cash che/at
Cash/Net Assets che/(at-che)
Ebitda ebitda/at
Cash Flow (oibdp-xint-txt-dvc)/at
Non Cash NWC (wcap-che)/at
Q ((at-ceq)+( csho*prcc_f))/at
Capex capx/at
IndSalesVol st.dev. of annual 3-digit industry sales (rolling 5 years)
Leverage (dltt + dlc)/at
R&D xrd/sale
Acquisitions aqc/at
Dividends 1 if dvc>0, 0 otherwise
Debt issuance (dltis-dltr)/at
Equity issuance (sstk-prstkc)/at
Tangibility ppent/at
Networth (ceq - che)/at
ProfitVol st.dev. of annual ebitda (rolling 5 years)
Globalization sum of all foreign sales over total sales for each year
Domestic firms whose Globalization is zero for all years in sample
Globalized
firms with at least one positive Globalizaiton at some year on 
sample
Domestic Segment see Appendix A
Foreign Segment see Appendix A
Identified Foreign Segment (IFS) see Appendix A
Source: Compustat North America Fundamentals
Source: Compustat Geographic Segments
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